Corporate Taxation of Heterogeneous Firms by Lichtenberg, Julia
 CORPORATE TAXATION OF  
HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS 
 
 
Inaugural-Dissertation 
zur Erlangung des Grades 
 
 
Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.) 
 
 
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
im Jahr 2009 
vorgelegt von 
 
 
Julia Lichtenberg 
 
 
 
 
Referent: Prof. Dr. Peter Egger 
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Andreas Haufler 
Promotionsabschlussberatung: 10. Februar 2010    
 
21. September 2009 
  
 
 
Nil difficile volenti. 
 Cicero 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
During the last years working on this thesis I have experienced remarkable support, 
both academically and personally, by a large number of people. 
 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Professor Peter Egger 
for his outstanding support and encouragement. He always provided me with very 
insightful comments and ideas as well as excellent guidance. Professor Peter Egger 
was and continues to be a real mentor for me. 
 
I am also deeply grateful to Professor Andreas Haufler who offered his support and 
time to serve as second supervisor on my committee and I thank Professor Monika 
Schnitzer who kindly agreed to complete my thesis committee as third examiner. 
 
I am particularly indebted to Hanne Elisabeth Ehmer, my co-author, for inspiring and 
challenging discussions. Working jointly with her was a great source of motivation 
and inspiration. Furthermore, I would like to thank her for her friendship over all these 
years. 
 
Special thanks and my greatest gratitude go to my dear family and friends who have 
always given me their unconditional and invaluable support, and affected the way I 
am today. Thanks for being there whenever I needed you all! 
Therefore, this is for you. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
 
 
 
PREFACE ...................................................................................................................1 
 
CHAPTER 1 ................................................................................................................7 
1.1 INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................8 
1.2 OPTIMAL PROFIT TAXATION OF HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS WITH PROVISION OF PUBLIC 
INFRASTRUCTURE ........................................................................................................11 
 
1.2.1 SOME GENERAL FEATURES OF THE MODEL SET-UP .................................................11 
1.2.2 THE UTILITY FUNCTION OF A REPRESENTATIVE HOUSEHOLD ....................................13 
1.2.3 THE HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS ...............................................................................14 
1.2.4 ICEBERG TRANSPORT COSTS ................................................................................15 
1.2.5 ANALYSIS WITH HIGH TRANSPORT COSTS AND WITHOUT TAXATION ...........................16 
1.2.6 ANALYSIS WITH HIGH TRANSPORT COSTS, PROFIT TAXATION AND PROVISION OF PUBLIC 
INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DIFFERENTIATED GOODS .............................................................28 
1.2.6.1 The problem of the governments...................................................................29 
1.2.6.2 Integration strategies with profit taxation .......................................................30 
1.2.6.3 The decisions of the governments with combined provision of public 
infrastructure for differentiated goods........................................................................37 
 
CONTENTS 
1.3 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................52 
1.4 APPENDIX............................................................................................................54 
 
CHAPTER 2 ..............................................................................................................81 
2.1 INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................82 
2.2 OPTIMAL PROFIT TAXATION OF HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS WITH LUMP-SUM TRANSFER .84 
 
2.2.1 SOME GENERAL FEATURES OF THE MODEL SET-UP .................................................84 
2.2.2 THE UTILITY FUNCTION OF A REPRESENTATIVE HOUSEHOLD ....................................85 
2.2.3 THE HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS ...............................................................................86 
2.2.4 ICEBERG TRANSPORT COSTS ................................................................................88 
2.2.5 ANALYSIS WITH HIGH TRANSPORT COSTS AND WITHOUT TAXATION ...........................88 
2.2.6 ANALYSIS WITH HIGH TRANSPORT COSTS, PROFIT TAXATION AND LUMP-SUM TRANSFER
................................................................................................................................100 
2.2.6.1 The problem of the governments.................................................................101 
2.2.6.2 Integration strategies with profit taxation .....................................................102 
2.2.6.3 Optimal tax policy ........................................................................................107 
2.2.7 INSIGHT OF HETEROGENEITY............................................................................117 
 
2.3 CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................118 
2.4 APPENDIX..........................................................................................................122 
 
CHAPTER 3 ............................................................................................................143 
3.1 INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................144 
3.2   BEST-RESPONSE TAX RATES ON PROFITS OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS: A NUMERICAL 
APPROACH…………………………………………………………………………………………………..146 
 
3.2.1 THE SET-UP OF THE MODEL ................................................................................146 
3.2.2 DEMAND...........................................................................................................147 
3.2.3 PRODUCTION ....................................................................................................150 
CONTENTS 
3.2.4 WELFARE MAXIMIZATION AND THE OBJECTIVE OF THE GOVERNMENTS ....................158 
3.2.4.1 The objective of the governments ...............................................................158 
3.2.4.2 Strategic alignment......................................................................................159 
3.2.4.3 The decisions of the governments...............................................................161 
3.2.5 SET-UP OF THE NUMERICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................163 
3.2.5.1 Definitions....................................................................................................164 
3.2.5.2 Consistency of market size X ......................................................................165 
3.2.5.3 The mass of firms in equilibrium..................................................................168 
3.2.5.4 Equilibria......................................................................................................169 
3.2.5.5 Results of numerical analysis ......................................................................172 
3.2.5.5.1 Results with identical country sizes ..........................................................172 
3.2.5.5.2 Results with different country sizes ..........................................................177 
3.2.6 OUTLINE...........................................................................................................181 
3.2.6.1 The role of the constellation of exogenously given parameters...................181 
3.2.6.2 The role of endogenous market entry and market size................................183 
3.2.6.3 The role of heterogeneity.............................................................................183 
 
3.3 CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................185 
3.4   APPENDIX…………………………………………………………………………………………….188 
 
REFERENCES........................................................................................................201 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Preface 
 
 
 
 
Overview – Corporate Taxation  
and Integration Strategies of Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
2
Are governments in charge of the world economy? 
 
With ever increasing economic integration and the increasing mobility of firms, the 
authority of single governments over their national economies has declined in the last 
decades (i.e., forces of world markets became more powerful). Due to this diffusion 
of power in the world economy, the international competitiveness of governments has 
become a key concern in policy debates.1  
Because policy makers consider mobile multinational firms (MNEs) the most 
profitable and productive ones, attracting these firms has become a dominant 
concern of governments. Many factors determine corporate production locations, 
such as factor price differences or market sizes. However, high attention is given to 
the impact of corporate tax rates, because these are policy instruments and can be 
influenced by governments directly.2 
Because MNEs extract the gains associated with their presence in the economy, the 
best reply of governments concerning tax environments may be to seek for 
international coordination between governments.3  
Competition is brought to governments due not only to the mobility of firms but also 
to the market and surrounding conditions. In addition, the objectives of the 
governments are essential. Although firms are mobile and, therefore, can distort 
national tax bases, competitive tax setting does not necessarily have to be optimal 
for governments acting as benevolent planners.  
Recent models have developed corporate tax rates consistent with a race-to-the- 
bottom scenario due to this competition.4 These tax rates are inefficiently low and 
negative effects on the tax bases of other countries are ignored by governments 
when selecting lower tax rates to be optimal from their national perspective.   
Several proposals for tax reforms have already been considered (e.g., by the 
German Council of Economic Advisors) because of this international competition.5 A 
review of the development of corporate taxation has revealed that corporate tax 
harmonization has become conventional in the European Union and that the major 
economies in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
                                            
1
 See Strange (1996) for a survey. 
2
 See Devereux and Griffith (2003) or Hines (1999) for a survey. 
3
 As suggested by Hanson (2001). 
4
 See Mintz (1999) or Eichner and Runkel (2006) for a survey on a race-to-the-bottom in corporate tax 
rates. 
5
 See German Council of Economic Advisors (2006). 
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have reduced their tax rates greatly in the past thirty years. Nevertheless, tax 
harmonization but not a race-to-the-bottom scenario involving zero taxation by these 
governments can be considered empirically.6      
 
Facing these challenges for government policies due to the growing presence of 
mobile firms, this work is the author’s contribution to the debate on corporate taxation 
of heterogeneous firms. Hence, not only MNEs are considered in the following 
models but also innovation noted in the literature described by the heterogeneity of 
firm-productivity is incorporated in all three settings. By allowing for heterogeneous 
firms, productivity differences are considered as a reason for high-productivity firms 
to set up foreign plants. Different integration strategies may arise and it is focused on 
the interaction of firm-productivity, trade, and international integration. Furthermore, 
because governments act as benevolent planners and their actions also are driven 
by governmental considerations other than relying on competitive governmental 
structures, a pure competitive governmental view of the world involving zero taxation 
is inconsistent with previously described evidence.7  
 
Chapters 1 and 2 deal with corporate taxation of heterogeneous firms producing 
differentiated goods in a two-country setting with differing exogenously given market 
sizes, wage-level differences between both countries, transport costs, and 
endogenous market entry of firms depending on their productivity in which, these 
firms produce intermediate and final goods. Not only taxation but also the herein 
described factors are determinants in corporate production locations and, therefore, 
determinants in the tax basis in the jurisdiction of each government.   
 
In chapter 1, both governments levy taxes on firms’ profits to provide public 
infrastructure. If combined tax revenue is high enough, public infrastructure can be 
afforded. This results in declining transport costs associated with modified choices of 
the integration strategies of mobile firms. If provision of public infrastructure and its 
impact do not have negative implications on welfare in both jurisdictions, it is 
provided jointly by both governments. For this reason, in this analysis, both 
governments act as social planners. Only if provision of public infrastructure is 
                                            
6
 E.g. compare to OECD (2005). 
7
 Additionally also shown by Chennels and Griffith (1997). 
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welfare optimal for the representative households in both countries is profit taxation 
selected. Furthermore, welfare implications of this analysis are based on the 
distribution of firms over productivity levels, taken into account by both governments 
when levying profit taxes. 
Hence, considering this analysis, coordination may be a best-reply considering the 
development of the world economy if governments use tax revenue to provide public 
infrastructure.  
In contrast, in a scenario with tax competition, only under provision of public 
infrastructure is induced.8 Because this approach does not imply competitive 
governmental objectives, efficient tax rates can be selected by both governments 
when providing public infrastructure with combined tax revenue. Due to differing 
market and surrounding conditions in both countries, the governments select different 
levels of corporate tax rates as optimal in both jurisdictions.  
 
In chapter 2, governments can levy taxes on the profits of firms to provide a lump-
sum transfer to households in their own jurisdictions. However, they only levy them if 
doing so induces national welfare gains.  
In contrast to chapter 1, this does not result in declining transport costs and can 
never induce a welfare gain in the larger country in the model. Hence, the optimal 
corporate tax rate in Country A is zero and this is independent of the corporate tax 
rate in Country B. The government in B can anticipate zero taxation in A, and 
therefore, can select an optimal corporate tax rate and depreciation possibilities 
unilaterally when maximizing national welfare. Therefore, optimality depends on 
market conditions and the distribution of firms over productivity levels; but it is 
independent of tax competition between governments.    
 
Chapter 3 also deals with two governments levying profit taxes. In contrast to 
chapters 1 and 2, in chapter 3, taxes are only levied on profits of MNEs earned in the 
country other than the country of origin of the single MNE (i.e., withholding taxes are 
levied on these profits). The wage-level in both countries is identical in this setting, 
relative country sizes are varied within this analysis, and the mass of firms entering 
both markets depends on selected tax rates. Hence, the mass of firms supplying both 
markets is determined endogenously. Additionally, firms producing differentiated 
                                            
8
 Compare to Davies and Eckel (2007). 
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goods only produce final goods (i.e., integration strategies of these heterogeneous 
firms are not as complex as in chapters 1 and 2 because intermediate goods do not 
exist in this analysis). Hence, only domestic producers, exporting firms, or horizontal 
MNEs exist; and either country can be the location of origin of any single firm. As in 
chapter 2, both governments act as benevolent planners, providing lump-sum 
transfers to households in their own jurisdictions when levying taxes on profits. In 
chapter 3, therefore, best-response tax rates are derived in contrast to chapter 2 in 
which the optimal tax rate of one country is determined by exogenous factors.    
 
In chapter 3, competition brought to the single governments acting as benevolent 
planners when levying withholding taxes on profits of MNEs is emphasized. Hence, 
no other prevailing approach of governmental competition concerning tax bases is 
selected. This analysis rather focuses on a less competitive policy instrument. By 
levying withholding taxes on the profits of MNEs, governments do not compete for 
the same tax base (i.e., only the foreign earned profits of MNEs are taxed by the 
foreign government). Hence, the analysis focuses on the profits that are not taxed in 
their country of origin. This is independent of the selected integration strategy. 
However, because the selected tax rate of the other government influences welfare 
of the representative household in the home country, the government in the home 
country reacts with another withholding tax rate. The reason for this implication on 
welfare in the home country is that the mass of firms entering the market is 
influenced by the other withholding tax rate and vice versa. To observe these 
implications on welfare in both jurisdictions, best-response tax rates from the point of 
view of single governments as well as from a social planner’s perspective are 
derived.  
Analyzing the tax setting of single governments, maximizing welfare in their own 
jurisdictions results in inefficient levels of tax rates due to the governmental 
competition brought to them, although both governments do not directly compete in 
terms of their tax bases when levying withholding taxes. 
In contrast, the analysis from a social planner’s perspective results in international 
coordination and efficient tax rates from a world welfare perspective. Through 
coordination, governments can avoid the prisoner’s dilemma in the tax competition 
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game.9 Therefore, coordination is a best reply for markets that work beneficially and 
efficiently.  
 
The following chapters contain the author’s contribution to the debate on corporate 
taxation and its efficiency between more and less competitive governmental motives 
in an increasingly more economically integrated world.10 The chapters may also be 
read independently. 
                                            
9
 This follows from Nash (1951). 
10
 Note, that Chapter 3 is based on joint work with Hanne Elisabeth Ehmer. 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
Corporate expansion to foreign markets is a phenomenon that has occurred for at 
least two centuries. Early on, economic motives for cross-border activities of 
enterprises were mostly associated with the organization of supply networks to serve 
European markets from abroad. Since then, multinational enterprises (MNEs) have 
gained importance quite dramatically; and the economic motives for corporate 
expansion to foreign markets have become far more complex than in old times. Firms 
now exploit comparative advantages across host countries and plant locations to 
organize production networks across borders. New markets have emerged and 
economies of scale have materialized so that manifold motives for cross-border firm 
organization can be distinguished.  
New trade theory on MNEs11 posits the importance of the jointness of input in firm 
setup and transport cost savings, which are associated with multi-plant production 
within MNEs. Such firms have gained importance quite obviously. For instance, 
between 1990 and 2001, the sales of foreign affiliates of MNEs grew a lot faster than 
goods exports. In 2001, foreign affiliates of MNEs earned 11% of world gross 
domestic product (GDP) and contributed 35% to world trade of goods.12 
As mentioned before, the motives of MNEs for foreign direct investments (FDI) and 
their modes of organization are quite diverse.13 Low-cost seeking versus market-
seeking motives are important, but they rarely generate purely vertical or purely 
horizontal MNE integration strategies empirically.14 Recent theoretical work 
acknowledges complex integration strategies that combine vertical integration 
strategies, such as those associated with intermediate goods production, and the 
vertical slicing of production chains across international borders15 with horizontal 
ones, such as export platform set-up.16 
Furthermore, a recent innovation in the literature is the incorporation of 
heterogeneous firms into the models of MNE activities. Due to international trade and 
                                            
11
 Surveys of the literature include Markusen (2002) and Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004). 
12
 As in UNCTAD (2002). 
13
 Evidence also is found in UNCTAD (1998).  
14
 Literature about vertical integration strategies includes Helpman (1984, 1985). Literature about 
horizontal integration strategies includes Markusen (1984) and Markusen and Venables (1998). 
Empirical evidence that integration strategies are more complex include Hanson, Mataloni, and 
Slaughter (2005) and Feinberg and Keane (2006).    
15
 As in Yeaple (2003) and Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
16
 As shown by Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2007). 
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FDI, in recent work, firms of heterogeneous productivity have been introduced in 
models of imperfect competition.17 In previous models, firms were assumed to be 
identical. Allowing for heterogeneous firms gives rise to productivity differences as a 
reason for (ex-post) sorting of high-productivity firms into setting up foreign plants. 
Heterogeneous firms also allow for different integration strategies to be considered to 
determine production locations, whereas identical firms have the same preferences 
concerning their production locations. 
Some models of taxation with imperfect competition surely already exist. However, in 
most of them taxation of identical firms is analyzed.18 Recently, theoretical work 
concerning taxation with heterogeneous firms has surfaced, in which researchers 
claim inefficiently low tax rates, resulting in under provision of public goods because 
of tax competition.19 
A single government is only interested in maximizing its own national welfare. It does 
not consider that its lower tax rate, which attracts more productive firms, lowers tax 
revenues of countries with higher tax rates. For this reason, also other governments 
react with lower tax rates. Consequently, inefficiently low tax rates from a world 
welfare perspective emerge.20 This tax setting behavior with tax competition actually 
can be seen as a race-to-the-bottom scenario due to the profit-shifting activities of 
MNEs.21  
Therefore, not only has the economic importance of MNEs risen in the last decades, 
but this development also influences governments’ decisions about corporate 
taxation. Surely, other factors are also important to firms concerning the location of 
corporate investments (e.g., wage differences between countries), which suggests 
that governments must be careful about their use. Nevertheless, noting empirical 
studies, corporate taxes are relevant for firms.22  
This chapter outlines a model of corporate taxation in the presence of MNEs in which 
it may be efficient for governments to use positive corporate taxation. Firms are 
heterogeneous in their productivity and engage in imperfect competition. They 
produce intermediate and final goods so that various simple, as well as complex, 
                                            
17
 Examples are Melitz (2003), Ghironi and Melitz (2005), and Davies and Eckel (2007). 
18
 Examples in literature include Baldwin and Krugman (2004). 
19
 Davies and Eckel (2007) provide this approach. Further work on inefficiently low capital tax rates 
and under provision of public goods due to tax competition is Haufler (2001).   
20
 As in Hines (1999). 
21
 As in Mintz (1999). 
22
 As in Hines (1999). 
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integration strategies may arise here.23 This is supported by the empirical evidence 
mentioned previously.     
The model deals with two countries: The North is the home country of heterogeneous 
firms; the South is a country with a relatively lower wage level. Every single 
production activity of heterogeneous firms can be run in both countries.24 Also, a 
simple setting with all production activities located in the North is possible. For this 
reason, a heterogeneous firm must not necessarily be a multinational. 
By assumption, the wage level in the South is lower than in the North. For this 
reason, production costs for intermediate and final goods are lower there, too. 
However, to produce at cheaper costs in the South, firms must invest to set-up 
production plants there. These fixed costs do not occur when producing in the North, 
and their size differs, depending on shifting intermediate or final good production to 
the South. However, transportation can result in additional costs to a firm. Therefore, 
it may be optimal to avoid them at extra fixed costs associated with foreign plant set-
up in the South. For this reason, the key parameters of the basic setting of this model 
are the size of transport costs, factor price differences, the relative size of fixed costs 
for MNE activities, firm productivities, and the market shares of final goods 
consumption.25  
A host of factors influencing the choice of location for corporate investments is 
introduced into this model. These factors have already been identified as being 
important in general. The key factors relevant here, however, are corporate taxes, 
which influence decisions in firms about their integration strategies.  
Governments act as benevolent planners and can anticipate the impact of profit 
taxes on integration strategies. Accordingly, Northern and Southern tax rates are 
determined endogenously in this model; and their impact on integration strategies 
and welfare are discussed. Double taxation of profits is not possible in this setting.26 
By levying taxes, a government is only interested in its own national welfare; but 
combined tax revenues from both governments are used to finance public 
                                            
23
 Concerning possible integration strategies of firms this model is very much based on Grossman, 
Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
24
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
25
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
26
 An example in literature is Egger et al. (2006a). 
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infrastructure.27 Therefore, transport costs for goods produced by the heterogeneous 
firms decrease endogenously in the model because of taxation. Even though tax rate 
differentials can occur in this model, inefficiently low tax rates do not arise because 
governments take the impact of their own tax rate on the foreign tax base into 
account. 
 
This theoretical analysis is structured in the following way:  
Section 1.2 outlines the model and derives optimal integration strategies of firms in 
the differentiated sector. These depend on relative size of fixed costs for plant set-up, 
factor price differences, relative market size, firm productivities, and transport costs.  
Subsequently, we introduce profit taxation and study its impact on the optimal 
integration strategies. 
Section 1.3 concludes the analysis and illustrates impact of profit taxation on 
integration strategies and welfare.         
 
1.2 Optimal profit taxation of heterogeneous firms with provision 
of public infrastructure 
 
1.2.1 Some general features of the model set-up 
The following partial analysis describes the optimal integration strategies of 
heterogeneous firms based on the theoretical framework of Grossman, Helpman and 
Szeidl (2006), with particular emphasis on the role of profit taxation.  
This analysis studies the optimal tax policy of governments when providing public 
infrastructure for differentiated goods, depending on the integration strategies chosen 
by heterogeneous firms. 
We set-up a simple model with two countries: North (N) and South (S). The former is 
developed, the latter less developed. While factors are assumed to be immobile 
across national borders, goods are not. However, factor price equalization does not 
emerge due to the presence of transport costs. With regard to integration strategies, 
firms choose between two options: concentrating final production in one country and 
serving consumers world-wide from there (exporting) or engaging in multi-plant final 
                                            
27
 An example of a model with public infrastructure analyzing its impact on trade patterns, industrial 
location, and welfare, is Martin and Rogers (1995), even though their setting is totally different from 
this one and it does not deliver optimal tax rates. 
PROFIT TAXATION WITH PROVISION OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
12
production and serving consumers locally through domestic and foreign subsidiaries 
(multinational activity). In the parsimonious framework chosen, labor is the only factor 
used in production and in firm or plant set-up. 
One industry produces a homogeneous good x0; the other industry produces 
differentiated goods. 
  
The homogeneous good is supplied under perfect competition. N is more productive 
in this sector than S. For this reason, there exists a gap between wages (w) in N and 
S. It is assumed that one unit of labor is needed to fabricate one of these goods in N. 
However, 
w
1
 > 1 units of labor are needed in S to produce one unit of the 
homogeneous good. We focus on parameter configurations which ensure that the 
homogeneous good is produced in both countries in equilibrium and traded across 
national borders. The price of the homogeneous good is chosen as the numéraire. 
Consequently, wN = 1 > wS = w arises, where iw  is the wage rate in country i, i { }S,N∈  
and transport costs for the homogeneous good exist.28 
 
The differentiated good is supplied under monopolistic competition. Each firm acts as 
a monopolist in supplying its variety. The price elasticity of demand between varieties 
is ε > 1 so that firms charge a fixed mark-up over marginal costs. Due to monopolistic 
competition, the price will be lower than the monopoly price because, otherwise, the 
firms would loose an over proportionate amount of demand for their varieties. 
 
We assume that these firms are heterogeneous in productivity, that they only can be 
founded in N, and that firm headquarters are not internationally mobile. For this 
reason, all headquarters are located in N (e.g., because of the unfavorable 
institutional environment in S) and they are all owned by N. 
To enter the differentiated industry, an amount of h Northern units of labor, which are 
sunk costs, must be invested. These are firm set-up costs. With this investment, a 
firm in the heterogeneous sector gets to know its own potential productivity level ( θ ). 
Then, the firm can decide if it wants to enter the market. Firms in the differentiated 
sector can be diverse in their productivity so, if they decide to enter the market after 
                                            
28
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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investing h, they can make positive profits.29 However, before investing h, all 
heterogeneous firms have the same expectations about their profits. For this reason, 
all heterogeneous firms are the same ex ante. If ex ante zero profits are expected, no 
more firms are willing to enter the differentiated sector. The productivity level drawn 
by a firm is a random variable (graphic 1.1). 
 
Graphic 1.1: 
 
In addition, it is assumed that not only are production costs less in S than in N but 
also that its market for differentiated goods (MS) is much smaller than the 
differentiated goods market in N (MN). 
  
1.2.2 The utility function of a representative household 
All households have the same preferences and their utility function depends on a 
homogeneous good x0 and the sub-utility of consumption of differentiated goods X. 
Each household consumes goods of either sector and, in formal accounts, its utility 
function may be written as: 
 
XxU 0i += ,  i { }S,N∈                                                                                             (1.1) 
where  








µα
= ∫
Θ
α
α
dj)j(x1X
max
0
i
              10 <α< , 0<µ <1 and α<µ                          (1.2)        
Consequently, the utility of the representative household increases if more varieties 
of the differentiated product are available. These love for variety preferences30 exist 
for the consumption of differentiated goods. The elasticity of substitution between two 
of these varieties is constant: )1(
1
α−
. All varieties in the differentiated sector are non-
perfect substitutes for one another, as α <1. But as α >0, they are somehow 
substitutable. µ  is a constant with 0<µ < α <1 and reflects the preference for the 
differentiated industry over the homogeneous industry in the utility function of the 
                                            
29
 As in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). 
30
 As in Krugman (1979) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
θDecision to  
invest h or not 
is drawn Decision to  
produce or not 
t 
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representative household. X  shows the sub-utility of consumption of the 
differentiated output, where )j(xi  features the consumption in i of the j-th variety in 
this industry.31 
Thus, the utility function of a representative household is linear in x0 and non-linear in 
differentiated goods. This implies that the demand for differentiated products 
depends on prices of differentiated goods but not on earnings.  
 
1.2.3 The heterogeneous firms 
As mentioned before, heterogeneous firms arise in the differentiated industry and 
locate their immobile headquarters in the North. Irrespective of their integration 
strategies, these firms sell their products to each market. 
This analysis discusses the optimal integration strategies of these firms, which 
depend on the firm productivity levels. An integration strategy is defined by the 
choice of the location of intermediate and final goods production. In the following 
sections the choice for an integration strategy is influenced not only by transport 
costs but also by taxation on profits.    
To begin, in this analysis a firm in the differentiated industry with productivity θ  
produces final goods according to the production function θ F(m, a). The amount of 
intermediate input used is denoted by m, and a is the level of final good activity. Both 
are measured in units of labor input. F(m, a) is an increasing, concave function with 
constant returns to scale. Furthermore, the elasticity of substitution between m and a 
is not greater than 1. c(pm, pa) describes the unit cost function, referring to F(m, a), 
where the price of input i at the location of final goods production is denoted by pi, 
i { }a,m∈ . Taking stock, c(pm, pa)/ θ  describes the per-unit variable costs of production 
of a firm with productivity θ  at a particular location.32 
Households only consume final goods. 
A firm producing intermediate goods in S has to bear extra fixed costs of g for 
communication and supervision because the headquarters of MNEs are located in N. 
Likewise, MNEs incur additional fixed costs of f if they produce final goods in S. 
These fixed costs are measured in labor units of the home country. Therefore, it is 
assumed that fixed costs do not exist in N.33 
                                            
31
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
32
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
33
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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However, as already discussed, wages in S are lower than in N. It is assumed that 
production of one unit of the intermediate or final goods requires one unit of local 
labor at the place of production but that the intermediate goods have to be 
transported to the location of final production, if the latter are manufactured 
elsewhere. However, per-unit variable costs of manufacturing differentiated final or 
intermediate goods in S are lower than those of manufacturing these goods in N. 
Because wS=w<1=wN, S has a comparative advantage in manufacturing 
differentiated goods. 
 
 Table 1.1:34  
Intermediate production m Final good production a Fixed 
costs 
Per-unit variable 
costs 
in N in N 0 c(1, 1) / θ  
in N in S f c(1, w) / θ  
in S in N g c(w, 1) / θ  
in S in S f+g c(w, w) / θ  
 
Table 1.1 shows that the optimality of integration strategies depends on per-unit 
variable costs c(pm,pa) and the fixed costs of a firm in the differentiated industry. 
Furthermore, the total factor productivity of a firm is elemental for optimal integration 
strategy. 
Additionally, these strategies also depend on market size, the level of transport costs, 
and taxes. 
In the following, strategies depend on the location of intermediate and final goods 
production, where can be produced in S as well as in N.  
 
1.2.4 Iceberg transport costs 
Now, iceberg transport costs (d) are introduced. This implies that an exporting firm 
has to ship more than one unit of the final goods so that one unit of the goods arrives 
at the location of foreign consumers. Transport costs for final goods are identical 
                                            
34
 See Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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across countries and differentiated products, and they are proportional to the extent 
of shipments.35 
In the following, section the size of transport costs is relatively high: (d=dH). 
 
1.2.5 Analysis with high transport costs and without taxation 
Let us first describe the case in which transport costs for final goods are high and 
taxes are zero. By assumption, transport of intermediate goods is free.36 
Compared to production in N, setting up foreign production plants in S induces 
additional fixed costs for a firm. However, its per-unit variable costs can be reduced 
when shifting production activities to S.37 
Subsequently, the variation in firm productivity levels θ  in the differentiated industry 
will be observed more precisely.38 
A firm would also never conduct activities in more than one plant per country. Such a 
strategy would unnecessarily incur additional costs. 
To illustrate optimal integration strategies depending on the productivity level of a 
firm, we compare profits across alternative integration strategies. Consistent with the 
preferences depicted in (1.1) and (1.2), every manufacturing firm of this industry 
faces the following demand function in each country i, i { }S,N∈ :39 
[ ] )1(1iii )j(pM)j(x −αµα=                                                                                               (1.3)   
 
)j(xi  describes the total demand in one country for the differentiated good of a single 
firm. This demand depends on market size iM , i { }S,N∈ . Furthermore, it depends on 
the substitutability of differentiated products among each other, α , on µ , which 
reflects the preference for the differentiated industry over the homogeneous industry 
by the representative household, and  on )j(pi , which is the effect of the price of the 
individual firm on ix . Hence demand from a single household for differentiated goods 
is independent of income.  
Each firm, therefore, maximizes its profits accordingly to: 
                                            
35
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
36
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
37
 As also in Yeaple (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). 
38
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
39
 See derivation I in Appendix 1.4. 
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kc)j(xc)j(x)j(x)j(p)j(x)j(p SSNNSSNN −θ−θ−+=pi                                                     (1.4) 
Here )j(x)j(p)j(x)j(p SSNN +  denotes total sales, ( θ+θ
SSNN c)j(xc)j(x ) reflects total 
costs in both countries, and k are the fixed costs. 
θ
Nc
 and 
θ
Sc
 are per-unit variable 
costs in N and S, respectively. 
This results in the identification of the optimal prices of a firm:40 
pN(j)opt= θα
Nc1
,  pS(j)opt= θα
Sc1
                                                                                   (1.5) 
As shown here, the optimal price of a firm is independent of demand, respectively, on 
market size in N and S. Each market price is defined as 
α
1
 times the per-unit variable 
costs of a firm serving the specific market. Hence, prices entail a fixed markup over 
marginal costs. 
In the following, we allow for transport costs and introduce terms that capture 
transport costs as well as variable (marginal) production costs.   
Generally, profits may be formulated as follows:41 
b,a
b,a
S
b,a
N
b,a k)r,j(Cd
X
)r,j(Cd
X
* −
Θ
+
Θ
=pi , with a { }S,N∈  and b { }S,N∈                           (1.6) 
Firm profits depend on its integration strategy, where a is the determinant of the 
location of intermediate goods production and b of final goods production. Hence, 
intermediate as well as final differentiated goods can be produced either in N or in S 
or in both countries. Depending on the location of production of a and b, different 
possible fixed costs (ka,b) are taken into account in the profit function of a firm. If 
intermediate goods are produced in S, ka,b has size g; if final goods are produced in 
S, ka,b has size f; and if intermediate or final goods are produced in N, fixed costs are 
zero. Also per-unit variable costs dCa,b(j, r) depend on the locations of intermediate 
and final production, a and b. As denoted in table 1.1, j is the determinant of the 
dependency of total per-unit variable costs on per-unit variable costs for intermediate 
                                            
40
 See derivation II in Appendix 1.4. 
41
 See derivation III in Appendix 1.4.  
Furthermore, )1( α−
α
θ=Θ , dC= )1(c α−
α
, =X
)1(1)1( α−





µ
α
⋅α− , MN X = NX , and MS X = SX , where 
SX < NX  because the market share of S is smaller than that of N. 
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goods, measured in units of labor at the production location. Hence, j is j { }w,1∈ ; 1 
occurs if intermediate goods are produced in N; and w<1 denotes these costs if they 
are produced in S. Additionally, r is the determinant of the dependency of total per-
unit variable costs on per-unit variable costs for final goods, measured in units of 
labor at the production location. Hence, r is r { }w,1∈ ; 1 occurs if final goods are 
produced in N; and w<1 denotes these costs if they are produced in S. Finally, also 
transport costs (d) are part of per-unit variable costs and depend on the location of 
final production. If final goods have to be shipped to serve a market, d >1 occurs; if 
final goods are produced at the location of consumption, d =1 (no transportation of 
final goods) is taken into account in the profit function of a firm. 
 
Furthermore, high transport costs exist if:42 
Hd)w,w(C
)1,w(C
<   or  Hd)w,1(C
)1,1(C
<  
For this reason, the following possible profit functions arise for a firm, depending on 
its productivity level in a two-country setting with high transport costs: 
)1,1(Cd
X
)1,1(C
X
H
SN
N,N
Θ
+
Θ
=pi                                                                                               (1.I) 
This strategy N,N with profit function N,Npi  describes concentration of intermediate 
and final goods production in the home country, N. A firm operates in the Southern 
market by exporting the differentiated products. For this reason, supplying the 
Southern market is more expensive. This strategy minimizes fixed costs but produces 
with relative high per-unit variable costs C(1,1) because factor prices in N are higher 
than in S. 
f)w,1(C
X
)1,1(C
X SN
NS,N −
Θ
+
Θ
=pi                                                                                          (1.II) 
Firms choosing strategy N,NS supply the Northern market by producing intermediate 
and final goods in N. Intermediate goods from N are shipped to S, where final goods 
production takes place to serve consumers in S locally. In this case, MNE activity in 
final goods eliminates all trade in final goods. With this strategy, medium high fixed 
costs of f are incurred. On the other hand, the firm can save per-unit variable costs 
when supplying S compared to (1.I). 
                                            
42
 See Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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A strategy N,S with the profit function S,Npi  is no alternative to N,NS in the case with 
high transport costs.  
f)w,1(C
X
)w,1(Cd
X S
H
N
S,N −
Θ
+
Θ
=pi                                                                                    (1.II’) 
Even though the fixed costs and the costs of supplying S are identical when selecting 
one of these two strategies, this strategy can be eliminated because of the costs of 
operating in the Northern market. Supplying to N under strategy N,NS, a firm 
produces intermediate as well as final goods in N. Consequently, the only difference 
to strategy N,S is that the per-unit variable costs of supplying N are lower. This is due 
to the high transport costs to supply the Northern market when selecting N,S instead 
of N,NS. For this reason, this strategy never is reasonable if high transport costs 
exist. If transport costs vary, it also is possible that N,S is the better strategy; but one 
of these strategies always dominates the other.  
g)1,w(Cd
X
)1,w(C
X
H
SN
N,S −
Θ
+
Θ
=pi                                                                                     (1.III) 
In this case, intermediate goods are produced in S and final goods in N. For this 
reason, this strategy can also be seen as “partial globalization”.43 Intra-firm trade 
exists. Transport costs arise when supplying S because final goods are produced in 
N. 
Similar to strategy N,NS, a firm in this case has to bear medium high fixed costs, 
here denoted by g, because intermediate goods are manufactured in S and final 
goods in N. However, adequate ranking of strategies N,NS and S,N cannot be 
determined without an exact identification of the level of the different fixed costs f and 
g and of the per-unit variable costs.  
gf)w,w(C
X
)1,w(C
X SN
NS,S −−
Θ
+
Θ
=pi                                                                               (1.IV) 
Firms choosing strategy S,NS supply to S by producing intermediate and final goods 
there. To satisfy Northern demand, these firms produce intermediate goods in S, ship 
them to N at zero transport costs, produce final goods in N, and sell them there. In 
this case, international trade in final goods does not occur. Strategy S,NS is 
associated with fixed costs of f and g. Hence, these firms save high per-unit variable 
                                            
43
 Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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costs, including trade costs. Because of the higher fixed costs associated with this 
strategy, S,NS only is reasonable for highly productive firms that face a high demand. 
Table 1.2 is a summary of the here described diverging factors determining profit 
functions. 
 
Table 1.2: 
Strategy 
a,b 
Meaning Marginal costs 
of serving 
consumers in N 
Marginal costs 
of serving 
consumers in S 
Fixed 
costs 
ka,b 
N,N Intermediate good 
production in N; 
final good 
production in N 
C(1,1) dHC(1,1) 0 
N,S Intermediate good 
production in N; 
final good 
production in S 
dHC(1,w) C(1,w) f 
N,NS Intermediate good 
production in N; 
final good 
production in N 
and S 
C(1,1) C(1,w) f 
S,N Intermediate good 
production in S; 
final good 
production in N 
C(w,1) dHC(w,1) g 
S,NS Intermediate good 
production in S; 
final good 
production in N 
and S 
C(w,1) C(w,w) f and g 
 
 
Alternative strategies to S,NS are S,S and NS,NS. Their costs of supplying to S and 
the fixed costs of these strategies match those of NS,Spi , but the per-unit variable 
costs for supplying the Northern market are higher. In this scenario, with high 
transport costs, per-unit variable costs are lower with S,NS than with S,S or NS,NS; 
fixed costs are the same. Therefore, firms will never choose S,S or NS,NS. 
 
Theoretically, two further integration strategies, namely NS,N and NS,S, are possible. 
However, these strategies are never reasonable. A firm will only produce 
intermediate goods in both N and S (associated with extra fixed costs for 
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intermediate production) if high transport costs for intermediate goods exist. If this is 
the case, it will only make sense to produce final products in both countries as well to 
save on transport costs.44  
Hence (1.I), (1.II), (1.III) and (1.IV) are the only relevant strategies if transport costs 
are high.45 
In this case, a pure trade-off between fixed costs and per-unit variable costs exists. 
Transportation of final goods to N is never optimal because of the size of dH. This can 
be seen from Hd)w,w(C
)1,w(C
< .  
The lowest per-unit variable costs to satisfy demand in each market, therefore, can 
be achieved with local production of final goods. Strategies that are chosen in this 
setting where final goods are not only produced locally are S,N and N,N. If g is very 
small, S,N is a possible optimal strategy even though high transport costs exist. Also, 
N,N belongs to the set of optimal strategies. However, both of these strategies are 
chosen by more unproductive firms because they cannot afford high fixed costs. 
A firm produces intermediate goods at only one location because transportation is 
free.46 A firm producing intermediate goods in N also produces final goods there to 
satisfy Northern demand because transportation of final goods from S is relatively 
costly. Therefore, it is not attractive for a firm.  
This can be considered by Hd)w,1(C
)1,1(C
< .  
A firm producing intermediate goods in S has two possibilities. Either it only produces 
final goods in N, or it ships some of them to N to serve the North and the 
intermediate goods for S stay in S so that final goods for every market are produced 
locally. The optimal strategy for a firm depends on its productivity and fixed costs. 
Therefore, the following integration strategies are possibly relevant: N,N; N,NS; S,N; 
S,NS. 
   
Graphic 1.2 shows N,Npi  and NS,Spi  depending on productivity Θ .  
 
                                            
44
 All seven possible strategies with transport costs for final goods are shown in IV in Appendix 1.4, 
where the size of transport costs is the determinant of the set of optimal strategies. 
45
 If, and only if, high transport costs exist, this set of optimal integration strategies is chosen. This can 
be seen in derivation V in Appendix 1.4. 
46
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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Graphic 1.2:47 
 
 
Firms will always choose the integration strategy with the highest attainable positive 
profit at a given level of Θ . NS,Spi  is associated with fixed costs f and g, while N,Npi   is 
associated with zero fixed costs. However, the variable production costs under N,N 
are higher than those under S,NS. Therefore, N,Npi  is higher than NS,Spi  if productivity 
is lower than a critical level Θ (N,N; S,NS) and is lower than NS,Spi  at Θ > Θ (N,N; 
S,NS). N,Npi  and NS,Spi  intercept at Θ (N,N; S,NS).  
The profit function NS,Npi  now can be added to this analysis. NS,Npi  is associated with 
fixed costs f. The variable production costs under N,NS are higher than those under 
S,NS and lower than those under N,N. Graphic 1.3 shows alternative possibilities for 
this strategy. Therefore, N,Npi  is higher than NS,N'pi  if productivity is lower than a critical 
level A and is lower than NS,N'pi  at Θ >A. N,Npi  and NS,N'pi  intercept at A. NS,Spi  is lower 
than NS,N'pi  if productivity is lower than a critical level C and is higher than NS,N'pi  at 
Θ >C. NS,Spi  and NS,N'pi  intercept at C. Another possibility for the profit function 
corresponding to strategy N,NS is NS,N''pi . In this case, NS,N''pi  is lower than N,Npi  and 
NS,Spi . Only N,Npi  and NS,Spi  then intercept at B in the graphic.  
 
 
 
                                            
47
 Own construction on the basis of Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
0 
Θ
pi NS,Spi
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Graphic 1.3:48 
 
 
A = )NS,N;N,N(Θ ; B = )NS,S;N,N(Θ ; C = )NS,S;NS,N(Θ  
 
For N,NS to be an optimal strategy, it is necessary that the intersection of NS,Npi  and 
NS,Spi  lies above the intersection of N,Npi  and NS,Spi , at )NS,S;N,N(Θ , resulting in49 
 
f
g ≥  








−
−+−
)1,1(Cd
X
)w,1(C
X
)w,1(C
X
)w,w(C
X
)1,1(C
X
)1,w(C
X
H
SS
SSNN
Hγ=  .                                                          (1.7) 
This condition has to hold so that N,NS is an optimal strategy for a firm. As shown in 
graphic 1.3, low-productivity firms locate all production activities at home; high- 
productivity firms produce intermediate goods only in S and final goods in N and S; 
and, if NS,Npi  runs like NS,N'pi , firms with intermediate productivity levels manufacture 
intermediate goods in N and final goods in N and S. 
 
 
                                            
48
 Own construction on the basis of Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
49
 See derivation VI in Appendix 1.4. 
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Just as NS,Npi  can be added to the analysis in graphic 1.2, this is also possible with 
N,Spi . N,Spi  is associated with fixed costs g. The variable production costs under S,N 
are higher than those under S,NS and lower than those under N,N. 
For S,N to become an optimal strategy, it is necessary that the intersection of N,Spi  
and NS,Spi  lies above the intersection of N,Npi  and NS,Spi . Using the same approach as 
in the previous analysis for NS,Npi , the following condition must hold for S,N  to 
become an optimal strategy:50 
L
H
SS
H
SN
H
SN
)1,w(Cd
X
)w,w(C
X
)1,1(Cd
X
)1,1(C
X
)1,w(Cd
X
)1,w(C
X
f
g γ=
−
−−+
≤                                                          (1.8) 
If (1.8) holds, firms with low productivity levels locate all production activities at home, 
highly productive firms produce intermediate goods in S and final goods in N and S, 
and firms with intermediate levels of productivity manufacture intermediate goods in 
S and final goods in N.  
From (1.7) and (1.8) it can be seen that, if Lγ < Hf
g γ<  is true, only two optimal 
strategies exist: Either all firms only produce in N, or intermediate goods are 
produced in S and final goods are produced in both locations. The assumption that 
the elasticity of substitution between intermediate and final goods production is not 
greater than 1 ensures that Lγ < Hγ  holds.51  
For NS,Npi  or N,Spi  to be a dominate integration strategy either Lf
g γ≤  or Hf
g γ≥  must 
hold true. Because this is not possible at the same time, only one of the strategies, 
S,N or N,NS, can be optimal, depending on the size of the fixed costs relation. In 
graphic 1.3 NS,N'pi  is a possible optimal strategy for a firm, depending on its 
productivity. This means that Hf
g γ≥  must be true. Then, the fixed costs for a final 
goods producing plant in S are relatively lower than the fixed costs for an 
intermediate goods producing plant there.  
                                            
50
 See derivation VII in Appendix 1.4. 
51
 Lγ < Hγ  is considered if, and only if, )w,1(C
1
)1,w(Cd
1
)1,1(Cd
1
)w,w(C
1
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In case S,N, not N,NS, is optimal, Lf
g γ≤  holds. This means that the fixed costs for a 
final goods producing plant in S are relatively higher than the fixed costs for an 
intermediate goods producing plant in S. Accordingly, whether N,NS or S,N is optimal 
depends on the fixed costs.52  
 
For this reason, another graphical description (graphic 1.4) shows all areas of optimal 
strategies in one diagram. 
 
Graphic 1.4:53 
 
A = )NS,S;N,S(Θ ; B = )NS,S;NS,N(Θ ; C = )NS,N;N,N(Θ  
Graphic 1.4 shows combinations of fixed costs g for intermediate goods and Θ  that 
generate different strategies of integration. In this connection, the level of fixed costs 
for final goods f is held constant. If f changes, the bold, broken lines will change.54 
In the section N,N, all activities of a firm are located in N; in section S,N, intermediate 
goods are produced in S and final goods in N. Section N,NS shows firms that 
manufacture intermediate goods in N and final goods in N and S. Finally, if the 
productivity of a firm lies in region S,NS intermediate goods producing activities are 
shifted to S and final goods are produced in both countries.55 
Hence, if, depending on the productivity level of a firm, strategies N,N, N,NS, or S,NS 
are reasonable, fixed costs g are high relative to the given value of f. If, depending on 
                                            
52
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
53
 Own construction on the basis of Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
54
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
55
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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the productivity level of a firm, strategies N,N, S,N, or S,NS are reasonable, fixed 
costs g are small relative to the given value of f. If, depending on the productivity 
level of a firm, strategies N,N or S,NS are only reasonable, the fixed costs relation 
between g and f is medium high. 
 
The five graphical analogues to the analytical cut-off levels separating the optimal 
integration strategies in graphic 1.4 result from the following:  
The cut-offs are calculated by equating the profits of one strategy with those of 
another strategy and solving for Θ . Four different possibly optimal pi exist: N,Npi , 
NS,Npi , N,Spi , and NS,Spi ; and five different cut-off levels arise. The sixth theoretically 
possible comparison is NS,Npi with N,Spi . However, as already discussed, these two 
strategies cannot be equated because they are never optimal at the same time if only 
productivities of firms differ because they arise when different fixed costs relations 
exist.  
Hence, the different cut-off levels are given by 56 






−
=Θ
)1,1(Cd
1
)w,1(C
1X
f)NS,N;N,N(
H
S
.                                                                   (1.a) 
This cut-off level between sections N,N and N,NS is independent of g. For this 
reason, it is represented by a vertical line in graphic 1.4.  
From graphic 1.3 it is known that N,NS is the optimal strategy for firms with 
intermediate levels of productivity, if Hf
g γ≥  holds. If Θ  is smaller than Θ (N,N;N,NS), 
N,N is optimal. If Θ  is greater, then N,NS is the optimal strategy. Firms with the exact 
productivity of Θ (N,N;N,NS) are just indifferent between the production of all goods 
at home and the production of intermediate goods in N and of final goods in N and S 
because their profits are the same in both cases. 






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

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                                   (1.b) 
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This cut-off level between sections N,N and S,N depends on g and is represented by 
a line through the origin. At levels of Θ  that exceed Θ (N,N;S,N), S,N is optimal; for 
lower levels, N,N is optimal. 






−+
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
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1X)1,1(C
1
)1,w(C
1X
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                                  (1.c) 
This cut-off level between sections N,N and S,NS depends on g and starts from a 
negative intercept. Because of the per-unit variable costs, it is steeper than 
Θ (N,N;S,N). At levels of Θ  that exceed Θ (N,N;S,NS), S,NS is optimal; for lower 
levels, N,N is optimal. 

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                                 (1.d) 
This cut-off level between sections N,NS and S,NS again depends on g and is 
represented by a line through the origin. Because of the per-unit variable costs, it is 
steeper than Θ (N,N;S,N). At levels of Θ  that exceed Θ (N,NS;S,NS), S,NS is 
optimal; for lower levels, N,NS is the better strategy for a firm. The higher fixed costs 
g are, the higher firm productivity must be for intermediate goods production in S to 
be profitable. 

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                                                                 (1.e) 
This cut-off level between sections S,N and S,NS is independent of g. For this 
reason, it is represented by a vertical line in graphic 1.4. If the level of Θ  is lower 
than Θ (S,N;S,NS), then S,N is optimal. If the level of Θ  exceeds Θ (S,N;S,NS), then 
S,NS is the optimal strategy for a firm. 
Because of the high transport costs, firms choose this strategy (S,NS) to produce 
final goods locally. Hence, in final goods production, these are horizontal firms.57 
These highly productive firms shift most production activities to S, where per-unit 
costs are lower, to generate the highest possible reduction of variable per-unit 
costs.58 Due to high transport costs, final goods for the Northern market are produced 
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 As in Markusen and Venables (1998). 
58
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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in N to maximize profits. The fraction of firms choosing this strategy depends on the  
productivity of the firms. It increases if g falls and then becomes independent of g.  
MNE activities for final goods production only arise to the right of the bold, broken 
line in graphic 1.4. The smaller g, the greater this fraction of firms will be.  
If g is very high, the fraction of firms producing final goods in N and S is independent 
of g; whereas the fraction of them choosing strategy N,NS or S,NS depends on the 
size of g. The fraction of firms choosing strategy S,N increases if g is small and 
productivity of a firm is greater than zero. In the graphical analogue to the cut-off 
level )NS,S;N,S(Θ  in graphic 1.4, this fraction becomes independent of g.59 
If firms have an intermediate productivity level Θ , namely that 
Θ (S,N;S,NS) <Θ< Θ (N,N;N,NS), then the fixed costs for a production plant in S for 
final goods are only borne if the fixed costs for intermediate goods producing plants g 
are small. Accordingly, these firms either shift intermediate production activities to S 
and produce final goods in both countries, due to high transport costs; or they 
produce intermediate and final goods only in N, if Lγ < Hf
g γ<  holds.60 For positive 
values of given fixed costs for intermediate goods g, the most unproductive firms 
locate all production activities in N and export their final goods to the Southern 
market, whereas transport costs are high. 
Consequently, a reduction of fixed costs, as well as a reduction of barriers to trade, 
or transport costs, is influential in determining optimal integration strategies for firms 
and encourages their economic outcome.  
 
1.2.6 Analysis with high transport costs, profit taxation and provision of public 
infrastructure for differentiated goods 
In the following, the governments set profit taxes in a first stage and cannot rescind 
their offers by assumption. Then, firms decide upon their optimal integration 
strategies, which are taken into account by the governments when setting tax rates.  
A government chooses a tax rate, ti i { }S,N∈ , to tax profits of firms. The resulting tax 
revenue is spent for public infrastructure for differentiated goods. Governments take 
the utility of the representative household in their jurisdiction into account when 
deciding to levy profit taxes or not (i.e., the utility of the representative household 
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may not decline when selecting ti>0 compared to its utility without profit taxation). The 
provision of this public infrastructure at least induces fixed costs of R, where d 
depends on R. If public infrastructure for differentiated goods is provided, d declines, 
influencing the utility of the households. 
By assumption, without investment of tax revenue in public infrastructure for 
differentiated goods, transport costs are high if R is zero. Furthermore, taxes reduce 
profits of a firm. Transport costs influence the set of optimal integration strategies and 
they influence the location of the graphical analogues to the cut-off levels shown in 
graphic 1.4. The set of optimal strategies differs depending on the height of d 
because the higher d becomes, the more local production is reasonable. Also, profit 
taxes influence the location of these graphical analogues to the cut-off levels in 
graphic 1.4 because they are determinants of the profitability of alternative modes of 
firm integration. If tax revenue is used to finance provision of public infrastructure for 
firms in the differentiated sector, this influences d and, therefore, the set of optimal 
integration strategies, if R is invested. Tax rates are set in such a way that the set of 
optimal integration strategies from the point of view of the governments and the firms 
stays the same. Furthermore, households do not gain utility through consumption of 
the public good directly; but prices for differentiated goods depend on d, which is 
influenced by R. 
  
1.2.6.1 The problem of the governments  
In this section, cases are analyzed in which the governments of both N and S can 
levy taxes tN and tS, which are taken into account in the profit functions of the firms. In 
this setting, taxes are paid on firm profits either in N or in S. The location of tax 
payment depends on the location of final goods production for firms. Intermediate 
goods production is not taxed. In this setting, double taxation is not the problem of 
the analysis.61 
Governments select profit taxes to finance public infrastructure for differentiated 
goods; consequently, social welfare in their jurisdictions may not decline. Social 
welfare is defined by the utility of the representative household in the jurisdiction of a 
government as described in section 1.2.2. Furthermore, by assumption, the highest 
possible productivity level, Θ max=1, always is part of the integration strategy, with 
most of its total production in S. We also assume a uniform distribution function for 
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firms over productivity levels in this analysis. If public infrastructure for differentiated 
goods is provided, this influences d. Therefore, the utility of households resident in 
the jurisdiction of a government rises, where not only d influences the utility of 
households. 
Here, the price for the homogeneous product is p0=1. Prices for differentiated 
products are denoted by pi(j), where p is the price for variety j in country i, i { }S;N∈ .  
As already shown in section 1.2.2, the utility of a representative household in country 
i, i { }S;N∈ , is given by: 
XxU 0i +=                                                                                                             (1.1) 
where 








µα
= ∫
Θ
α
α
dj)j(x1X
max
0
                10 <α< , 0<µ <1 and α<µ                          (1.2) 
This alternatively can be denoted by:62 
∫
Θ
−α
α
−αµ⋅α−+=
max
0
)1(
i
)1(1
ii dj)j(p)1(mV                                                                        (1.9) 
The utility of a representative household increases in mi and declines in pi(j). 
For a government to decide to provide a positive amount of public infrastructure and, 
therefore, to select ti>0, the previously shown utility of households in its country may 
not decline. Also, the size of the combined tax revenue of both governments must be 
high enough to afford R>0. 
 
To show welfare implications, optimal integration strategies with taxation must be 
examined. 
 
1.2.6.2 Integration strategies with profit taxation  
If ti>0 is selected by the governments, firms can anticipate that d will decline because 
the governments only select ti>0 if tax revenue is high enough so that R can be 
afforded. If R is invested, d declines from high (dH) to low (dL). 
For this reason, firms select other integration strategies to be reasonable instead of 
those with high transport costs. 
 
Low transport costs can be described in the following way:63  
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1 < dL < )w,1(C
)1,1(C
 
In this case, the optimal profit functions of the firms, depending on their productivity, 
are N,Npi , S,Npi , N,Spi , and S,Spi . A trade-off between fixed costs for production plants in 
S and the reduction of per-unit variable costs in shifting production activities to S is 
shown.64 These profit functions also depend on the size of fixed costs, market size, 
per-unit variable costs, and the degree of taxation:   
)t1()1,1(Cd
X)t1()1,1(C
X
N
L
S
N
N
N,N −
Θ
+−
Θ
=pi                                                                         (1.I´) 
This strategy, N,N, is identical to the one with high transport costs. However, the 
variable per-unit costs for products supplied in the Southern market are lower than 
those with high transport costs because dL<dH. Furthermore, the decline of these 
costs depends on the size of the Southern market; but, in this setting, MN > MS.  
Referring to lower transport costs, the slope of N,Npi  is steeper than in the previous 
analysis with high transport costs; but a higher tax rate, tN, reduces the slope of N,Npi . 
For this reason, the slope of N,Npi  depends on exact parameter configurations and 
cannot be compared with the slope of N,Npi  with high transport costs in general. 
If a firm selects strategy N,N, all its taxes on profits are paid in N because all final 
goods are produced there. tN reduces the profits of a firm. The degree of the 
reduction depends on the tax rate chosen by the Northern government. 
f)t1()w,1(C
X)t1()w,1(Cd
X
S
S
S
L
N
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Θ
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Θ
=pi                                                              (1.II´´) 
The per-unit variable costs for products in the Northern market decline for firms 
selecting this as their optimal strategy in comparison to the analysis with high 
transport costs in which they selected NS,Npi . The decline of these costs is induced by 
a smaller d; therefore, another optimal integration strategy concerning the Northern 
markets supply is chosen. Furthermore, the size of the decline of these costs 
depends on the size of the Northern market. Not only has the size of d decreased, 
but this has also induced firms to select S,Npi  instead of NS,Npi  as an optimal profit 
function. Also, the slope of S,Npi  instead of NS,Npi  is steeper than in the analysis with 
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high transport costs, referring to the per-unit variable costs; the higher the degree of 
taxation, the more gradual the slope of S,Npi  becomes. For this reason, the slope of 
S,Npi  depends on exact parameter configurations and cannot be compared with the 
slope of NS,Npi  with high transport costs in general. 
If a firm selects strategy N,S, taxes on profits are paid in S because all final goods 
are produced there. When choosing strategy N,S, the degree of reduction in firm 
profits depends on the tax rate chosen by the Southern government. Furthermore, 
fixed costs f are incurred in S. 
 
A further profit function is: 
g)t1()1,w(Cd
X)t1()1,w(C
X
N
L
S
N
N
N,S −−
Θ
+−
Θ
=pi                                                               (1.III´) 
This strategy, S,N, is identical to the one with high transport costs. However the 
variable per-unit costs for products supplied in the Southern market are lower than 
with high transport costs because dL<dH. Furthermore, the decline of these costs 
depends on the size of the Southern market; but, in this setting, MN > MS.  Referring 
to the lower d, the slope of N,Spi  is steeper than in the previous analysis with high 
transport costs; a higher tN reduces the slope of N,Spi . For this reason, the slope of 
N,Spi  depends on exact parameter configurations and cannot be compared with the 
slope of N,Spi  with high transport costs in general. 
Again, if a firm selects strategy S,N, all its taxes on profits are paid in N because all 
final goods are produced there. When choosing strategy S,N, the degree of reduction 
in firm profits depends on the tax rate chosen by N.  
gf)t1()w,w(C
X)t1()w,w(Cd
X
S
S
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=pi                                                     (1.IV´) 
The per-unit variable costs for products in the Northern market decline for firms 
selecting this as their optimal strategy in comparison to the analysis with high 
transport costs in which they selected NS,Spi . The decline of these costs is induced by 
a smaller d; therefore, another optimal integration strategy concerning the Northern 
markets supply is chosen. Furthermore, the size of the decline of these costs 
depends on the size of the Northern market. Not only has the size of d decreased, 
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but this has also induced firms to select S,Spi  instead of NS,Spi  as an optimal profit 
function. Also, the slope of S,Spi  instead of NS,Spi  is steeper than in the analysis with 
high transport costs, referring to the per-unit variable costs; the higher the degree of 
taxation, the more gradual the slope of S,Spi  becomes. For this reason, it can be seen 
that the slope of S,Spi  depends on exact parameter configurations and cannot be 
compared with the slope of S,Spi  with high transport costs in general. 
If a firm selects strategy S,S, taxes on profits are paid in S because final goods are 
produced there. When choosing strategy S,S, the degree of reduction in firm profits 
depends on the tax rates chosen by the Southern government. Furthermore, fixed 
costs f and g are incurred in S.  
 
This set of strategies is only chosen by firms if d is low and if the firms select the 
welfare optimal set of integration strategies because their choice is also influenced by 
ti.  
From the formal description of the profit functions, it can be seen that they are all 
steeper than in the previous analysis with high transport costs, referring to d. 
Additionally, the higher ti is, the more gradual are the profit functions. 
    
The cut-off levels between two strategies also are shown in the previous section with 
high transport costs. However, because d now is low, another set of integration 
strategies is reasonable and cut-off levels additionally depend on ti.65  
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)S,N;N,N(Θ  is independent of g. For this reason, it is represented by a vertical line in 
the graphical analysis below (graphic 1.5). 
In comparison to the analysis with high transport costs in graphic 1.4 this cut-off level 
changes from )NS,N;N,N(Θ  to )S,N;N,N(Θ . Only referring to lower transport costs, 
the line representing this cut-off level shifts a bit inward if the additional earnings in 
the Northern market resulting from changing strategy N,NS to N,S are higher than 
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the loss in savings in the Southern market because of a lower d. The more inward 
the line representing this cut-off level shifts, the lower firm productivity must be, to 
deselect N,N as the preferred strategy of a firm.  
However, the higher the tax rate selected by the Southern government, the more the 
line representing this cut-off level shifts back outward. The higher the tax rate 
selected by the Northern government, the more the line representing this cut-off level 
shifts inward.   
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In comparison to the analysis with high transport costs in graphic 1.4, the line 
representing this cut-off level becomes steeper, induced by lower transport costs.  
The higher the tax rate selected by the Northern government, the more gradually the 
line representing this cut-off level runs.   
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In comparison to the analysis with high transport costs in graphic 1.4, this cut-off 
level changes from )NS,S;N,N(Θ  to )S,S;N,N(Θ . With lower transport costs, the line 
representing this cut-off level becomes steeper if the additional earnings in the 
Northern market from changing strategy S,NS to S,S are higher than the loss in 
savings in the Southern market because of a lower d. The steeper the line 
representing this cut-off level runs, the lower firm productivity must be, to deselect 
N,N as the preferred strategy of a firm.  
The higher the tax rate selected by the Southern government, the more gradually the 
line representing this cut-off level runs; and the higher the tax rate selected by the 
Northern government, the more steeply it runs. 
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Because of the per-unit variable costs, this cut-off level is steeper than Θ (N,N;S,N). 
In comparison to the analysis with high transport costs in graphic 1.4, this cut-off 
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level changes from )NS,S;NS,N(Θ  to )S,S;S,N(Θ . If, due to lower transport costs, the 
additional earnings in the Northern market are higher than the loss in savings 
because of the by d induced change in optimal strategies, the line representing this 
cut-off level runs more steeply. The steeper the line representing this cut-off level, the 
lower firm productivity must be to select S,S as the preferred strategy of a firm.  
However, the higher the tax rate selected by the Southern government, the more 
gradually the line representing this cut-off level runs.   
( ) ( )N
L
SN
S
S
L
N
t1)1,w(Cd
X
)1,w(C
Xt1)w,w(C
X
)w,w(Cd
X
f)S,S;N,S(
−








+−−








+
=Θ                 (1.e´) 
)S,S;N,S(Θ  is independent of g. For this reason, it is represented by a vertical line in 
the graphical analysis below (graphic 1.5). 
In comparison to the analysis with high transport costs in graphic 1.4, this cut-off 
level changes from )NS,S;N,S(Θ  to )S,S;N,S(Θ . With lower transport costs the line 
representing this cut-off level shifts a bit inward if the additional earnings in the 
Northern market from changing strategy S,NS to S,S are higher than the loss in 
savings in the Southern market because of a lower d. The more inward the line 
representing this cut-off level shifts, the lower firm productivity must be to select S,S 
as the preferred strategy of a firm.  
However, the higher the tax rate selected by the Southern government, the more the 
line representing this cut-off level shifts back outward; the higher the tax rate selected 
by the Northern government, the more the line representing this cut-off level shifts 
inward.   
  
By combining all five graphical analogues to the aforementioned cut-off levels, the 
representation of optimal firm integration strategies shown in graphic 1.5 is obtained. 
In comparison to graphic 1.4, with high transport costs, the set of optimal integration 
strategies changes. Whether, the vertical lines representing cut-off levels shift 
somewhat inward or outward and the other cut-off levels representing lines run more 
steeply or gradually than in graphic 1.4 cannot be said in general. They depend on 
exact parameter configurations. 
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Graphic 1.5:66 
 
A = )S,S;N,S(Θ ; B = )S,S;S,N(Θ ; C = )S,N;N,N(Θ   
 
This graphical description is an example of the vertical lines shifting somewhat 
inward and the other cut-off level representing lines running more steeply than in 
graphic 1.4. Firms change their optimal integration strategies in response to the size 
of transport costs. The new set of optimal integration strategies selected delivers a 
higher economic outcome than the previous set with high transport costs only 
referring to d. 
Referring to graphic 1.5, an increasing fraction of firms invests in MNE activities for 
final goods production if fixed costs for intermediate goods production sink. The lower 
transport costs are, the less productive firms must be to manufacture final goods in S 
because the per-unit variable costs decline if high transport costs decline. Transport 
costs, in sum, are higher to supply the Northern market than to supply the Southern 
market because MN>MS. For this reason, it is true that the smaller transport costs for 
final goods are, the more economic integrated strategies are chosen by the more 
productive firms. 
If a firm invests in any activity in S, per-unit costs decrease. This increases the 
demand for output and, consequently, the willingness to produce the other goods 
there, too. This is also identified as “unit-cost complementarity”.67 Consequently, if g 
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or f decline, the fraction of firms that invest in production plants in S for intermediate 
and final goods increases because of the “unit-cost complementarity” .68 
This graphical description is only an example of how the lines representing the cut-off 
levels may possibly run. Theoretically, a utility loss from profit taxation and its impacts 
also does not arise if the lines representing the cut-off levels in graphic 1.5 run further 
on the right hand side than those in graphic 1.4. This depends on exact values for the 
following variables:  
• the decreased dL relative to dH and the corresponding tax rates tN and tS; 
• the decreased C, which only is relevant for the Northern jurisdiction when 
selecting strategy N,S or S,S; and 
• the distribution of the firms over the integration strategies. 
Furthermore, the following question must be answered:  
Which tax rates are selected by N and S if they can anticipate reactions of firms?  
 
1.2.6.3 The decisions of the governments with combined provision of public 
infrastructure for differentiated goods 
For the governments to select ti>0, combined tax revenue must be at least high 
enough to finance R. 
Furthermore, for a government to decide to provide public infrastructure, it must 
consider the utility of the representative household. In each government jurisdiction, 
the utility of the representative household with provision of public infrastructure for 
differentiated goods must be at least as high as its utility in the ti=0 scenario. As 
shown before the utility of each household is described by:   
∫
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−αµ⋅α−+=
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ii dj)j(p)1(mV                                                                       (1.9) 
If taxes are levied, α  and µ  do not change.  
The impact of ti on mi is different for N and S. All firms enter the market in N and, by 
assumption, belong to households in N. Accordingly, levying ti lets mN decline 
because the firm profits are part of the income of the Northern households. 
Additionally, introducing ti>0 also induces a change in optimal integration strategies. 
This does not lower the labor income of the households in the original production 
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location because they can work in the homogeneous sector. For this reason, taxation 
in either country does not influence income in S. 
In the setting of this model, effects on income – which are only induced by ti for 
households in N – only influence the consumption of the homogeneous good. 
Consumption of differentiated goods only depends on prices. This negative impact on 
the utility of the representative Northern household must be compensated through 
positive impacts from consumption of differentiated goods.  
Furthermore, the degree of taxation does not influence the mass of firms entering the 
market in the North because of profit taxation if 0<tN<1. Firms that decide to enter the 
market at least make zero profits. This is not changed if governments tax firm profits 
in the described manner. Therefore, the only restriction is that tN<1 always holds true 
because firms invest before entering the market. With this investment, a firm gets to 
know its productivity level and, therefore, decides to enter the market or not. If a firm 
makes positive profits, it enters the market; but, if tN=1 holds true, then any firm will 
always make zero profits, will never invest to get to know its productivity, and will 
never enter the differentiated market. This will not be in the interest of the 
government. The tax rate in S does not influence market entry either because the 
least productive firms entering the market choose strategy N,N, which is not 
influenced by tS anyhow. 
 
One must consider that the prices of a single firm do not change in response to 
taxes. These are only influenced by transport costs. For this reason, it is clear that:69 
pi(j)opt= 
α−
−α






Θα
)1(
dC1
                                                                                            (1.10) 
Transport costs are passed on to households; taxes must be paid by the firms. 
As has already been said, taxation itself is not passed on to households through 
raising prices. However, as taxation induces low transport costs, because tax 
revenue is spent for public infrastructure for differentiated goods, prices are 
influenced because of the lower d and because other integration strategies become 
reasonable for firms. Therefore, also the outputs of the single firms are influenced 
because demand for differentiated goods only depends on prices. 
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Optimal integration strategies now are N,N, S,N, N,S, and S,S instead of N,N, S,N, 
N,NS, and S,NS when transport costs are high. This induces the following changes in 
prices for differentiated goods in both markets: 
First, if firms select strategy N,N, their optimal prices for differentiated goods in the 
Northern market are defined by  
α−
−α


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


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. These prices are the same as those 
without public good provision. 
 
If firms select strategy N,N, their optimal prices for differentiated goods in the 
Southern market are defined by 
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these firms for differentiated goods in the Southern market with high transport costs 
are defined by 
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. Because dL< dH, prices with public good provision 
in the Southern market are lower than those without. 
 
Second, if firms select strategy S,N, their optimal prices for differentiated goods in the 
Northern market are defined by 
α−
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. These prices stay the same as 
those without public good provision. 
If firms select strategy S,N, their optimal prices for differentiated goods in the 
Southern market are defined by 
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these firms for differentiated goods in the Southern market with high transport costs 
are defined by 
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. Because dL< dH, prices with public good provision 
in the Southern market are lower than those without. 
 
Third, if firms select strategy N,S, their optimal prices for differentiated goods in the 
Northern market are defined by 
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these firms for differentiated goods in the Northern market with high transport costs 
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are defined by 
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 when N,NS is selected as the optimal integration 
strategy. Because transport costs decrease with provision of public infrastructure, 
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 holds true. For this reason, the prices of these 
firms are lower for consumers in the Northern market than in the analysis with high 
transport costs.  
 
If firms select strategy N,S, their optimal prices for differentiated goods in the 
Southern market are defined by 
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. These prices are the same as 
those without public good provision because the Southern market’s demand also is 
supplied with these prices when firms select strategy N,NS with high transport costs. 
  
Fourth, if firms select strategy S,S, their optimal prices for differentiated goods in the 
Northern market are defined by 
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 holds true. For this reason, the prices of 
these firms are lower for consumers in the Northern market than in the analysis with 
high transport costs.  
 
If firms select strategy S,S, their optimal prices for differentiated goods in the 
Southern market are defined by 
α−
−α






Θα
)1()w,w(C1
. These prices are the same as 
those without public good provision because demand in the Southern market also is 
supplied with these prices when firms select strategy S,NS with high transport costs. 
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Summarizing, firms selecting strategies N,N or S,N in both analyses, with either low 
or high d, supply the Northern market at the same prices and the Southern market at 
lower prices if tax revenue is invested in public good provision for differentiated 
goods. Firms selecting strategies N,S and S,S instead of N,NS and S,NS in the 
previous analysis supply the demand of the Northern market to lower prices, whereas 
the prices in the South stay the same as in the analysis without taxation and with dH.   
This section describes the impact of taxation on prices if the firms if a firm selects the 
corresponding strategy to previous analysis without taxation and with dH (i.e., 
selecting N,N with low transport costs if they selected N,N with high transport costs, 
selecting S,N with low transport costs if they selected S,N with high transport costs, 
selecting N,S with low transport costs if they selected N,NS with high transport costs, 
and selecting S,S with low transport costs if they selected S,NS with high transport 
costs). 
However, optimal taxation depends on the impact of ti on the utility of the 
representative household in the jurisdiction of a government. For example, if the fixed 
costs relation is medium high some firms selecting S,NS in the analysis with high 
transport costs may find it reasonable to select N,N if its choice is influenced by 
taxation. This decision again depends on the productivity level of a firm. In this case, 
prices of differentiated goods from these firms will increase in both jurisdictions. This 
possibility depends on the exact tax rates in both countries, which induce a shift of 
the graphical analogues to the cut-off levels in the previous graphical analysis either 
in one direction or into the other. For this reason, the impact of taxation on the utility 
of the representative household from differentiated goods depends on the distribution 
of the firms over the integration strategies. If the prices of these firms do not increase 
either, the impact of taxation on utility of the representative household from 
differentiated goods cannot decline in this model, where both governments know the 
distribution of the firms over the integration strategies when selecting tax rates. If the 
total impact of taxation does not result in a decline in utility in both jurisdictions both 
governments select ti>0, as long as total tax revenue is high enough that R can be 
afforded and public infrastructure is provided. 
This description shows all effects of taxation on the households’ utility depending on 
the parameter configurations in general. 
Precisely, this is shown in the case of the fixed costs relation being medium high. 
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In other words, if 2Lγ < 2Hf
g γ<  holds true, only strategies N,N or S,S are optimal. If 
transport costs decrease, taxation is introduced into the model and the set of optimal 
integration strategies changes. The range of parameters for which 2Lγ < 2Hf
g γ<  
holds true has changed in comparison to the analysis without taxation and with high 
transport costs. 
 
Now, N,N and S,S are the only optimal strategies only if the fixed costs relation is 
given by70 
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Given this situation, a minimum utility of Vinew = Viold must hold true for that ti>0 is 
selected, as has already been described. 
 
For this reason, the Southern government is confronted with following utility functions 
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This results in 
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Only if parameter configurations are ensured for which 0<(1-tS)<1 holds true, can 
0<tS<1 be selected by the Southern government.71 E is positive; and only then can 
0<tS<1 possibly be reasonable, where optimal taxation depends on exact parameter 
configurations. However, not every configuration lets equation (1.13) become 
reasonable for 0<tS<1. If 0< [ ] 21
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rate 0<tS<1 can be derived from equation (1.13).72  
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As can be seen, the optimal Southern tax rate depends on the Northern tax rate. For 
this reason, the reaction of tS on tN must be examined. It must be considered that in 
contrast to income mN in N income mS in S is independent of tN and tS: 
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Accordingly, )t1(
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 is never negative.  
If taxation itself is reasonable, )t1(
)t1(
N
S
−∂
−∂
 is positive (i.e., if the tax rate in N increases, 
the tax rate in S increases; and if the tax rate in N declines, the tax rate in S 
declines). Because of this correlation, the governments can set tax rates in such a 
way that combined tax revenue is high enough to finance R. 
 
As can be seen from derivation (1.13), whether profit taxation in S is reasonable 
depends on the parameter configurations. The optimal tax rate 0<tS<1, if it exists, is 
positively correlated with tN, as can be seen from derivation (1.14). 
 
The same analysis can be done from the Northern government’s perspective, which 
is confronted with the following utility functions 
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This results in 
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Only if parameter configurations are ensured for which 0<(1-tN)<1 holds true, can 
0<tN<1 be selected by the Northern government.73 In contrast to the analysis for the 
South, in which E is positive anyhow, K can be either positive or negative. Only if K is 
positive, can 0<tN<1 be reasonable, because optimal taxation depends on exact 
parameter configurations and not every configuration lets equation (1.15) become 
reasonable for 0<tN<1. If 0< [ ] 21
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As can be seen from equation (1.15) the optimal Northern tax rate depends on the 
Southern tax rate. For this reason, the reaction of tN on tS must be examined. It must 
be considered that income mNnew depends on tN and tS and that tN and tS depend on 
one another:75  
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The effect of υ  is new compared to the analysis for S, because income in N is 
influenced by taxation. 
 
First, income of households in N depends on taxation in N and S.  
Therefore 
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income in N is so negatively influenced by taxation that B becomes negative, taxation 
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no longer is reasonable from the point of view of the Northern government. In terms 
of finding an optimal 0<tN<1, this case is neglected previously in equation (1.15) with 
the condition that K may not be negative. Otherwise, the negative impact of taxation 
on income cannot be compensated by the positive impact on prices.  
 
Second, if B is positive, taxation can be reasonable. Again, this depends on exact 
parameter configurations.  
Solving (1.16) with a positive B, the following conditions can be derived: 
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The tax rates tN and tS are always positively correlated so that 0<tS<1 is selected by 
the government in S. For this reason, the governments in S and N will only find a 
solution for the provision of public infrastructure if  )t1(
)t1(
S
N
−∂
−∂
 is positive, too.  
That is, a tax rate 0<tN<1 can only be achieved if parameters are configured in such 
way that either (1.17) or (1.18) yields a positive  )t1(
)t1(
S
N
−∂
−∂
. 
For this reason, the following conditions can be derived from (1.17) and (1.18): 
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a) Condition from (1.17) is 
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Otherwise, )t1(
)t1(
S
N
−∂
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>0 cannot be derived and public infrastructure will not be 
provided. Then, only (1.18) can possibly deliver a solution. 
 
b) Condition from (1.18) is 
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Otherwise, )t1(
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S
N
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 will be negative or undefined and public infrastructure will not be 
provided. Then, only (1.17) can possibly deliver a solution. 
 
Following these conditions, if taxation is reasonable at all, all parameter 
configurations serve a positive )t1(
)t1(
S
N
−∂
−∂
. In this case, the governments can set tax 
rates in such a way that combined tax revenue is high enough to finance R. 
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Theoretically, a further argument against tax rates being correlated negatively exists. 
Optimal integration strategies from the point of view of the firms are defined 
endogenously. This implies that firms consider taxation when selecting their optimal 
integration strategies. For example, if public infrastructure is provided but tN is very 
low and tS is very high, it may be optimal to select strategy S,NS instead of strategy 
S,S, even though transport costs are low. This will not be in the interest of benevolent 
planners because only transport costs, not taxes, are passed on to households. For 
this reason, when setting tax rates, the governments must take into account that 
optimal integration strategies from the points of view of the firms will stay the same as 
the welfare optimal ones. 
 
Furthermore, the utility functions of the representative households in both countries 
are different because income and prices are not the same in both jurisdictions. For 
this reason, only by chance will the chosen tax rates of both governments correspond 
and the governments will not have an incentive to deviate. Instead, if N selects a tax 
rate given tS, S will react to tN again and select another tS to be optimal. Then again, 
N can select a higher tax rate without inducing a utility loss of the representative 
household in its jurisdiction. This will become a dynamic process. For this reason, 
both governments will cooperate with each other. They will select tax rates tN and tS, 
resulting in combined tax revenue high enough to afford R. A further reaction of 
selecting an even higher ti than just to finance R is not induced. Therefore, the 
possible resulting utility gain can be given to all households by setting tN and tS. Then 
neither jurisdiction has an incentive to deviate. 
Further, to achieve these tax rates, the required tax revenue to finance R must be 
illustrated. If, because of the previous analysis, positive values of ti are reasonable, 
the governments must achieve combined tax revenue high enough to cover R. 
Without governmental actions Hd)w,1(C
)1,1(C
<  holds true; but because the governments 
invest R, d declines. Therefore, Ld)w,1(C
)1,1(C
>  can be achieved. Up to now, only 
optimal tax rates tN and tS have been illustrated, saying that tax revenue is high 
enough to cover R and that, because firms know that d declines if tax rates are 
introduced, they change their optimal integration strategies from N,N, N,NS, S,N, and 
S,NS to N,N, N,S, S,N, and S,S. Because a positive correlation of tN and tS holds 
PROFIT TAXATION WITH PROVISION OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
51
true, if the governments select 0<ti<1, the required total tax revenue can always be 
achieved to finance R.   
This analysis is an exemplary description of the situation when the fixed costs 
relation for production plants in S is medium high. 
For this reason, tax revenue in N is defined in the following way: 
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The formal description of tax revenue in S, then, is described by: 
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Hence, if the fixed costs relation for production plants in S is medium high and it is 
ensured that the utility of the representative households in both countries does not 
decline by levying taxes, the optimal tax rates of both governments must ensure 
combined tax revenue of 
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This shows that tax rates are optimal from the perspectives of both governments, that 
the utility of households at least does not decline when ti is levied, and that the tax 
revenues are high enough to provide public infrastructure for differentiated goods 
because tax revenue is as high as R. 
 
If the described equations hold true and the governments select 0<ti<1, the 
representative household’s utility in both jurisdictions increases in comparison to the 
scenario without taxation. For this reason, depending on parameter configurations, 
profit taxation by a social planner for N and S to finance combined public 
infrastructure, can be a reasonable political instrument. 
If the described equations do not hold true and 0<ti<1 cannot be selected because of 
the parameter configurations, then profit taxation to finance public good provision is 
not optimal from the perspective of a social planner. Because combined tax revenue 
is needed to provide public infrastructure, taxation by a single government is never 
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optimal in this analysis. It only results in optimal profit taxation from a social planners 
perspective.  
 
1.3 Conclusion 
 
In this analysis, a trade-off between fixed costs and high per-unit variable costs is 
identified. Firms can choose between different integration strategies. Their 
headquarters are located in N and they serve the Northern and the Southern market 
with differentiated products. Every single firm must produce intermediate and final 
goods for itself; however, firms can choose N, S or both places as location for both 
production activities. As a result, many different integration strategies can be 
identified. Their optimality depends on the relative size of fixed costs for MNE 
activities, the size of transport costs for final goods, the fraction of demand in both 
markets, the wages in S being relatively low, the productivity of a single firm, and the 
degree of profit taxation in both governments.    
First, the case with high transport costs is analyzed, excluding taxes. Transport of 
intermediate goods by assumption is free.  
Low productive firms choose a strategy that minimizes fixed costs; high productive 
firms minimize the per-unit variable costs to supply both markets in which the 
transport costs are considered.   
If transport costs for final goods are high, some firms, depending on their productivity, 
can find it optimal to produce intermediate goods in one country and final goods in 
both countries locally.  
As a result of the analysis with high transport costs for final goods, their impact on 
the economic outcome becomes apparent: The higher transport costs are, the more 
firms prefer local production. Therefore, transport costs affect the per-unit variable 
costs.  
 
Then, we analyze cases in which governments levy profit taxes on final goods 
production in the differentiated sector. Here, the governments invest tax revenue in 
public infrastructure for differentiated goods. If tax revenue is high enough to cover 
costs associated with the provision of public infrastructure for differentiated goods, 
transport costs decline from high to low endogenously. Therefore, the set of optimal 
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integration strategies of heterogeneous firms changes. Then, when transport costs 
for final goods are small, no single activity is located at several places. Rather, every 
single activity, whether intermediate or final production, is located in N or in S. 
Therefore, profit functions also depend on tax rates. 
Through this analysis, optimal tax policies of governments can be economically 
explained, with comparative advantages on the one hand and elements of the “New 
Trade Theory”76 on the other when firms’ integration strategies are endogenous. 
Governments select tax rates in such a way that the utilities of the representative 
households in their jurisdictions do not decline because, they are benevolent 
planners. If parameters are configured in such a way that this condition cannot be 
held optimal tax rates are zero. Levying taxes has several impacts on the utility of 
households in both countries: They influence prices paid for differentiated goods and 
income in N, but households do not gain utility through consuming public 
infrastructure directly. If governments select 0<ti<1, because a utility loss does not 
arise in either jurisdiction, the tax rates are always positively correlated. For this 
reason, total tax revenue can always be set high enough to provide public 
infrastructure. Therefore, the level of costs for provision of public infrastructure is not 
a restriction in deciding whether to levy taxes or not. If taxation is reasonable from 
the point of view of both governments, costs to finance public infrastructure only 
influence the exact level of 0<ti<1.  
Because higher tax revenue than to finance costs for provision of public infrastructure 
is not required, if 0<ti<1 is selected, tax rates can be set in such way that the utility of 
the representative household can even increase. Because of the lower transport 
costs induced by taxation, the economic outcome can even increase. The always 
increasing economic integration is positive from the perspective of both governments; 
and, in this model, taxation also is reasonable from a world welfare perspective.  
However, in using the derived model to achieve optimal tax rates, zero taxation can 
be the best choice of governments acting as benevolent planners. This depends on 
exact parameter configurations. Although in these cases zero profit taxation of 
heterogeneous firms is optimal from the welfare perspective of both governments, it 
has not been derived in this way in other literature. There, zero taxation is optimal 
due to a race-to-the-bottom scenario under tax competition. 
 
                                            
76
 The first approach in this direction was derived by Krugman (1979). 
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1.4 Appendix 
 
Derivation I: 
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This xi(j) is the demand of one household for the variety of a firm in country i.  
Total demand for the variety of a firm in country i therefore is given by: 
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Derivation II: 
Inserting (1.3) in (1.4) following condition arises: 
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IV: All seven possible profit functions with transport costs for final goods  
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=pi , where NS,NSpi  can only be an optimal strategy if transport costs for 
intermediate goods exist. This does not occur in this analysis. For this reason, NS,Spi  always 
dominates NS,NSpi  here. 
 
Derivation V: 
For that this set of integration strategies is optimal, following is necessary: 
NS,Npi S,Npif  
NS,Spi  S,Spif  
NS,Spi NS,NSpif  
This must be the case because each of these profit function pairs contains the same fixed costs and 
only differ by the components of per-unit variable costs and transport costs.  
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If NS,Spi S,Spif  also NS,Spi NS,NSpif  always holds because C(w,1) < C(1,1). 
If this is true it can also be followed from the equations that: 
 
C(1,1) < dH C(1,w)                                                                                                                                (iv) 
C(w,1) < dH C(w,w)                                                                                                                                (v) 
holds. 
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Transformation delivers: 
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< dH 
This proves that this set of optimal integration strategies only is optimal, if high transport costs exist.  
 
Derivation VI: 
To calculate this N,Npi  is equated with NS,Spi . Then NS,Npi  and N,Npi  are compared at this location and 
for N,NS to be an optimal strategy it is necessary that: NS,Npi > N,Npi . 
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This is the  x-axis coordinate. At this point NS,Npi  has to be greater than N,Npi . 
For this reason, the x-axis coordinate of N,Npi  is required: 
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It is necessary that: 
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Derivation VII: 
N,Npi  = NS,Spi  
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This is the  x-axis coordinate. At this point N,Spi  has to be greater than N,Npi . 
For this reason, the y-axis coordinate of N,Npi  is required: 
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 y-axis coordinate of N,Spi : 
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Derivation VIII: 
N,Npi = NS,Npi  
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NS,Npi = NS,Spi  
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Derivation IX:  
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Derivation X: 
To show the set of optimal integration strategies, depending on the size of d, profit functions 
independent of ti have to be looked at. For that this set of integration strategies is optimal from the 
point of view of firms, following conditions are necessary: 
fS,Npi  NS,Npi , 
fS,Spi  NS,Spi ,  
NS,NSS,S pipi f , 
The inequalities above must hold because these strategies are compared directly. 
As a result, a further set of inequalities surfaces in our analysis: 
dLC(1,w)<C(1,1) , as fS,Npi  NS,Npi .                                                                                                      (i) 
dLC(w,w)<C(w,1) , as fS,Spi  NS,Spi .                                                                                                    (ii) 
dLC(w,w)<C(1,1) , as NS,NSS,S pipi f .                                                                                                   (iii)         
Whereas (iii) always holds if (ii) is true because C(1,1)>C(w,1). 
Transformation delivers: 
Ld)w,1(C
)1,1(C
>  and )w,w(C
)1,w(C
> dL 
This proves that this set of integration strategies only is optimal, if low transport costs exist.  
 
Derivation XI: 
N,Npi = S,Npi  
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N,Npi = N,Spi  
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Derivation XII: 
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Solving this for p: 
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  if transport costs and taxes exist. 
 
Derivation XIII: 
To calculate this, N,Npi  is equated with S,Spi . Then S,Npi  and N,Npi  are compared at this location and 
for N,S to be an optimal strategy, it is necessary that: S,Npi > N,Npi . 
N,Npi  = S,Spi  
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This is the  x-axis coordinate. At this point S,Npi  must be greater than N,Npi . 
For this reason, the y-axis coordinate of N,Npi  is required: 
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y-axis coordinate of S,Npi : 
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Derivation XIV: 
To calculate this N,Npi  is equated with S,Spi . Then N,Spi  and N,Npi  are compared at this location and 
for S,N to be an optimal strategy, it is necessary that: N,Spi > N,Npi . 
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N,Npi  = S,Spi  
( )N
L
SN
t1)1,1(Cd
X
)1,1(C
X
−







 Θ
+
Θ ( ) gft1)w,w(C
X
)w,w(Cd
X
S
S
L
N
−−−







 Θ
+
Θ
=  
 
=Θ )S,S;N,N( ( )
( ) ( )N
L
SN
S
S
L
N
t1)1,1(Cd
X
)1,1(C
Xt1)w,w(C
X
)w,w(Cd
X
gf
−








+−−








+
+
 
This is the  x-axis coordinate. At this point N,Spi  must be greater than N,Npi . 
For this reason, the y-axis coordinate of N,Npi  is required: 
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y-axis coordinate of N,Spi : 
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It is necessary that: 
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Derivation XV: 
The fixed costs relation is medium high: 
Utility of the representative household in S with taxation: 
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This results in: 
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Utility of the representative household in S without taxation: 
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Then: 
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For that
A
1
oldV
A
1
newV SS =  holds true, following condition is necessary: 
 
=





−





α
µα−+





α
µα−+
−α
α
−α−α
α
−α
)w,w(C2
1
)1,1(Cd2
11)1()w,w(C2
1
A
11)1(
A
1
m
L
)1()1(1)1()1(1
S  






























−+−
+






−+






α
µα−+
−α
α
−α
2
H
SSNNH
)1()1(1
S
)1,1(Cd
X
)w,w(C
X
)1,1(C
X
)1,w(C
X
gf
)w,w(C2
1
)1,1(Cd2
1
)w,w(C2
1
A
11)1(
A
1
m
 
 
This results in: 
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Following, it is defined: 
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This results in: 
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Derivation XVI: 
In any parameter configuration, E is positive: 
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Derivation XVII: 
The fixed costs relation is medium high: 
Utility of the representative household in N with taxation: 
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This results in: 
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Derivation XVIII: 
1.) if K is negative ⇒  no optimal tN exists 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
In so-called “New Trade Theory” models firms produce differentiated goods under 
monopolistic competition and trade emerges independently of comparative 
advantages.77 However, in the course of the always more proceeding international 
integration, trade, and foreign direct investments (FDIs) recent innovation to the 
literature derived. 
In the prevailing opinion, multinational enterprises (MNEs) belong to the key players 
in an economically integrated world. Also policy makers want them to invest in their 
country because MNEs have dramatically gained importance in the past decades. 
For instance, between 1990 and 2001 the sails of foreign affiliates of MNEs grew a 
lot faster than the exports of goods.78 It also has been estimated that MNEs then 
were responsible for 75% of commodity trade in the world.79 The top-rate of FDI 
inflows was reached in 2000 with $1.4 trillion.80 After the enormous growth, the FDIs 
of MNEs stabilized between 2001 and 2005.81   
On the basis of this description, of the increasing importance of FDIs since the 
1990s, the gain of the relevance of MNEs for the world economy is clearly made. 
Their modes of organization are quite diverse.82 And mostly motives as savings of 
transport costs, savings of factor prices, or economies of scale come to the fore.83 
Even though factor endowments are difficult to measure, evidence for FDIs being 
influenced by factor cost differences can be found in latest studies; additionally, firm-
level economies of scale influence the decision of an integration strategy of a firm.84 
In sectors in which firm-level economies of scale are important firms are less likely to 
serve foreign markets through exports than through subsidiaries.85  
Not only more complex integration strategies are introduced into the theory. Also a 
very convenient but not at all realistic assumption, applied in most of the recent 
models, is abandoned: the assumption of identical firms. Instead, we introduce 
                                            
77
 As in Krugman (1979). 
78
 As in UNCTAD (2002). 
79
 As in Dunning (1993). 
80
 As in UNCTAD (2004). 
81
 As in Barba Navaretti and Venables (2006). 
82
 Evidence here fore also is found in UNCTAD (1998) and Feinberg and Keane (2006). 
83
 As in Markusen (2002). 
84
 Evidence  for the influence of factor cost differences can be found by Hanson et al. (2001) and 
Yeaple (2003) . 
85
 Studies underpinning the motive of economies of scale are Brainard (1997) and Ekholm(1998). 
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heterogeneous firms and focus on the interaction of productivity, trade, and 
international integration.86 Such a framework exhibits important features suggested 
by empirical evidence.87  
Our analysis assumes monopolistic competition between firms in manufacturing, 
diverse integration strategies, and firm heterogeneity. A government levies taxes as a 
benevolent planner. From recent literature it is known that the economic structure 
and the nature of competition are essential for optimal policies.88  
A single government is interested in maximizing its own national welfare. To benefit 
from activities of MNEs and from profits of other firms in their jurisdictions, 
governments levy corporate taxes. MNEs shift their profits across borders in 
response to corporate tax increases. Hence, an increasing national corporate tax rate 
induces a decline of multinational investments.89  According to Hines (1999), an 
elasticity of FDIs, with respect to taxes, of minus 0.6 is a typical result. 
Realizing the dramatically gained importance of MNE activities and its relevance for 
corporate taxation, this model outlines a possibility of efficient corporate tax policies 
for governments in a two country setting with monopolistic competition and 
heterogeneous firms.  
 
The subsequent analysis is structured in the following way to deal with the outlined 
problems:  
Section 2.2 first shows the composition of the model and then optimal integration 
strategies of firms in the differentiated sector are derived. These depend on the 
relative size of fixed costs, factor price differences, relative market shares, firm 
productivities, and transport costs.  
We then introduce profit taxation where tax revenue is spent for a lump-sum transfer 
to the households in the jurisdictions. Again the reactions of firms are shown and 
optimal tax policy of both governments is portrayed. First, a scenario with profit 
taxation only and, afterwards, a scenario with profit taxation and depreciation 
possibilities, and their impacts are discussed. 
Section 2.3 summarizes the results of the analysis and illustrates its impacts on the 
economic outcome. 
                                            
86
 Main theoretical papers are Bernard et al. (2003), Melitz (2003), Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 
(2004), Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) or Baldwin and Okubo (2006). 
87
 As in e.g. Bernard and Jensen (2001) or Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000). 
88
 As in Dixit and Grossman (1987), Venables (1985) or Helpman and Flam(1986). 
89
 Evidence therefore can be found in Devereux (2006), Hines and Rice (1994) or Clausing (2003). 
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2.2 Optimal profit taxation of heterogeneous firms with lump-sum 
transfer 
 
2.2.1 Some general features of the model set-up  
The following partial analysis describes the optimal integration strategies of 
heterogeneous firms based on the theoretical framework of Grossman, Helpman and 
Szeidl (2006) with particular emphasis on the role of profit taxation.  
In this analysis, the optimal tax policy of governments is considered when tax 
revenue is spent as lump-sum transfer. A government’s choice depends on the 
integration strategies chosen by the heterogeneous firms. 
We set up a simple model with two countries: A and B. The former is developed, the 
latter less developed. Although factors are assumed to be immobile across national 
borders, goods are not. However, factor price equalization does not emerge due to 
the presence of transport costs. With regard to integration strategies, firms choose 
between two options: concentrating production in one country and serving 
consumers world-wide from there (exporting) or engaging in multi-plant production 
and serving consumers locally through domestic and foreign subsidiaries 
(multinational activity). In the parsimonious framework chosen, labor is the only factor 
used in production and for firm or plant set-up. 
 
One industry produces a homogeneous good x0; the other industry produces 
differentiated goods. 
The homogeneous good is supplied under perfect competition. A is more productive 
in this sector than B. For this reason, there exists a gap between wages (w) in A and 
B. It is assumed that one unit of labor is needed to fabricate one of these goods in A. 
However, 
w
1
 > 1 units of labor are needed in B to produce one unit of the 
homogeneous good. We focus on parameter configurations to ensure that the 
homogeneous good is produced in both countries in equilibrium and traded across 
national borders. The price of the homogeneous good is chosen as the numéraire. 
Consequently, wA = 1 > wB = w arises, where iw  is the wage rate in country i, 
i { }B,A∈ , and transport costs for the homogeneous good exist.90 
                                            
90
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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The differentiated good is supplied under monopolistic competition. Each firm acts as 
a monopolist in supplying its variety. The price elasticity of demand between varieties 
is ε > 1 so that firms charge a fixed mark-up over marginal costs. Due to monopolistic 
competition, the price will be lower than the monopoly price because, otherwise, the 
firms will loose an over proportional amount of demand for their varieties. 
 
We assume that these firms are heterogeneous in productivity that they only can be 
founded in A, and that firm headquarters are not internationally mobile. For this 
reason, all headquarters are located in A (e.g., because of the unfavorable 
institutional environment in B) and are all owned by A. 
To enter the differentiated industry, an amount of h units of A’s labor, which are sunk 
costs, must be invested. These are firm set-up costs. With this investment, a firm in 
the heterogeneous sector gets to know its own potential productivity level ( θ ). Then, 
the firm can decide if it wants to enter the market. Firms in the differentiated sector 
can be diverse in their productivity so, if they decide to enter the market after 
investing h, they can make positive profits.91 However, before investing h, all 
heterogeneous firms have the same expectations about their profits. For this reason, 
all heterogeneous firms are the same ex ante. If ex ante zero profits are expected, no 
more firms are willing to enter the differentiated sector. The productivity level drawn 
by a firm is a random variable (graphic 2.1). 
 
Graphic 2.1 
 
In addition, it is assumed that not only are production costs less in B than in A but 
also that its market for differentiated goods (MB) is much smaller than the 
differentiated goods market in A (MA). 
  
2.2.2 The utility function of a representative household 
All households have the same preferences and their utility function depends on a 
homogeneous good x0 and the sub-utility of consumption of differentiated goods X. 
                                            
91
 As in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). 
θDecision to  
invest h or not 
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Each household consumes goods of either sector and, in formal accounts, its utility 
function may be written as: 
 
XxU 0i += ,  i { }B,A∈                                                                                            (2.1) 
where  








µα
= ∫
Θ
α
α
dj)j(x1X
max
0
i
              10 <α< , 0<µ <1 and α<µ                          (2.2)        
Consequently, household utility increases if more varieties of the differentiated 
product are available. These love for variety preferences exist for the consumption of 
differentiated goods.92 The elasticity of substitution between two of these varieties is 
constant: )1(
1
α−
. All varieties in the differentiated sector are non-perfect substitutes 
for one another, as α <1. But as α >0, they are somehow substitutable. µ  is a 
constant with 0<µ < α <1 and reflects the preference for the differentiated industry 
over the homogeneous industry in the utility function of the representative household. 
X  shows the sub-utility of consumption of the differentiated output, where )j(xi  
features the consumption in i of the j-th variety in this industry.93 
Thus, the utility function of a representative household is linear in x0 and non-linear in 
differentiated goods. This implies that the demand for differentiated products 
depends on prices of differentiated goods, but not on earnings.  
 
2.2.3 The heterogeneous firms 
As mentioned before, heterogeneous firms arise in the differentiated industry and 
locate their immobile headquarters in A. Irrespective of their integration strategies, 
these firms sell their products on each market. 
In this analysis, the optimal integration strategies of these firms, which depend on 
firm productivity levels, are discussed. An integration strategy is defined by the 
choice of production location of intermediate and final goods. In the following 
sections the choice of an integration strategy is influenced not only by transport costs 
but also by taxation on profits.    
To begin, a firm in the differentiated industry with productivity θ  produces final goods 
according to the production function θ F(m, a). The amount of intermediate input 
                                            
92
 As in Krugman (1979) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
93
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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used is denoted by m, and a is the level of final goods activity. Both are measured in 
units of labor input. F(m, a) is an increasing, concave function with constant returns 
to scale. Furthermore, the elasticity of substitution between m and a is not greater 
than 1. c(pm, pa) describes the unit cost function, referring to F(m, a), where the price 
of input i at the location of final goods production is denoted by pi, i { }a,m∈ . Taking 
stock, c(pm, pa)/ θ  describes the per-unit variable costs of production of a firm with 
productivity θ  at a particular location.94 
Households only consume final goods. 
A firm producing intermediate goods in B has to bear extra fixed costs of g for 
communication and supervision, because the headquarters of MNEs are located in 
A. Likewise, MNEs incur additional fixed costs of f if they produce final goods in B. 
These fixed costs are measured in labor units of the home country. Therefore, it is 
assumed that fixed costs do not exist in A.95 
However, as already discussed, wages in B are lower than in A. It is assumed that 
production of one unit of the intermediate or final goods requires one unit of local 
labor at the place of production but that the intermediate goods have to be 
transported to the location of final production, if the latter are manufactured 
elsewhere. However, per-unit variable costs of manufacturing differentiated final or 
intermediate goods in B are lower than those of manufacturing these goods in A. 
Because wB=w<1=wA, B has a comparative advantage in manufacturing 
differentiated goods. 
 
Table 2.1:96  
Intermediate production m Final good production a Fixed 
costs 
Per-unit variable 
costs 
in A in A 0 c(1, 1) / θ  
in A in B f c(1, w) / θ  
in B in A g c(w, 1) / θ  
in B in B f+g c(w, w) / θ  
 
Table 2.1 shows that the optimality of integration strategies depends on per-unit 
variable costs c(pm,pa) and the fixed costs of firms in the differentiated industry. 
                                            
94
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
95
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
96
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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Furthermore, the total factor productivity of a firm is elemental for optimal integration 
strategies. 
Additionally, these strategies also depend on market size, the level of transport costs, 
and taxes. 
In the following, strategies depend on the location of intermediate and final goods 
production, where both can be produced in B as well as in A.  
 
2.2.4 Iceberg transport costs 
Now, iceberg transport costs (d) are introduced. This implies that an exporting firm 
has to ship more than one unit of the final goods so that one unit of the goods arrives 
at the location of foreign consumers. Transport costs for final goods are identical 
across countries and differentiated products, and they are proportional to the extent 
of shipments.97 
In the following section, the size of transport costs is relatively high: (d=dH). 
 
2.2.5 Analysis with high transport costs and without taxation 
Let us first describe the case in which transport costs for final goods are high and 
taxes are zero. By assumption, transport of intermediate goods is free.98 
Compared to production in A, setting up foreign production plants in B induces 
additional fixed costs for a firm. However, its per-unit variable costs can be reduced 
when production activities are shifted to B.99 
Subsequently, the variation in firm productivity levels θ  in the differentiated industry 
will be observed more precisely.100 
A firm will also never conduct activities in more than one plant per country. Such a 
strategy will unnecessarily incur additional costs. 
To illustrate optimal integration strategies depending on the productivity level of a 
firm, we compare profits across alternative integration strategies. Consistent with the 
preferences depicted in (2.1) and (2.2), every manufacturing firm of this industry 
faces the following demand function in each country i, i { }B,A∈ :101 
[ ] )1(1iii )j(pM)j(x −αµα=                                                                                               (2.3)   
                                            
97
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
98
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
99
 As also in Yeaple (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). 
100
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
101
 See derivation I in Appendix 2.4. 
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ix  (j) describes the total demand in one country for the differentiated good of a single 
firm. This demand depends on market size iM , i { }B,A∈ . Furthermore, it depends on 
the substitutability of differentiated products among each other, α , on µ , which 
reflects the preference for the differentiated industry over the homogeneous industry 
by the representative household, and  on ip  (j), which is the effect of the price of the 
individual firm on ix . Hence, demand from a single household for differentiated 
goods is independent of income.  
Each firm, therefore, maximizes its profits accordingly: 
kc)j(xc)j(x)j(x)j(p)j(x)j(p BBAABBAA −θ−θ−+=pi                                                   (2.4) 
Here )j(x)j(p)j(x)j(p BBAA +  denotes total sales, ( θ−θ−
BBAA c)j(xc)j(x )reflects total 
costs in both countries and k are the fixed costs. 
θ
Ac
 and 
θ
Bc
 are per-unit variable 
costs in N and S, respectively. 
This results in the identification of the optimal prices of a firm:102 
pA(j)opt= θα
Ac1
,  pB(j)opt= θα
Bc1
                                                                                  (2.5) 
As shown here, the optimal price of a firm is independent of demand, respectively, on 
market size in A and B. Each market price is defined as 
α
1
 times the per-unit variable 
costs of a firm serving the specific market. Hence, prices entail a fixed markup over 
marginal costs. 
In the following, we allow for transport costs and introduce terms that capture 
transport costs as well as variable (marginal) production costs.   
Generally, profits may be formulated as follows:103 
b,a
b,a
S
b,a
N
b,a k)r,j(dC
X
)r,j(dC
X
* −
Θ
+
Θ
=pi , with a { }B,A∈  and b { }B,A∈                            (2.6) 
 
                                            
102
 See derivation II in Appendix 2.4. 
103
 See derivation III in Appendix 2.4. 
Furthermore, )1( α−
α
θ=Θ , dC= )1(c α−
α
, =X
)1(1)1( α−





µ
α
⋅α− , MA X = AX , and MB X = BX , where 
BX < AX  because the market share of B is smaller than of A. 
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Firm profits depend on its integration strategy, where a is the determinant of the 
location of intermediate goods production and b of final goods production. Hence, 
intermediate as well as final differentiated goods can be produced either in A or in B 
or in both countries. Depending on the location of production of a and b, different 
possible fixed costs (ka,b) are taken into account in the profit function of a firm. If 
intermediate goods are produced in B, ka,b has size g; if final goods are produced in 
B, ka,b has size f; and if intermediate or final goods are produced in A, fixed costs are 
zero. Also per-unit variable costs dCa,b(j, r) depend on the locations of intermediate 
and final production, a and b. As denoted in table 2.1 j is the determinant of the 
dependency of total per-unit variable costs on per-unit variable costs for intermediate 
goods, measured in units of labor at the production location. Hence, j is j { }w,1∈ ; 1 
occurs if intermediate goods are produced in A; and w<1 denotes these costs if they 
are produced in B. Additionally, r is the determinant of the dependency of total per-
unit variable costs on per-unit variable costs for final goods, measured in units of 
labor at the production location. Hence, r is r { }w,1∈ ; 1 occurs if final goods are 
produced in A; and w<1 denotes for these costs if they are produced in B. Finally, 
also transport costs (d) are part of per-unit variable costs and depend on the location 
of final production. If final goods have to be shipped to serve a market, d >1 occurs; if 
final goods are produced at the location of consumption, d =1 (no transportation of 
final goods) is taken into account in the profit function of a firm. 
 
Furthermore, high transport costs exist if:104 
Hd)w,w(C
)1,w(C
<   or  Hd)w,1(C
)1,1(C
<  
For this reason, the following possible profit functions arise for a firm, depending on 
its productivity level, in a two-country setting with high transport costs: 
)1,1(Cd
X
)1,1(C
X
H
BA
A,A
Θ
+
Θ
=pi                                                                                              (2.I) 
This strategy A,A with the profit function A,Api  describes concentration of intermediate 
and final good production in the home country. A firm operates in the market in B by 
exporting the differentiated products. For this reason, supplying the market in B is 
                                            
104
 See Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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more expensive. This strategy minimizes fixed costs but produces with relatively high 
per-unit variable costs C(1,1) because factor prices in A are higher than in B. 
f)w,1(C
X
)1,1(C
X BA
AB,A −
Θ
+
Θ
=pi                                                                                         (2.II) 
Firms choosing this strategy supply the market in A by producing intermediate and 
final goods there. Intermediate goods from A are shipped to B, where final goods 
production takes place to serve consumers in B locally. In this case, MNE activity in 
final goods eliminates all trade in final goods. With this strategy, medium high fixed 
costs of f are incurred. On the other hand, the firm can save per-unit variable costs 
when supplying B compared to (2.I). 
A strategy A,B with the profit function B,Api  is no alternative to A,AB in the case with 
high transport costs.  
f)w,1(C
X
)w,1(Cd
X B
H
A
B,A −
Θ
+
Θ
=pi                                                                                    (2.II’) 
Even though the fixed costs and the costs of supplying B are identical when selecting 
one of these two strategies, this strategy can be eliminated because of the costs of 
operating in the market in B. Supplying to A under strategy A,AB, a firm produces 
intermediate as well as final goods in A. Consequently, the only difference to strategy 
A,B is that the per-unit variable costs of supplying A are lower. This is due to the high 
transport costs occur to supply A’s market when selecting A,B instead of A,AB. For 
this reason, this strategy never is reasonable if high transport costs exist.  
g)1,w(Cd
X
)1,w(C
X
H
BA
A,B −
Θ
+
Θ
=pi                                                                                    (2.III) 
In this case, intermediate goods are produced in B and final goods in A. For this 
reason, this strategy also can be seen as “partial globalization”.105 Intra-firm trade 
exists. Transport costs arise when supplying B, because final goods are produced in 
A. 
Similar to strategy A,AB, a firm in this case has to bear medium high fixed costs, here 
amounting to g, because intermediate goods are produced in B and final goods in A. 
However, adequate ranking of strategies A,AB and B,A cannot be determined without 
an exact identification of the level of the different fixed costs f and g and of the per-
unit variable costs.  
                                            
105
 Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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gf)w,w(C
X
)1,w(C
X BA
AB,B −−
Θ
+
Θ
=pi                                                                               (2.IV) 
Firms choosing this strategy supply to B by producing intermediate and final goods 
there. To satisfy demand in A, these firms produce intermediate goods in B, ship 
them to A at zero transport costs, produce final goods in A, and sell them there. In 
this case, international trade in final goods does not occur. Strategy B,AB is 
associated with fixed costs of f and g. Hence, these firms save high per-unit variable 
costs, including trade costs. Because of the higher fixed costs associated with this 
strategy, B,AB only is reasonable for highly productive firms, that face a high 
demand. 
Table 2.2 is a summary of the described profit functions. 
 
Table 2.2: 
Strategy 
a,b 
Meaning Marginal costs 
of serving 
consumers in A 
Marginal costs 
of serving 
consumers in B 
Fixed 
costs 
ka,b 
A,A Intermediate good 
production in A; 
final good 
production in A 
C(1,1) dHC(1,1) 0 
A,B Intermediate good 
production in A; 
final good 
production in B 
dHC(1,w) C(1,w) f 
A,AB Intermediate good 
production in A; 
final good 
production in A 
and B 
C(1,1) C(1,w) f 
B,A Intermediate good 
production in B; 
final good 
production in A 
C(w,1) dHC(w,1) g 
B,AB Intermediate good 
production in B; 
final good 
production in A 
and B 
C(w,1) C(w,w) f and g 
 
 
Alternative strategies to B,AB are B,B and AB,AB. Their costs of supplying to B and 
the fixed costs of these strategies match those of AB,Bpi , but the per-unit variable 
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costs for supplying A are higher. In this scenario, with high transport costs, per-unit 
variable costs are lower with B,AB than with B,B or AB,AB; fixed costs are the same. 
Therefore, firms will never choose B,B or AB,AB. 
  
Theoretically two further integration strategies, namely AB,A and AB,B, are possible. 
However, these strategies are never reasonable. A firm will only produce 
intermediate goods in both A and B (associated with extra fixed costs for 
intermediate production) if high transport costs for intermediate goods exist. If this is 
the case, it will only make sense to produce final products in both countries to save 
on transport costs.106  
Hence (2.I), (2.II), (2.III) and (2.IV) are the only relevant strategies if transport costs 
are high.107 
In this case, a pure problem between fixed costs and per-unit variable costs exists. 
Transportation of final goods to A is never optimal because of the size of dH.  
This can be seen from Hd)w,w(C
)1,w(C
< .  
The lowest per-unit variable costs to satisfy demand in each market, therefore, can 
be achieved with local production of final goods. Strategies that are chosen in this 
setting where final goods are not only produced locally are B,A and A,A. If g is very 
small, B,A is a possible optimal strategy although high transport costs exist. Also, A,A 
belongs to the set of optimal strategies. However, both of these strategies are 
chosen by more unproductive firms because they cannot afford high fixed costs. 
A firm produces intermediate goods at only one location because their transportation 
is free.108 A firm producing intermediate goods in A also produces final goods there to 
satisfy demand in A, because transportation of final goods from B is relatively costly. 
Therefore, it is not attractive for a firm.  
This can be considered by Hd)w,1(C
)1,1(C
< .  
A firm producing intermediate goods in B has two possibilities. Either it only produces 
final goods in A, or it ships some of them to A to serve its demand and the 
intermediate goods for B stay in B so that final goods for every market are produced 
                                            
106
 All seven possible strategies with transport costs for final goods are shown in IV in Appendix 2.4, 
where the size of transport costs is the determinant of the set of optimal strategies. 
107
 If, and only if, high transport costs exist this set of optimal integration strategies is chosen. This can 
be seen in derivation V in Appendix 2.4. 
108
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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locally. The optimal strategy for a firm depends on its productivity and fixed costs. 
Therefore, following integration strategies are possibly relevant: A,A; A,AB; B,A; 
B,AB. 
 
Graphic 2.2 shows A,Api  and AB,Bpi  depending on productivity Θ . 
 
Graphic 2.2:109 
 
Firms will always choose the integration strategy with the highest attainable positive 
profit at a given level of Θ . AB,Bpi  is associated with fixed costs f and g, while A,Api   is 
associated with zero fixed costs. However, the variable production costs under A,A 
are higher than those under B,AB. Therefore, A,Api  is higher than AB,Bpi  if productivity 
is lower than a critical level Θ (A,A; B,AB) and is lower than AB,Bpi  at Θ > Θ (A,A; 
B,AB). A,Api  and AB,Bpi  intercept at Θ (A,A; B,AB).  
The profit function AB,Api  now can be added to this analysis. AB,Api  is associated with 
fixed costs f. The variable production costs under A,AB are higher than those under 
B,AB and lower than those under A,A. Graphic 2.3 shows alternative possibilities for 
this strategy. Therefore, A,Api  is higher than AB,A'pi  if productivity is lower than a 
critical level C and is lower than AB,A'pi  at Θ >C. A,Api  and AB,A'pi  intercept at C. AB,Bpi  
is lower than AB,A'pi  if productivity is lower than a critical level E, and is higher than 
AB,A
'pi  at Θ >E. AB,Bpi  and AB,A'pi  intercept at E. Another possibility for the profit 
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 Own construction on the basis of Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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function corresponding to strategy A,AB is AB,A''pi . In this case, AB,A''pi  is lower than 
A,Api  and AB,Bpi . Only A,Api  and AB,Bpi  then intercept at D in the graphic.  
 
Graphic 2.3:110 
 
 
C = )AB,A;A,A(Θ ; D = )AB,B;A,A(Θ ; E = )AB,B;AB,A(Θ  
 
For A,AB to be an optimal strategy, it is necessary that the intersection of AB,Api  and 
AB,Bpi  lies above the intersection of A,Api and AB,Bpi , at )AB,B;A,A(Θ , resulting in111 
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This condition has to hold so that A,AB is an optimal strategy for a firm. As shown in 
graphic 2.3, low productivity firms locate all production activities at home; high 
productivity firms produce intermediate goods only in B and final goods in A and B; 
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 Own construction on the basis of Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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 See derivation VI in Appendix 2.4. 
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and, if AB,Api  runs like AB,A'pi , firms with intermediate productivity levels produce 
intermediate goods in A and final goods in A and B. 
Just as AB,Api  can be added to the analysis in graphic 2.2, this is also possible with 
A,Bpi . A,Bpi  is associated with fixed costs g. The variable production costs under B,A 
are higher than those under B,AB and lower than those under A,A. 
For B,A to become an optimal strategy, it is necessary that the intersection of A,Bpi  
and AB,Bpi  lies above the intersection of A,Api  and AB,Bpi . Using the same approach 
as in the previous analysis for AB,Api , the following condition must hold for B,A to 
become an optimal strategy:112 
 
L
H
BB
H
BA
H
BA
)1,w(Cd
X
)w,w(C
X
)1,1(Cd
X
)1,1(C
X
)1,w(Cd
X
)1,w(C
X
f
g γ=
−
−−+
≤                                                          (2.8) 
 
If (2.8) holds, firms with low productivity levels locate all production activities at home, 
highly productive firms produce intermediate goods in B and final goods in A and B, 
and firms with intermediate levels of productivity manufacture intermediate goods in 
B and final goods in A.  
From (2.7) and (2.8), it can be seen that, if Lγ < Hf
g γ<  is true, only two optimal 
strategies exist: Either all firms only produce in A, or intermediate goods are 
produced in B and final goods are produced in both locations. The assumption that 
the elasticity of substitution between intermediate and final goods production is not 
greater than 1 ensures that Lγ < Hγ  holds.113  
For AB,Api  or A,Bpi  to be a dominate integration strategy, either Lf
g γ≤  or Hf
g γ≥  must 
hold true. Because this is not possible at the same time, only one of the strategies, 
B,A or A,AB, can be optimal, depending on the size of the fixed costs relation. In 
graphic 2.3 AB,A'pi  is a possible optimal strategy for a firm, depending on its 
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 See derivation VII in Appendix 2.4. 
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productivity. This means that Hf
g γ≥  must be true. Then, the fixed costs for a final 
goods producing plant in B are relatively lower than the fixed costs for an 
intermediate goods producing plant there.  
In case B,A, not A,AB, is optimal, Lf
g γ≤  holds. This means that the fixed costs for a 
final goods producing plant in B are relatively higher than the fixed costs for an 
intermediate goods producing plant in B. Accordingly, whether A,AB or B,A is optimal 
depends on the fixed costs.114  
 
For this reason, another graphical description (graphic 2.4) shows all areas of optimal 
strategies in one diagram. 
 
Graphic 2.4:115 
 
 
C = )AB,B;A,B(Θ ; D = )AB,B;AB,A(Θ ; E = )AB,A;A,A(Θ  
 
Graphic 2.4 shows combinations of fixed costs g for intermediate goods and Θ  that 
generate different strategies of integration. In this connection, the level of fixed costs 
for final goods f is held constant. If f changes, the bold, broken lines will change.116 
In the section A,A, all activities of a firm are located in A; in section B,A, intermediate 
goods are produced in B and final goods in A. Section A,AB shows firms that 
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 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
115
 Own construction on the basis of Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
116
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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manufacture intermediate goods in A and final goods in A and B. Finally, if the 
productivity of a firm lies in region B,AB, intermediate goods producing activities are 
shifted to B; and final goods are produced in both countries.117 
Hence, if, depending on the productivity level of a firm, strategies A,A; A,AB or B,AB 
are reasonable, fixed costs g are high relative to the given value of f. If, depending on 
the productivity level of a firm, strategies A,A; B,A or B,AB are reasonable, fixed 
costs g are small relative to the given value of f. If, depending on the productivity 
level of a firm, strategies A,A or B,AB are only reasonable, the fixed costs relation 
between g and f is medium high. 
 
The five graphical analogues to the analytical cut-off levels separating the optimal 
integration strategies in graphic 2.4 result from the following:  
The cut-offs are calculated by equating the profits of one strategy with those of 
another strategy and solving for Θ . Four different possibly optimal pi exist: A,Api , 
AB,Api , A,Bpi , and AB,Bpi ; and five different cut-off levels arise. The sixth theoretically 
possible comparison is AB,Api with A,Bpi . However, as already discussed, these two 
strategies cannot be equated because they are never optimal at the same time if only 
firm productivities differ because they arise when different fixed costs relations exist.  
Hence, the different cut-off levels are given by 118 






−
=Θ
)1,1(Cd
1
)w,1(C
1X
f)AB,A;A,A(
H
B
.                                                                  (2.a) 
This cut-off level between sections A,A and A,AB is independent of g. For this 
reason, it is represented by a vertical line in graphic 2.4.  
From graphic 2.3 it is known that A,AB is the optimal strategy for firms with 
intermediate levels of productivity, if Hf
g γ≥  holds. If Θ  is smaller than Θ (A,A;A,AB), 
A,A is optimal. If Θ  is greater, then A,AB is the optimal strategy. Firms with the exact 
productivity of Θ (A,A;A,AB) are just indifferent between the production of all goods at 
home and the production of intermediate goods in A and of final goods in A and B 
because their profits are the same in both cases. 
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 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
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 See derivation VIII in Appendix 2.4. 
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This cut-off level between sections A,A and B,A depends on g and is represented by 
a line through the origin. At levels of Θ  that exceed Θ (A,A;B,A), B,A is optimal; for 
lower levels, A,A is the optimal strategy. 
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                                (2.c) 
This cut-off level between sections A,A and B,AB depends on g and starts from a 
negative intercept. Because of the per-unit variable costs, it is steeper than 
Θ (A,A;B,A). At levels of Θ  that exceed Θ (A,A;B,AB), B,AB is optimal; for lower 
levels, A,A is optimal. 
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                                (2.d) 
This cut-off level between sections A,AB and B,AB again depends on g and is 
represented by a line through the origin. Because of the per-unit variable costs, it is 
steeper than Θ (A,A;B,A). At levels of Θ  that exceed Θ (A,AB;B,AB), B,AB is 
optimal; for lower levels, A,AB is the better strategy for a firm. The higher fixed costs 
g are, the higher firm productivity must be for intermediate goods production in B to 
be profitable. 

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                                                                (2.e) 
This cut-off level between sections B,A and B,AB is independent of g. For this 
reason, it is represented by a vertical line in graphic 2.4. If the level of Θ  is lower 
than Θ (B,A;B,AB), then B,A is optimal. If the level of Θ  exceeds Θ (B,A;B,AB), then 
B,AB is the optimal strategy for a firm. 
Because of the high transport costs, firms choose this strategy (B,AB) to produce 
final goods locally. Hence, in final goods production, these are horizontal firms.119 
These highly productive firms shift most production activities to B, where per-unit 
costs are lower, to generate the highest possible reduction of variable per-unit 
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 As in Markusen and Venables (1998). 
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costs.120 Due to high transport costs, final goods for the market in A are produced in 
A to maximize firm profits. The fraction of firms choosing this strategy depends on the 
productivity of the firms. It increases if g falls and then becomes independent of g.  
MNE activities for final goods production only arise to the right of the bold, broken 
line in graphic 2.4. The smaller g, the greater this fraction of firms will be.  
If g is very high, the fraction of firms producing final goods in A and B is independent 
of g; whereas the fraction of them choosing strategy A,AB or B,AB depends on the 
size of g. The fraction of firms choosing strategy B,A increases if g is small and firm 
productivity is > 0. In the graphical analogue to the cut-off level )AB,B;A,B(Θ  in 
graphic 2.4, this fraction becomes independent of g.121 
If firms have an intermediate productivity level Θ , namely that 
Θ (B,A;B,AB) <Θ< Θ (A,A;A,AB), then the fixed costs for a production plant in B for 
final goods are only borne if the fixed costs for intermediate goods producing plants g 
are small. Accordingly, these firms either shift intermediate production activities to B 
and produce final goods in both countries, due to high transport costs; or they 
produce intermediate and final goods only in A, if Lγ < Hf
g γ<  holds.122 For positive 
values of given fixed costs for intermediate goods g, the most unproductive firms 
locate all production activities in A and export their final goods to deliver the market in 
B, whereas transport costs are high. 
Consequently, a reduction of fixed costs, as well as a reduction of barriers to trade, 
or transport costs, is influential in determining optimal integration strategies for firms 
and encourages their economic outcome.  
 
2.2.6 Analysis with high transport costs, profit taxation and lump-sum transfer 
In the following, governments can set profit taxes in the first stage but cannot rescind 
their offers by assumption. Firms must decide upon their optimal integration 
strategies, whereas the governments take this into account when setting tax rates. 
Governments choose tax rates ti, i { }B,A∈ , to tax firm profits, and pass tax revenue 
on to the households in their jurisdictions. Therefore, the governments take the utility 
of the representative household in their jurisdictions into account when selecting 
optimal tax rates ti.  
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 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006). 
121
 As in Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006).  
122
 As in Yeaple (2003). 
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Transport costs reduce firm profits. On the one hand, the set of optimal integration 
strategies is influenced by these transport costs; on the other hand, transport costs 
also influence the run of the graphical analogues to the cut off levels shown in 
graphic 2.4. Profit taxes influence the run of these graphical analogues, which 
indicate the profitability of alternative modes of firm integration. Strategies producing 
final goods in A, as well as in B, only become optimal because of d. This argument of 
local production is independent of taxes. 
 
2.2.6.1 The problem of the governments 
In this chapter, the cases analyzed are those, in which the governments of both 
countries, A and B, can levy taxes At  and Bt , which are taken into account in the 
profit functions of the firms. In this setting, taxes are paid on firm profits either in A or 
in B. The location of tax payment depends on the location of final goods production of 
a firm. Intermediate goods production is not taxed. Therefore, in this setting, double 
taxation is not the problem of the analysis.123 
Furthermore, by assumption, households do not know the underlying tax basis for 
provision of the lump-sum transfer so that the composition of consumption of 
differentiated goods is not distorted. Additionally, by assumption, the highest possible 
productivity level Θ max=1 always is part of the integration strategy, with most of its 
total production in B. We assume a uniform distribution function of firms over 
productivity levels in this analysis. 
The price for the homogeneous product is p0=1, and prices for differentiated products 
are shown by pi(j), where p is the price for variety j in country i, i { }B;A∈ .  
As already shown in section 2.2.2, the utility of a representative household in country 
i, i { }B;A∈ , is given by: 
XxU 0i +=                                                                                                             (2.1) 
where 
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This can also be shown by:124 
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 As in Egger et al. (2006a). 
124
 See derivation IX in Appendix 2.4. 
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The utility of a representative household increases in mi and declines in pi(j). 
 
For a government to decide to pass on a lump-sum transfer to the households in its 
jurisdiction and, therefore, select ti>0, the utility of the representative household with 
lump-sum transfer may not be smaller than the previously shown utility in 2.9 (i.e., 
V´ V≥ ). However, tax revenue of a government depends on the strategies chosen by 
the firms. For this reason, we must first look at the profit functions of the firms, 
depending on tax rates, to set up the corresponding utility function with lump-sum 
transfer.   
 
To show welfare implications, optimal integration strategies with taxation are 
examined in the following sub-section. 
                                                                          
2.2.6.2 Integration strategies with profit taxation  
Assume now that optimal integration strategies depend on ti as well, where i { }B,A∈ . 
The set of optimal integration strategies stays the same as the one without taxation. 
However, the corresponding profit functions now also depend on ti. The profit 
functions depend on firm productivity, market sizes, per-unit variable costs, fixed 
costs, transport costs, and the degrees of taxation:   
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=pi                                                                       (2.I´) 
If a firm chooses strategy A,A, all its taxes on profits are paid in A because all final 
goods are produced there. tA reduces profits of a firm. The degree of the reduction 
depends on the tax rate selected by A. The higher the degree of taxation, the flatter 
the slope of A,Api .                                             
 
Another profit function is: 
)t1(f)t1()w,1(C
X)t1()1,1(C
X
BB
B
A
A
AB,A δ−−−
Θ
+−
Θ
=pi                                                    (2.II´´) 
 
If a firm chooses strategy A,AB, taxes on profits are paid in A and in B because final 
goods are produced in both locations to supply the local markets of final production. ti 
also reduces firm profits; the degree of this reduction depends on the tax rate chosen 
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by both governments. Furthermore, fixed costs f are incurred in B. In this case, δ  
affects the depreciation possibilities on the part of Bt , referring to the fixed costs f. In 
further analysis, depreciation is analyzed either with δ =1 or δ =0 so that either 
taxation referring to the fixed costs is depreciated totally or not at all.  
 
This results in, 
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=pi .          
 
In a graphical description, such as graphic 2.3, AB,Api is flatter. If depreciation is 
possible, the intercept is less negative than in the analysis without taxation.                                                      
 
A further profit function is: 
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Again, if a firm chooses strategy B,A, all its taxes on profits are paid in A because all 
final goods are produced there. tA again reduces firm profits. The degree of this 
reduction depends on the tax rate chosen by A. The higher the degree of taxation, 
the flatter the slope of A,Bpi . Furthermore, g are fixed costs abroad. They are not 
considered if a firm is taxed in A, and depreciation possibilities do not occur because 
Bt  is irrelevant.                                             
 
A further profit function is: 
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If a firm chooses strategy B,AB, taxes on profits are paid in A and B because final 
goods are produced in both locations to supply the local final production markets. ti 
also reduces firm profits. The degree of this reduction depends on the tax rate 
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chosen by both governments. Furthermore, fixed costs f and g are incurred in B with 
strategy B,AB. In this case, δ  affects the depreciation possibilities on the part of Bt , 
referring to the fixed costs f, which are associated with production plants for final 
goods in B. In further analysis, depreciation is analyzed either with δ =1 or δ =0 so 
that either taxation referring to fixed costs f is depreciated totally or not at all.  
This results in, 
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=pi .       
In a graphical description, such as graphic 2.2, AB,Bpi is flatter. If depreciation is 
possible, the intercept is less negative than in the analysis without taxation.                                           
From the formal description of the profit functions, it can be seen that they are all 
flatter than in the previous analysis with high transport costs. Therefore, if profit 
functions additionally depend on taxation, graphic 2.2 is changed in the following way 
if δ =0 (graphic 2.5): 
 
Graphic 2.5: 
 
 
C= )AB,B;A,A(Θ  without taxation 
D= )AB,B;A,A(Θ  with taxation 
If depreciation is possible instead, the intercept of profit functions AB,Bpi  and AB,Api  is 
less negative than before. Therefore, if profit functions depend on taxation and 
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additionally on depreciation with δ =1, the profit functions with taxation in graphic 2.5 
are changed in the following way (graphic 2.6): 
 
Graphic 2.6:                                            
 
 
C= )AB,B;A,A(Θ  with taxation and δ = 1 
D= )AB,B;A,A(Θ  with taxation and δ = 0 
In graphic 2.4 in section 2.2.5, with high transport costs and without taxation, the cut-
off levels between two strategies are shown. For this graphical analysis (graphic 2.7) 
δ =0 is assumed and the level of fixed costs for final goods f is held constant.125 
 
Graphic 2.7: 
 
C = )AB,B;A,B(Θ ; D = )AB,B;AB,A(Θ ; E = )AB,A;A,A(Θ  
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Compared to graphic 2.4, the graphical analogues to the cut-off levels with δ =1 
cannot be shown because the fixed costs f are held constant but δ =1 influences the 
size of f.   
 
The following explains the change of the graphical analogues to the cut-off levels as 
shown in graphic 2.7 with δ =0 and with taxation in comparison to graphic 2.4: 
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)AB,A;A,A(Θ  is independent of g. For this reason, it is represented by a vertical line 
in the graphical analysis. 
In comparison to the analysis without taxation in graphic 2.4, the line representing 
this cut-off level shifts inward the higher the tax rate selected by the government in A 
is; and the higher the tax rate selected by the government in B is, the more the line 
representing this cut-off level shifts back outward.  
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In comparison to the analysis without taxation in graphic 2.4, the line representing 
this cut-off level is flatter the higher the tax rate selected by the government in A is. 
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In comparison to the analysis without taxation in graphic 2.4, the line representing 
this cut-off level is flatter the higher the tax rates selected by the governments in A 
and B are. 
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Because of the per-unit variable costs, this cut-off level is steeper than Θ (A,A;B,A). 
In comparison to the analysis without taxation in graphic 2.4, the line representing 
this cut-off level is flatter the higher the tax rates selected by the governments in A 
and B are. 
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 )AB,B;A,B(Θ  is independent of g. For this reason, it is represented by a vertical line 
in the graphical analysis. 
In comparison to the analysis without taxation in graphic 2.4, the line representing 
this cut-off level shifts inward the higher the tax rates selected by the governments in 
A and B are. 
  
By combining all five graphical analogues to the aforementioned cut-off levels, the 
representation of optimal firm integration strategies as shown in graphic 2.7 is 
obtained. 
 
However, the following question must be answered:  
Which tax rates are selected by governments in A and B if they can anticipate the 
reaction of firms and if social welfare in their jurisdictions cannot decline because of 
their decisions to tax profits?    
 
2.2.6.3 Optimal tax policy 
Government decisions depend on the exogenous variables, such as transport costs, 
market size, per-unit variable costs, fixed costs, and firm productivities (which result 
in a set of optimal integration strategies), and the firm reactions according to the tax 
rates chosen. 
First, it must be considered that prices of a single firm do not change in response to 
taxes. These are only influenced by transport costs. For this reason, it is clear that126 
)j(pA opt= 
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−α






Θα
)1(
AdC1
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. 
Transport costs are passed on to households; taxes must be paid by the firms. 
Consequently, prices in A and B only differ if transport costs exist. 
For this reason, firm profits do not change because of a change in prices in this 
analysis. Firm profits, including taxation, only change if levied taxes influence firms to 
select other strategies as optimal. If this is true, the tax revenue of the governments 
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also changes. Because optimal integration strategies depend on d, tax revenue 
depends on it, too. Furthermore, taxes on profits are levied at the location of final 
goods production. If a strategy of final goods production in A and B is reasonable, not 
all profits of a firm are taxed by a single government. However, governments 
maximize the utility of the representative household in their jurisdictions. 
Hence, household utility with lump-sum transfer in general is given by:127  
∫
∫ Θ
−α
α
−α
Θ
µα−+
pi
+=
max
max
0
)1(
i
)1(1
i
0
i
iii dj)j(p)1(M
dj)j(
tm´V                                                 (2.10)    
 
Thus, V´i is influenced by the size of µα, , Mi, mi, the cut-off levels, and ti on profits. 
The government choice of ti, therefore, influences the location of cut-off levels. For 
this reason, ∫
Θ
pi
max
0
i dj)j(  and ∫
Θ
−α
αmax
0
)1(
i dj)j(p  are influenced by profit taxation. 
The following aspects are considered by governments when setting optimal tax rates: 
1. In general, a lump-sum transfer is additional income for households in that 
country. 
2. Prices in the differentiated sector depend on the chosen strategies of firms, and 
the mass of firms selecting an integration strategy depends on ti. An impact on 
utility of all households arises if firms select other strategies from the set of 
optimal integration strategies as optimal because of taxation. Therefore, if firms in 
the differentiated sector select strategies other than those in the analysis without 
taxes, their single prices and, therefore, their outputs are influenced. This also 
influences the outputs of those firms that do not select other strategies.  
3.  If firms in the differentiated sector select strategies other than those in the 
analysis without taxes, this does not lower the working income of the households 
in the original production location because they can work in the homogeneous 
sector. 
4. The degree of taxation does not influence the mass of firms entering the market 
because of profit taxation. Firms that decide to enter the market at least make 
zero profits; this is not changed if governments tax firm profits in the described 
way. 
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5. When selecting tI>0, the tax rate selected by one government depends on the tax 
rate of the other. 
 
Only if the positive impacts of taxation outweigh the negative ones will a government 
selects ti>0. 
This results in different optimal tax rates, depending on the Country A or B 
maximizing the representative household utility in its jurisdiction. 
 
Considering Country A, all firms in the differentiated sector are headquartered in A 
and, by assumption, also belong to households in A. For this reason, profit taxation in 
A with a lump-sum transfer to the households there does not induce higher income 
for them. Furthermore, if taxation in A is introduced, firms with productivity near a cut-
off level may no longer find it reasonable, for example, to select B,AB but A,A instead 
because the fixed costs of B,AB now are too high. The final goods from these firms, 
then, are more expensive for households in A and B than they are without taxation. 
This impact on prices the taxation of the government in A imposes always is negative 
for households in A if d is high. How many firms increase their prices in A depends 
on the distribution of firms over Θ . Higher prices reduce the output of these firms 
because demand for their differentiated goods declines. Hence, the output of 
cheaper products from other firms in the differentiated sector increases due to 
demand. This weakens the negative impact of the higher prices. 
Therefore, profit taxation to finance a lump-sum transfer in A does not have a positive 
impact on utility of the representative household in A. For this reason, the optimal tax 
rate selected by the government in A is zero. This decision is independent of the tax 
rate selected by the government in B. 
Considering Country B: 
If the government in B levies profit taxes, and tA=0 is selected, more firms produce in 
A than do so without taxation if depreciation of taxation on the fixed costs is not 
introduced, too. How many firms select different strategies from the set of optimal 
integration strategies as optimal because of the taxation depends on the distribution 
of firms over Θ . This has a negative impact on households in B because prices for 
the goods of these firms increase there. However, because of taxation, the demand 
for the varieties from these firms declines; and the output of firms with lower prices 
increases so that this negative impact is weakened, depending on the degree of α . 
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Furthermore, households in B achieve additional income because of the lump-sum 
transfer. This, in turn, obviously lowers the income of households in A; and the 
government in A can do nothing about it. For tB>0 to be selected by the government, 
positive impacts of taxation in B (e.g., the lump-sum transfer) must outweigh negative 
ones (i.e., higher prices for goods from firms selecting other integration strategies). 
Depending on the exact parameter configurations, either depreciation of taxation on 
the fixed costs )1( =δ  or no depreciation )0( =δ  may be the more reasonable 
strategy for the government in B. For this reason, both possibilities must be 
examined.  
The optimal tax rate from the perspective of this government is 0
t
´V
B
B
=
∂
∂
.  
This is shown in the case of a medium high fixed costs relation. 
In other words, if 2Lγ < 2Hf
g γ<  holds true, only strategies A,A or B,AB are optimal. 
Because taxation is introduced into the model, the range of parameters for those a 
medium high fixed costs relation holds true in this part of the analysis with taxation, 
has changed in comparison to the analysis without taxation. 
 
Now, only if the fixed costs relation is given by128 
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Are A,A and B,AB the only optimal strategies in this setting. 
The representative household utility with lump-sum transfer in B then is given by: 
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Given this situation the government in B selects the following tax rates as optimal: 
 
(a) Without depreciation )0( =δ :129 
First, tax revenue in B in this setting must be examined: 
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Solving the utility function of the representative household for 0
t
´V
B
B
=
∂
∂
, the following 
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This can be defined as tB3+a tB2+b tB+c=0. Accordingly, three general equations for 
optimal tax rates can be derived.130 Inserting the exogenously given parameters, we 
can determine whether an optimal tax rate with 0<tB<1 exists. In solving the 
equations for tB not only real but also complex tax rates can occur.  
 
Whether 0< tB<1 is reasonable or not depends on the distribution of firms over Θ  
because the negative impact of tB on prices of firms with productivity levels near cut-
off levels has to be outweighed. Households in B get additional income because of 
the lump-sum transfer. However, additional income only is spent for the 
homogeneous goods. If 0<tB<1 really is selected by the government in B, this results 
in maximizing the utility of the representative household in B. At the same time, the 
income of households in A declines and their utility also is influenced by the negative 
impact of tB on prices of differentiated goods. 
Because optimal tax rates are difficult to see from general equations, possible 
numerical solutions are shown for tax rates in B with high transport costs and a 
medium high fixed costs relation without depreciation possibilities and selection of a 
uniform distribution of the firms:131 
 
(a1) With exogenous parameter configurations given by  
,5d,2)w,w(C,4)1,w(C,6)1,1(C,50X,100X HBA ======
6.0,75.0,83M,9f,9g B =µ=α=== , the following tax rates arise:  
tB1=0.0142255                      (2.15) 
tB2=1.89289 + 1.10711 i 
tB3=1.89289 – 1.10711  i 
It is obvious that tB2 and tB3 are complex solutions. Only tB1 delivers a real optimal tax 
rate, and 0<tB1<1 holds true. In this scenario, a tax rate of 1.4% is selected by the 
government in B to be optimal.  
Prices for differentiated goods from firms now selecting strategy A,A instead of B,AB 
without taxation obviously increase. Therefore, their output declines. Due to α , 
differentiated products are better substitutes for one another in this case than those 
following in (a2). Therefore, the output of firms supplying the market with lower prices 
increases; and the negative impact of higher prices for goods supplied by the firms 
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selecting A,A instead of B,AB previously may be weakened. Additionally, the 
representative household in B obtains a lump-sum transfer from the achieved tax 
revenue. 
(a2) With exogenous parameter configurations given by  
,5d,2)w,w(C,4)1,w(C,6)1,1(C,50X,100X HBA ======  
65.0,7.0,131M,9f,9g B =µ=α=== , the following tax rates arise: 
tB4=-0.0031552                                   (2.16) 
tB5=1.90158 + 1.12186 i 
tB6=1.90158 – 1.12186 i 
It is obvious that tB5 and tB6 again are complex solutions. Only tB4 delivers a real 
optimal tax rate, but 0<tB1<1 does not hold true. With this parameter configuration 
without depreciation possibilities, a tax rate of zero is selected by the government in 
B to be optimal because the negative impact of taxation on prices cannot be 
outweighed. 
For this reason, it may also be reasonable to allow depreciation on the part of 
taxation, referring to the fixed costs for final goods occurring in B, from the 
perspective of the government in B.  
 
(b) With depreciation )1( =δ :132 
First, tax revenue in B in this setting must be examined: 
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Solving for 0
t
´V
B
B
=
∂
∂
, a condition tB3+a tB2+b tB+c=0 can be achieved. Again, three 
general equations for optimal tax rates can be derived in which not only real but also 
complex tax rates can occur.133 Inserting the exogenously given parameters, we can 
determine whether an optimal tax rate with 0<tB<1 exists.  
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In this case, if 0< tB<1 is selected by the government in B, more firms can select 
B,AB than without taxation and depreciation possibilities, depending on the 
distribution of firms over Θ . This implies that more varieties of differentiated goods 
are purchasable for lower prices. If the government in B selects 0<tB<1 with 
depreciation possibilities, the additional utility of the representative household in B 
must be high enough that the representative household utility in B increases in 
comparison to the analysis without taxation. The total impact of introducing 
depreciation possibilities, therefore, obviously depends on the mass of firms selecting 
B,AB instead of A,A. 
Furthermore, if the government in B selects 0<tB<1 with depreciation possibilities, this 
also influences the utility of the representative household in A. On the one hand, 
profits of firms owned by households in A but producing final goods in B decline 
because of taxation in B. On the other hand, because of the depreciation 
possibilities, prices for final goods of firms with productivity near the cut-off levels for 
the representative household in A decline, too. The government in A still selects an 
optimal tax rate of tA=0 because it cannot positively influence the impact of tB on the 
utility of the representative household in A by profit taxing policies in A.  
Again, optimal tax rates are difficult to see from general equations. Therefore, 
possible numerical solutions are shown for tax rates in B with high transport costs 
and a medium high fixed costs relation with depreciation possibilities and selection of 
a uniform distribution of the firms:134 
(b1) With exogenous parameter configurations given by  
,5d,2)w,w(C,4)1,w(C,6)1,1(C,50X,100X HBA ======
6.0,75.0,83M,9f,9g B =µ=α=== , the following tax rates arise:  
tB7=0.48007                             (2.18) 
tB8=0.245466 + 2.18785 i 
tB9=0.245466 – 2.18785 i 
These are the corresponding tax rates to scenario (a1) without depreciation 
possibilities. It is obvious that tB8 and tB9 are complex solutions. Only tB7 delivers a 
real optimal tax rate and 0<tB1<1 holds true. In this scenario, a tax rate of 48% is 
selected by the government in B to be optimal, where without depreciation 
possibilities 1.4% is selected. Inserting 48% in (2.10’) with a per capita lump-sum 
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transfer defined by (2.17)
 
and inserting 1.4% in (2.10’) with a per capita lump-sum 
transfer defined by (2.13), the government in B can determine the representative 
household utility from either taxation strategy. The scenario that results in higher 
utility, then, is selected by the government in B. 
(b2) With exogenous parameter configurations given by  
,5d,2)w,w(C,4)1,w(C,6)1,1(C,50X,100X HBA ======  
65.0,7.0,131M,9f,9g B =µ=α=== , the following tax rates arise: 
tB10=0.482567                                    (2.19) 
tB11=0.244217 + 2.18981 i 
tB12=0.244217 – 2.18981 i 
These are the corresponding tax rates to scenario (a2) without depreciation 
possibilities. It is obvious that tB11 and tB12 are complex solutions. Only tB10 delivers a 
real optimal tax rate, and 0<tB1<1 holds true. In this scenario, a tax rate of 48.26% is 
selected by the government in B to be optimal, where without depreciation 
possibilities, the government in B does not select taxation as optimal. For this reason, 
if this parameter configuration holds true, the government in B may select profit 
taxation with depreciation of taxation on fixed costs, choosing a tax rate of 48.26%.  
 
Graphic 2.8 shows a comparison of the impact of the cases, with and without 
depreciation possibilities, on the optimal choice of firm strategies. 
  
Graphic 2.8: 
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This graphic refers to a constant level of fixed costs for final goods f if taxation 
without depreciation is selected and to another constant level of f if taxation with 
depreciation is selected. The only difference between the two graphical descriptions 
is that the graphical analogues to the cut-off levels differ because of the selected δ . 
As )A,B;A,A(Θ  and )AB,B;AB,A(Θ  are independent of δ , the slope of their 
graphical analogues in graphic 2.8 does not change whether depreciation is possible 
or not. The other cut-off levels depend on f and, therefore, on δ . For this reason, as 
can be seen from graphic 2.8, if the fixed costs relation is medium high, strategy 
B,AB already is more reasonable for firms with lower productivity levels with 
depreciation possibilities than without depreciation of taxation. In scenario (b), f is 
smaller than in scenario (a), because of the selected δ . If the fixed costs relation is 
high, strategy A,AB instead of A,A will become reasonable for some firms with lower 
productivity level because of depreciation possibilities. If the fixed costs relation is 
low, some firms will select B,AB instead of B,A. The final goods produced by these 
firms, then, will be cheaper for consumers. Therefore, their utility from differentiated 
good consumption will increase.  
 
Furthermore, the set of optimal integration strategies referring to a constant level of g 
may change because of depreciation possibilities. This can be seen from g* in 
graphic 2.8. In the case of g* in a setting without depreciation possibilities, A,A and 
B,AB are the optimal strategies, depending on the productivity level of a firm. With 
depreciation possibilities and a fixed costs level of g*, the optimal choice of a strategy 
is A,A, A,AB, or B,AB, depending on firm productivity levels. Therefore, the optimal 
set of integration strategies referring to a given fixed costs relation changes 
endogenously because of δ . For this reason, (2.11) and (2.12) have been derived 
previously to ensure that a situation with A,A and B,AB as optimal integration 
strategies is illustrated in both scenarios (a) and (b) when deriving the optimal profit 
tax rates.  
 
By inserting the derived tax rates from the equations with and without depreciation 
possibilities in the respective utility function of the representative household, the 
government in B decides if depreciation is reasonable or not. 
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To summarize, if high transport costs exist, firms always supply to consumers in A 
locally. This cannot be influenced by welfare-optimizing taxation. If in this setting, B 
levies high taxes on profits, even fewer firms will produce final goods locally for the 
market in B. This implies much higher prices for differentiated goods supplied from 
these firms to the market in B. This has a negative impact on the representative 
household utility in B, which is not in the interest of a benevolent planner in B. This 
utility loss must be compensated through the lump-sum transfer and higher 
consumption of cheaper varieties. Therefore, the possibility of compensation 
depends on the exact value of α . If this is not possible, taxation without depreciation 
possibilities in B is not reasonable. 
If depreciation is possible, positive impacts on the single prices of firms with Θ  near 
cut-off levels can be achieved in B by introducing tB. Therefore, depending on the 
exact values of the parameters and the distribution of firms over Θ , taxation with or 
without depreciation may be a reasonable instrument for a benevolent planner in B.  
Furthermore, taxation in B results in a negative impact on the utility of households in 
A because firm profits are part of their income. Because of possibly lower single 
prices for differentiated goods in A, tB in the scenario with depreciation possibilities 
also may have a positive impact on households in A. Regardless, the government in 
B does not take the impact of tB on utility in A into account when selecting tB; and 
taxation in A never is optimal if the government in A acts as a benevolent planner in 
providing a lump-sum transfer. 
Furthermore, taxation with lump-sum transfer to the households in this setting does 
not influence the economic outcome as much as high transport costs do. Taxes, as 
well as depreciation possibilities, only somewhat influence the run of the cut-off levels 
between strategies of a given set; whereas the exogenously given, high transport 
costs restrict the set of optimal integration strategies. 
In this analysis, this set of optimal integration strategies from the perspective of both 
governments and firms cannot be deviated because of the introduction of ti, due to 
high transport costs.  
 
2.2.7 Insight of heterogeneity 
In our model, depending on exact parameter configurations, the government in B 
unilaterally can deviate from zero taxation to induce positive impacts on welfare in its 
jurisdiction. This influence on welfare is characterized by the following implications: 
PROFIT TAXATION WITH LUMP-SUM TRANSFER 118 
The higher the taxes on profits in B, the fewer final goods firms produce locally for 
the market in B. This implies much higher prices for differentiated goods supplied 
from these firms for the market in B. This negative impact on the representative 
household utility in B must be compensated through the lump-sum transfer and 
higher consumption of cheaper varieties. However, the possibility of compensation 
depends on the exact value of α . Therefore, depending on the exact values of the 
parameters, taxation may be a reasonable instrument for a benevolent planner in B.  
However, exact parameter configurations, in particular the value of α , are not the 
only determinants. The role of firm heterogeneity and its effects on implications of 
taxation on welfare is especially outstanding. In our analysis, a uniform distribution of 
firms over Θ  is assumed. As derived in section 2.2.6.3 (a) welfare maximization with 
this distribution function can result in optimal tax rates tB>0 or tB=0, depending on the 
other parameter configurations. The specification of an alternative distribution 
function, therefore, may induce differing results (e.g., if a distribution function is 
assumed where only a marginal mass of firms has a productivity level Θ  near a cut-
off level). In this scenario, fewer firms will be induced not to produce final goods 
locally for the market in B than in our analysis with a uniform distribution function 
when selecting tB. These goods will be much more expensive for households in B. 
Concluding profit taxation will still depend on the other parameter configurations, but 
the negative impact of taxation will be weakened, assuming this distribution function 
in contrast to our analysis with a uniform distribution function.
 
 
Hence, the results in our analysis are mainly constituted from the exact specification 
of the distribution of firms over productivity and, therefore, due to heterogeneity.  
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
In this analysis a trade-off between fixed costs and high per-unit variable costs is 
identified. Firms can choose between different integration strategies. Their 
headquarters are located in A, and they serve markets in A and B with differentiated 
products. Every single firm must produce intermediate and final goods for itself, 
although they can choose A, B, or both places as production locations. As a result, 
different integration strategies can be identified. Their optimality depends on the 
relative size of fixed costs for MNE activities, the size of transport costs for final 
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goods, the fraction of demand in each market, per-unit variable costs, the productivity 
of a single firm, and the degree of profit taxation in both governments, respective to 
depreciation possibilities.    
 
First, the case with high transport costs is analyzed, excluding taxes and depreciation 
possibilities. Transport of intermediate goods is free by assumption.  
Firms with low productivity select strategies to minimize fixed costs; firms with high 
productivity minimize per-unit variable costs to supply both markets in consideration 
of transport costs. With high transport costs for final goods, some firms (depending 
on their productivity) may find it optimal to produce intermediate goods in one country 
and final goods in both countries locally.  
The impact of high transport costs for final goods on the economic outcomes 
becomes apparent. The higher transport costs are, the more firms prefer local 
production. Transport costs affect the per-unit variable costs.  
 
Then, cases in which transport costs stay high but governments levy additional profit 
taxes on firms in the differentiated sector for final goods production are analyzed. 
Governments pass tax revenue to the households in their jurisdictions as lump-sum 
transfers. Firms react, choosing strategies from the optimal set other than the ones 
used without taxation, although their own productivity levels stay the same. This is 
due to tax rates being considered in the profit functions of firms. Governments take 
firm reactions on profit taxation into account. Due to high transport costs, the set of 
optimal integration strategies stays the same as the set used in the case without 
taxation. 
Governments select profit taxes in ways to maximize the representative household 
utility in their jurisdictions because they are benevolent planners. Otherwise, optimal 
tax rates are zero. Levying taxes has several impacts on the utility of households in 
both countries, influencing both income and the prices paid for differentiated goods.  
A government tax rate 0<ti<1 is defined endogenously in this model. As profit taxation 
with a lump-sum transfer in A always induces a utility loss for the representative 
household in A, that government selects tA=0 as optimal. This is also taken into 
account by the government in B, reflected in its selection of tB. 
From the perspective of a benevolent planner parameter configurations exist, for 
those taxation in B is reasonable. In this case, either the representative household 
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utility is higher due to profit taxation alone or to profit taxation with depreciation 
possibilities. In the first scenario, the utility of the representative household in B 
increases because of the lump-sum transfer but declines because of higher prices for 
differentiated goods from firms that select other strategies than those used without 
taxation. This negative impact is weakened due to demand and depends on the 
exact size of α  because, if prices on goods from single firms increase, the demand 
for their products declines. Therefore, demand for other differentiated goods 
increases. Hence, the output of other firms producing differentiated goods increases 
as 0<α . For taxation in B to be set 0<tB<1, the positive impact of the additional 
income must outweigh the weakened but still negative impact of higher prices for 
some differentiated goods. However, the government in B can also select the second 
scenario: taxation with depreciation possibilities. Depending on which scenario 
delivers higher utility for the representative household in B with 0<tB<1, the 
government in B selects the corresponding scenario. In the case with depreciation 
possibilities, depending on the distribution of firms over productivity, prices for 
differentiated goods also can decline. This has an additional positive impact on 
households in A in contrast to the first scenario. Because firms belong to households 
in A, the lump-sum transfer in B has a negative impact on the representative 
household utility in A because it is financed at their expense. Although any activity of 
the government in A will be negative for its households, in this analysis, tA=0 is 
selected. Furthermore B does not take the utility of the representative household in A 
into account when selecting tB and δ . Depending on exact parameter configurations, 
0<tB<1 can result in even higher utility for all households in both jurisdictions. 
 
Hence, this analysis is an economical explanation of optimal tax policies of 
governments when integration strategies chosen by firms are endogenous, having 
comparative advantages on the one hand and elements of the “New Trade 
Theory”135 on the other.  
Using the derivates for optimal tax rates in this analysis, zero taxation may also be 
the best choice of governments acting as benevolent planners, depending on exact 
parameter configurations. In these cases, zero taxation is optimal from the welfare 
perspective of both governments independently. Therefore, a further result of this 
                                            
135
 The first approach in this direction was derived by Krugman (1979). 
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analysis is an explanation of zero taxation as being optimal, independent of a race-
to-the-bottom scenario, because of tax competition, as shown in other literature.136 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
136
 Compare to Davies and Eckel (2007). 
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2.4 Appendix 
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This xi(j) is the demand of one household for the variety of a firm in country i.  
Total demand for a firm variety in country i therefore is given by: 
[ ] )1(1iii )j(pM)j(x −αµα=  
 
Derivation II: 
Inserting (2.3) in (2.4) following condition arises: 
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IV: All seven possible profit functions with transport costs for final goods  
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intermediate goods exist. This does not occur in this analysis. For this reason, AB,Bpi  always 
dominates AB,ABpi  here. 
 
Derivation V: 
For that this set of integration strategies is optimal, following is necessary: 
AB,Api B,Apif  
AB,Bpi  B,Bpif  
AB,Bpi AB,ABpif  
This must be the case because each of these profit function pairs contains the same fixed costs and 
only differ by the components of per-unit variable costs and transport costs.  
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If AB,Bpi B,Bpif  also AB,Bpi AB,ABpif  always holds because C(w,1) < C(1,1). 
If this is true, it can also be followed from the equations that 
 
C(1,1) < dH C(1,w)                                                                                                                                  (i) 
C(w,1) < dH C(w,w)                                                                                                                                (ii) 
holds. 
Transformation results in: 
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This proves that this set of optimal integration strategies only is optimal, if high transport costs exist.  
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Derivation VI: 
To calculate this A,Api  is equated with AB,Bpi . Then AB,Api  and A,Api  are compared at this location 
and for A,AB to be an optimal strategy it is necessary that: AB,Api > A,Api . 
A,Api  = AB,Bpi  
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This is the x-axis coordinate. At this point AB,Api  must be greater than A,Api . 
For this reason, the y-axis coordinate of A,Api  is required: 
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Derivation VII: 
A,Api  = AB,Bpi  
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This is the x-axis coordinate. At this point A,Bpi  must be greater than A,Api . 
For this reason, the y-axis coordinate of A,Api  is required: 
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 y-axis coordinate of A,Bpi : 
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Derivation VIII: 
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AB,Api = AB,Bpi  
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Derivation X: 
Cut-off levels with profit taxation: 
A,Api = AB,Api  
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Derivation XI: 
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Solving this for p: 
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Derivation XII: 
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Derivation XIII: 
To calculate this A,Api  is equated with AB,Bpi . Then AB,Api  and A,Api  are compared at this location 
and for A,AB to be an optimal strategy it is necessary that: AB,Api > A,Api . 
A,Api  = AB,Bpi  
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This is the x-axis coordinate. At this point AB,Api  must be greater than A,Api . 
For this reason, the y-axis coordinate of A,Api  is required: 
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It is necessary that: 
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Derivation XIV: 
A,Api  = AB,Bpi  
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This is the x-axis coordinate. At this point A,Bpi  must be greater than A,Api . 
For this reason, the y-axis coordinate of A,Api  is required: 
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It is necessary that: 
A,By  ≥  A,Ay  
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Derivation XV: 
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Derivation XVI: 
tB3+a tB2+b tB+c=0 
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The three general equations for the optimal tax rates are given by: 
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Derivation XVII: 
For (a1): With exogenous parameter configurations given by  
,5d,2)w,w(C,4)1,w(C,6)1,1(C,50X,100X HBA ======
6.0,75.0,83M,9f,9g B =µ=α===   
following tax rates arise, solving for L1[a_,b_,c_],  L2[a_,b_,c_], L3[a_,b_,c_] from derivation XVI:  
( ) ( )[ ( )] =6.0;75.0;83;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100c,9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100b,5;2;4;6;50;100a1L  
tB1=0.014225 
   
( ) ( )[ ( )] =6.0;75.0;83;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100c,9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100b,5;2;4;6;50;100a2L  
tB2=1.89289 + 1.10711 i 
 
( ) ( )[ ( )] =6.0;75.0;83;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100c,9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100b,5;2;4;6;50;100a3L  
  
tB3=1.89289 – 1.10711  i 
 
For (a2): With exogenous parameter configurations given by  
,5d,2)w,w(C,4)1,w(C,6)1,1(C,50X,100X HBA ======  
65.0,7.0,131M,9f,9g B =µ=α===   
following tax rates arise, solving for L1[a_,b_,c_],  L2[a_,b_,c_], L3[a_,b_,c_] from derivation XVI:  
( ) ( )[ ( )] =65.0;7.0;131;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100c,9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100b,5;2;4;6;50;100a1L  
tB4=-0.0031552    
 
( ) ( )[ ( )] =65.0;7.0;131;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100c,9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100b,5;2;4;6;50;100a2L  
tB5=1.90158 + 1.12186 i 
 
( ) ( )[ ( )] =65.0;7.0;131;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100c,9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100b,5;2;4;6;50;100a3L  
tB6=1.90158 – 1.12186 i 
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Derivation XVIII: 
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whereas with depreciation 
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Derivation XIX: 
tB3+a tB2+b tB+c=0 
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The three general equations for the optimal tax rates are given by: 
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L3[a_,b_,c_]=
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Derivation XX: 
For (b1): With exogenous parameter configurations given by  
,5d,2)w,w(C,4)1,w(C,6)1,1(C,50X,100X HBA ======
6.0,75.0,83M,9f,9g B =µ=α===   
following tax rates arise, solving for L1[a_,b_,c_],  L2[a_,b_,c_], L3[a_,b_,c_] from derivation XIX:  
( ) ( )[ ( )]6.0;75.0;83;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100c,6.0;75.0;83;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100b,9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100a1L
=tB7=0.48007             
 
( ) ( )[ ( )]6.0;75.0;83;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100c,6.0;75.0;83;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100b,9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100a2L
=tB8=0.245466 + 2.18785 i 
 
( ) ( )[ ( )]6.0;75.0;83;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100c,6.0;75.0;83;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100b,9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100a3L
=tB9=0.245466 – 2.18785 i 
 
For (b2): With exogenous parameter configurations given by  
,5d,2)w,w(C,4)1,w(C,6)1,1(C,50X,100X HBA ======  
65.0,7.0,131M,9f,9g B =µ=α===  
following tax rates arise, solving for L1[a_,b_,c_],  L2[a_,b_,c_], L3[a_,b_,c_] from derivation XIX:  
( ) ( )[ ,65.0;7.0;131;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100b,9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100a1L
( )]65.0;7.0;131;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100c =tB10=0.482567 
 
( ) ( )[ ,65.0;7.0;131;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100b,9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100a2L   
( )]65.0;7.0;131;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100c =tB11=0.244217 + 2.18981 i 
 
( ) ( )[ ,65.0;7.0;131;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100b,9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100a3L  
( )]65.0;7.0;131;9;9;5;2;4;6;50;100c =tB12=0.244217 – 2.18981 i 
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3.1 Introduction  
 
In recent innovation to trade literature, heterogeneity of firm-productivity has been 
incorporated into models of monopolistic competition with international trade and 
multinational firms. Initially, models of vertical or horizontal integration strategies of 
multinational firms were developed under the assumption of homogeneous 
productivities between all plants in a market.137 Later, theoretical work was focused 
on the study of optimal integration strategies of such and even more complex firms in 
the presence of firm heterogeneity in terms of total factor productivity.138 One key 
finding was that the optimal integration strategy for a firm depends on its productivity. 
In addition, given productivity differences across firms, coexistence of alternative 
modes of integration is based on the notion of firm heterogeneity.  
Empirically, the activity of multinational enterprises is among the most dynamic 
economic activities (followed by international trade in goods and services).139 For 
instance, the average annual growth rate of foreign affiliate sales was 8.4% during 
the period 1996-2000 and was 16.2% in 2006.140 The focus of empirical analyses of 
integration strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs) has been on whether 
purely vertical or horizontal strategies are prevalent in data on foreign direct 
investments (FDIs). As a result of such work, indirect evidence has favored horizontal 
MNE models more than vertical MNE models.141  
Work on the role of profit taxes on FDIs has suggested that FDIs react sensitively to 
changes in tax rates.142 The latter indicates that the debate on optimal taxation 
should be of key interest to policy makers. Not only policy makers but also 
researchers have pointed out the importance of corporate taxation in influencing 
location and production decisions of irms.143 Empirical evidence in support of this has 
suggested the relevance of taxation to location and volume of FDIs (i.e., production 
decisions of MNEs). The various impacts include the impact of the corporate tax rate 
                                            
137
 As in Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984). 
138
 Compare with Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). 
139
 In the year 2006, global FDI inflows grew for the third consecutive year and reached the level of 
$1.306 trillion, being slightly below the record level of $1.411 trillion in 2000. As in UNCTAD (2008) 
and World Bank Institute (2007). 
140
 In the same time, the gross product of foreign affiliates increased 7.3% p.a. in the years 1996-2000 
and rose by 16.2% in 2006. Exports of foreign affiliates showed an increase of 3.3% p.a. in 1996-2000 
and rose by 12.2% in 2006. As in UNCTAD (2008).  
141
 As supported by Markusen and Maskus (2001) and Brainard (1993a). 
142
 As in Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Blonigen and Davies (2004). 
143
 See Hines (1999) or Gresik (2001) for a survey.  
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in the the parent country on inbound FDIs, the impact of the corporate tax rate in the 
host country on outbound FDIs, and the effects of parent and host country taxation in 
terms of different methods of double taxation relief.144    
Research regarding statutory tax rates and their impact on FDIs is abundant, 
containing diverse distinctions between different methods of double taxation relief 
and the impact of statutory corporate tax rates on MNE activities.145 In contrast, 
analyzing the impact of withholding tax rates on MNE activities, we have seen that 
they are independent of the method of double taxation relief. For example, if foreign-
earned profits are subject to withholding taxes levied, increasing withholding tax rates 
reduce MNE activities in the host country.146 
Although diverse implications of withholding tax rates are cogitable, these and the 
impacts of tax rates on MNE activities of heterogeneous firms have hardly been 
studied in theoretical work.    
 
To focus on the topics of firm heterogeneity, the increasing importance of MNEs, and 
the impact of corporate taxation on MNE activities, we set up a model of 
heterogeneous firms that select their strategies from a menu of three options: 
domestic operations, exporting operations or horizontal MNE activities.147 We 
assume that manufacturing firms supply varieties of differentiated goods under 
monopolistic competition.  
In our model, social welfare-maximizing governments levy withholding taxes on 
profits of MNEs earned by subsidiaries producing in the jurisdiction of the particular 
government. Furthermore, the generated tax revenue is spent for a lump-sum 
transfer to the households there. These corporate tax rates affect the integration 
strategies of heterogeneous firms. Of course, the economic structure and the nature 
of competition are essential for this to be a welfare-maximizing policy.148  
We also distinguish between the perspective of a social planner and a single 
government on maximization, because a single government only maximizes its own 
national welfare. An increase in withholding tax rates, nevertheless, induces a 
                                            
144
 To see the impact on inbound FDIs, see Head, Ries, and Swenson (1999) for a survey; to see the 
impact on outbound FDIs, see Mutti and Grubert (2004) for a survey; and for the impact of parent and 
host country taxation, see Swenson (1994).  
145
 We can distiguish between the credit, exemption, and deduction methods. See Egger et al. (2006b) 
for a survey. 
146
 As in Egger et al. (2006b). 
147
 In contrast to Davies and Eckel (2007) assuming mobile firms. 
148
 As in Dixit and Grossman (1986), Venables (1985) or Helpman and Flam (1986). 
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decline of MNE investments in this jurisdiction.149 This coherence is consistent with 
the findings of Hines (1999) or Devereux and Griffith (2003).150 Governments are 
completely informed and consider the implications of taxation on the integration 
strategies of heterogeneous firms and the resulting impacts on the utility of the 
representative household in their own jurisdictions. A social planner considers 
welfare implications in both countries.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In section 3.2, the model and 
the derived optimal integration strategies of firms in the differentiated are outlined. 
These depend on the relative size of fixed costs for plant set-up, market sizes, 
country sizes, firm productivities, transport costs, and corporate taxation. After 
presenting welfare maximization and government objectives, we set up a numerical 
framework in section 3.2.5. In contrast to related theoretical work, we endogenously 
derive the mass of firms entering markets as well as the market size itself.151 We 
study the results of this numerical analysis, with special emphasis on the role of 
country size. In section 3.2.6, we flesh out the main differences of this approach 
relative to recent theoretical work. Finally, in section 3.3, we point to the implications 
of our findings in terms of optimal taxation and economic outcome. 
 
3.2 Best-response tax rates on profits of multinational firms:  
A numerical approach 
 
3.2.1 The set-up of the model 
The following partial analysis is a description of the optimal integration strategies of 
heterogeneous firms, with particular emphasis on the role of profit taxation. We focus 
on the optimal tax policy of governments providing a lump-sum transfer to 
households in their jurisdictions depending on the integration strategies chosen by 
heterogeneous firms. 
 
First, we consider a simple model with two countries, A and B, in which only one 
factor, labor (L), is used for production and firm or plant set-up. L is assumed to be 
                                            
149
 Evidence for this can be found in Devereux (2006) and in Hines and Rice (1994). 
150
 Early empirical work finds negligible effects of tax policies on FDIs. See Brainard (1997) and 
Wheeler and Mody (1992) for a survey. 
151
 In contrast, see Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2006) or Davies, Egger, and Egger (2009). 
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mobile between sectors but immobile across national borders. Goods may be 
consumed from local or foreign producers. The latter results in goods trade, which 
invokes iceberg-type trade costs. With regard to integration strategies, firms choose 
between three options: locating in one country and serving only domestic consumers, 
concentrating production in one country and serving consumers world-wide from 
there (exporting), or engaging in multi-plant production and serving consumers locally 
through domestic and foreign subsidiaries (MNEs).  
 
There are two industries. One of them produces a homogeneous good x0; the other 
industry produces differentiated goods. The homogeneous good is supplied under 
perfect competition. For the sake of elegance, we assume that one unit of labor is 
needed to fabricate one unit of the homogeneous good. We focus on parameter 
configurations, which ensure diversification of production, so that the homogeneous 
good is produced in both countries in equilibrium and may be traded at zero costs 
across national borders.  
 
Varieties of the differentiated good are supplied under monopolistic competition. 
Each firm in the differentiated sector acts as a monopolist in supplying its variety. 
However, varieties are substitutable at an elasticity of σ >1, which also reflects the 
elasticity of demand. Consequently, firms in that sector charge a fixed mark-up over 
marginal costs. 
 
To enter the differentiated industry, the amount of fd units of labor, which are sunk 
costs, must be invested. These can be considered as firm set-up costs. With this 
investment, a firm in this heterogeneous sector discovers its own potential 
productivity level ( θ ). The productivity level drawn by a firm is a random variable. 
 
3.2.2 Demand 
We assume that the preferences of households are quasi-linear and that households 
are identical with respect to their preferences. In formal accounts, the utility function 
of the representative household is represented by: 
( ) }B,A{j,diix11xU max
0
j0j ∈







αµ
+=
µθ
α
∫                         (3.1)                                                                              
    
BEST-RESPONSE TAX RATES ON PROFITS OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS       148 
The representative household in A and B benefits from consumption of the 
homogeneous good xo, which is taken as the numéraire for convenience. 
Furthermore, each of the two countries hosts a second industry that produces 
differentiated goods under monopolistic competition. )i(x j  is the consumption of 
output of the i-th  firm, which is { }max,...,0i θ∈ . The condition 0< α <1 being constant 
results in a constant elasticity of substitution (C.E.S.) of =σ 1/ (1-α ) >1 between any 
pair of differentiated goods. This expression reflects standard properties of love for 
variety preferences, where a broader supply of differentiated goods results in an 
increased utility. µ  is a constant with 0<µ < α <1 and reflects the preference for the 
differentiated industry over the homogeneous industry in the utility function of the 
representative household. At a certain level of differentiated products supplied in one 
country, an additional unit shows diminishing marginal utility. The consumption of 
differentiated products is represented by the expression 








α
= ∫
θ
αdi)i(x1X
max
0
j , the sub-
utility of the differentiated sector.  
 
Obviously, the utility function is linear in 0x  but non-linear in the differentiated 
varieties. This implies that the demand for differentiated products depends on prices 
of differentiated goods but not on earnings. 
 
To derive demand of a single household for the variety xj(i) in country j,  we consider 
the utility function in (3.1) and satisfy the standard side condition 
∫
θ
⋅+⋅≥
max
0
jj00j )i(x)i(pxpm . Labor income m is spent on the homogeneous good, 
where we set p0 = 1, and on differentiated goods. This results in the demand of a 
single household for differentiated goods of152 
α−
α−
µ−
θ
α








α
=
∫ 1
1
j
1
1
0
j
j
)i(pdi)i(x1
1)i(x
max
           (3.2)   
 
 
 
 
                                            
152
 See derivation I in Appendix 3.4. 
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or   
( ) α−
µ−θ
α








α
=
∫
1
j
1
0
j
j
)i(xdiix1
1)i(p
max
,          (3.3) 
respectively. 
The demand of a single household in country j for differentiated goods of the i-th firm 
depends on the price firm i sets, on how any pair of differentiated goods can be 
substituted for another through α , on µ , and on the sub-utility of consumption 








α
= ∫
θ
αdi)i(x1X
max
0
j . The impact of an increasing α  is that products of the 
differentiated sector become closer substitutes for one another, which results in 
reduced market power of a single firm.  
 
As can be seen from equations (3.2) and (3.3), the size of X is determined 
endogenously. For this reason, X can also be interpreted as the market size for 
differentiated goods and demands for specification. X depends on the strategic 
alignment of heterogeneous firms. 
We distinguish between different scenarios. 
In the first case, market size X consists of the market of domestic firms, foreign firms 
exporting their goods from abroad (henceforth referred to as exporters), and firms 
choosing horizontal MNE activity. Market size X in equilibrium is defined as 
44 344 2144 344 2144 344 21
)i(MNE
j
)ex(orterexp
j
)d(domestic
0
ji,ex,d di)i(x1di)i(x1di)i(x1X
max
i/ex
i/ex
ex/d
max








α
+








α
+








α
= ∫∫∫
θ
θ
α
θ
θ
α
θ
α
.                                       (3.4) 
Alternatively, in another scenario, the export strategy does not exist (i.e., is not 
profitable). Firms choose either supplying domestically or acting as MNEs. This 
scenario results in a market size of 
44 344 2144 344 21
MNE
j
domestic
0
ji,d di)i(x1di)i(x1X
max
i/d
max








α
+








α
= ∫∫
θ
θ
α
θ
α
.                                                                     (3.5) 
Finally, MNE activity may be non-profitable so that market size consists of demand 
from domestic and exporting producers only. The specified market size in this case 
shows 
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
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Graphic 3.1 shows market size under the alternative integration strategies of 
heterogeneous firms: 
 
Graphic 3.1: 
 
 
  
3.2.3 Production 
As mentioned before, we focus on equilibria with diversification of production so that 
each of the two countries, j={A,B}, hosts the two industries. The associated country 
size of A and B is reflected by sA and sB.  
 
We assume that Countries A and B are endowed with a fixed amount of 
internationally immobile labor, L. Because the homogeneous good is freely tradable, 
is used as the numéraire, and one unit of L for one unit of output, there is 
international wage equalization at unitary wages (i.e., w
 j =1) as long as diversification 
of production prevails. 
 
The differentiated goods available in a country j are provided by different sources. 
Consumers in j buy goods produced by national producers in j, imports from the other 
country, and goods from subsidiaries in j, where the origin of these firms is in the 
other country (MNEs). Hence, the mass of firms in the world equals the amount of 
differentiated goods potentially available.  
 
Integration strategies 
Market size 
domestic,exporter domestic, exporter, 
multinational 
domestic, multinational 
Xd,ex Xd,ex,i Xd,i 
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Firms in the differentiated sector differ with respect to their productivity, but ex-ante 
all firms are identical. If they expect positive earnings from the production process, 
they pay sunk entry costs fd upfront, which are measured in units of labor. As long as 
firms expect positive profits, they enter the market. It is assumed that the individual 
productivity levels of the firms in each country are independent draws from a 
cumulative productivity distribution function F( θ ). The fee fd allows the firms to 
independently draw their productivity from the distribution F(θ) with support over (0, 
θmax). With this procedure, firms located in the home country, even with very low 
productivity, will at least produce domestically in order to reduce the loss of fd. The 
time line in graphic 3.2 shows the logical sequence from the moment prior to entry, 
where all firms are identical, to the moment where firms in the industry decide on 
their integration strategies and outputs. 
 
Graphic 3.2: 
 
Firms choose their integration strategies according to their productivity θ(i). In their 
domestic country, all firms start as domestic producers. If productivity is low, a firm 
will not enter the foreign market, neither through exports nor through foreign plant 
set-up. If productivity is high enough, a firm has the choice to serve foreign markets 
additionally via exports or foreign affiliate production (the latter being referred to as 
horizontal MNE activity). The choice between exporting and foreign plant set-up is 
driven by the proximity-concentration trade-off, characterized by the savings in 
trading costs for MNE activity relative to exports as reflected by iceberg transport 
costs t for cross-border trade of differentiated varieties.153 The idea of iceberg 
transport costs is that to deliver of one unit of differentiated goods, the producer must 
ship t≥1 units to the distant point of sale. On the other hand, in foreign plant set-up 
the fixed costs fi in terms of units of labor are higher than fixed costs for exporters fex 
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 See e.g. Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Brainard (1993b) or Markusen and Venables (2000) for 
a survey. 
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because production facilities must be duplicated.154 For this reason fd<fex<fi is 
assumed.  
 
In addition to these fixed costs, firms pay variable costs, depending on their own 
productivity levels θ (i), on the integration strategies (i.e. exporters pay transport 
costs t>1), and on country size [i.e., sjxj(i)t/ θ (i)]. Hence, country size sj reflects the 
total demand for variety i in j and t=1 for domestic producers and MNEs. 
Given two firms with the same amount of output in one country, the firm with higher 
productivity θ (i) must bear lower variable costs, according to sjxj(i)/ θ (i).  
 
Furthermore, governments may choose positive profit tax rates subject to foreign 
MNEs to maximize welfare in their own jurisdiction. If tax revenue in j is positive, it is 
passed on to households in j as a lump-sum transfer. In this analysis, a government 
in j can levy taxes on profits earned by MNEs in j. These MNEs are headquartered in 
the other country, and only the profits earned from production in the plant in j can be 
taxed by the government in j (i.e., the location of tax payment is identical with an 
MNE’s subsidiary location). Therefore, in this setting, double taxation is not the 
problem of the analysis.155 
For this reason, Aγ denotes a withholding tax rate of the government in A on profits of 
an MNE plant in A, where the origin of this firm is in B.  With Aγ >0, these firms 
consider Aγ  an additional factor influencing profits. Bγ denotes a withholding tax rate 
of the government in B on profits of an MNE plant in B, where the origin of this firm is 
in A. 
Because jγ  describes a withholding tax rate on profits earned by subsidiaries, 
taxation is not considered for domestic and exporting profits (i.e., Aγ and Bγ  are 
relevant parameters considering profits of MNEs only). 
 
Given the household demand in (3.2) and the price consumption curve in (3.3), it is 
straightforward to compute maximum attainable profits for a firm in j serving its 
domestic market: 
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 As in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). 
155
 As in Egger et al. (2006a). 
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This finally results in an expression for the profit maximizing output of a firm i in its 
domestic market j, j { }B,A∈ ,156 
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associated with the optimal price157 
)i(
1)i(p *dj
αθ
= .            (3.8) 
The optimal output of a firm in the domestic market depends on market size X.158 
According to (3.7), the optimal output level of a single firm is negatively correlated 
with X due to competitive conditions. Furthermore, the productivity level of a firm is 
positively correlated with its output.  
In setting the price, firms follow standard mark-up pricing in which higher productivity 
is associated with smaller price. The mark-up is represented by the factor
α
1
.  
Accordingly, maximum attainable profits of a domestic firm in j are given by159 
d
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Analogously, we now can derive profits of firms with an export strategy. Profits of 
exporters from Country A are defined by 
44444 344444 21444444 3444444 21
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 See derivation II in Appendix 3.4. 
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 See derivation II in Appendix 3.4. 
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 The market size X has to be specified according to Xd,ex, Xd,ex,i or Xd,i. 
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 See derivation II in Appendix 3.4. 
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Profits of exporters from Country B are defined by 
44444 344444 21444444 3444444 21
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An exporting firm has two sources of earnings. The company generates profits from 
domestic sales and export activity. The variable costs for exports depend on t. For a 
firm i from j, the expression results in optimal output in the other country (output for 
exporting),160 
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associated with the optimal price for exports,161 
)i(
t)i(p *exj
αθ
= .                          (3.13) 
 
In addition to the previous analysis, we can see that the optimal output and price for 
exports depend on transport costs t in contrast to the optimal output and price when 
supplying domestic demand. Accordingly, maximum attainable profits of a firm i from 
A, exporting to B, are given by162 
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Analogously, this can be derived for a firm i from B exporting to A. 
 
Now, it is straightforward to compute maximum attainable profits for firms engaged in 
multinational activities. As they produce goods for both markets locally, transport 
costs do not occur. Instead a firm i from Country A opens an affiliate in B and 
becomes a horizontal MNE.  
 
To maximize social welfare, a government in j may choose to levy withholding taxes 
on profits of foreign MNEs earned by subsidiaries in its jurisdiction.  
Profits of an MNE headquartered in Country A are defined by 
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 See derivation III in Appendix 3.4. 
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 See derivation III in Appendix 3.4. 
162
 See derivation III in Appendix 3.4. 
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Profits of an MNE headquartered in Country B are defined by 
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An MNE expects at least zero profits from running both domestic and foreign 
subsidiaries. Profit maximizing plant output is,163 
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Accordingly, the maximum attainable profits of a multinational firm i headquartered in 
Country A are given by165 
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Analogously, this can be derived for MNEs from B with subsidiaries in A. 
 
Firms choose their integration strategies based on the knowledge of their productivity 
levels. This results in the cut-off levels being the determinants of minimum levels of 
productivity for a firm i to generate zero profits additionally when ex-ante selecting a 
strategy with more than domestic production. In general, more productive firms are 
more successful in all three strategies. 
The least productive firms only serve the domestic market through domestic 
production. Because of their low productivity, their variable costs are too high. 
Therefore, the higher fixed costs to operate on an additional market cannot be 
covered.  
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At this point, the cut-off levels must be analyzed. 
At the first cut-off level productivity of a firm is such that additional profits of exporting 
exactly result in zero profits. 
For a firm i from A and exporting to B, this is derived from 
321
444444 3444444 21 profitsdomestic
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D
ex
*
exBB*
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.  
Analogously, this holds true for a firm i from B exporting to A.    
   
With 0D ≥ , this applies for166  
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The market size X results endogenously according to Xd,ex,i. Furthermore, the cut-off 
productivity depends on the country size sj. The larger the foreign country sj, the 
smaller the productivity of a firm has to be for the export strategy to become 
reasonable. A firm with productivity ex/dθ  generates zero profits from exporting. 
Hence, this firm is indifferent in terms of only selling domestically or engaging in 
exports in addition to domestic sales. A firm with productivity just above this level is 
already earning positive profits from exporting and will definitely engage in exporting. 
  
The critical productivity level in (3.20) is positively correlated with t, fex and market 
size X. Hence, the indifferent firm must be more productive to break even. In other 
words, a higher productivity yields lower variable costs of production. Furthermore, 
conditional on the existence of the export strategy, productivity levels exist that 
ensure that profits of exporters´ exceed profits of MNEs. 
  
The next threshold, profits of an exporting firm equal profits of an MNE (i.e.,  
iex )i()i( pi=pi ).167 
This applies to 
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Only firms with i/ex)i( θ>θ  gain positive profits from serving foreign markets through 
building subsidiaries instead of exporting their goods. 
i/exθ  depends on the difference in fixed costs (fi – fex) > 0 which can be interpreted as 
overhead and set-up costs of an MNE subsidiary. The higher the overhead costs      
(fi – fex) for a foreign subsidiary are, the more productive the indifferent firm must be 
to engage in MNE activity (i.e., the cut-off level i/exθ takes over a higher value). The 
higher the transport costs t are, the more likely firms are to engage in the MNE 
integration strategy. Higher transport costs, therefore, result in a lower value of i/exθ . 
The larger the foreign country sj, the smaller the productivity of a firm must be for the 
export strategy to become reasonable. 
Furthermore, only if )1(j t)1( α−
α−
>γ−  holds does a real and unique solution exists. If the 
parameter configuration of the transport costs t, the tax rate γ  and α  does not satisfy 
this condition, MNE activities do not exist. 
 
Alternatively, certain configurations of parameters may result in a situation in which 
domestic firms integrate directly as MNEs instead of choosing the export strategy. 
The following cut-off level is the relevant productivity threshold if i/dθ < ex/dθ . The 
associated cut-off level results from 
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The associated market size X in this scenario endogenously results in Xd,i. The larger 
the foreign country sj, the smaller the productivity of a firm must be for the MNE 
strategy to become reasonable. 
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For i/dθ < ex/dθ  so that this cut-off level exists, the following condition must hold169 
)1(
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j
tf
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≥γ−                      (3.23) 
 
3.2.4 Welfare maximization and the objective of the governments 
In the following, governments can set profit taxes in a first stage and cannot rescind 
their offers by assumption. Then, firms decide upon their optimal integration 
strategies, whereas the governments take this into account when setting tax rates. A 
government chooses a withholding tax rate 10 j <γ< , j { }B,A∈ , to capture profits of 
foreign MNEs earned in plants in j. Hence, MNE profits from production in j are taxed 
by the government in j. This tax revenue is passed on to the households within that 
jurisdiction. When selecting an optimal tax rate jγ , the government in j maximizes the 
utility of the representative household in its country.  
 
Furthermore, transport costs t reduce exporting firm profits and are given 
exogenously. Taxation reduces MNE profits, where tax rates are set endogenously 
by both governments. The set of optimal integration strategies is influenced by these 
transport costs and profit taxes, both of which have an impact on the mass of firms 
choosing the different optimal integrations strategies. 
 
3.2.4.1 The objective of the governments 
In this section, cases are analyzed in which the governments of both countries, A and 
B, can levy withholding taxes Aγ  and Bγ , which are taken into account in the MNE 
profit functions. In this setting, taxes are paid on MNE profits either in A or in B. The 
location of tax payments depends on the production location of the firm.  
Furthermore, by assumption, households do not know the underlying tax basis for 
provision of the lump-sum transfer so that the composition of consumption of 
differentiated goods is not distorted.  
The price for the homogeneous product is p0=1; and prices for differentiated products 
are shown by pj(i), where pj(i) is the price for variety i in country j.  
As already shown, the utility of the representative household in country j, j { }B;A∈ , is 
given by (3.1), which can also be shown by: 
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The utility of a representative household increases in m j  and declines in p j (i). 
For a government to pass on a lump-sum transfer to the households in its jurisdiction 
j and, therefore, to select jγ >0, the utility of the representative household with lump-
sum transfer may not be smaller than the utility shown in (3.24), considering the 
implications of profit taxation in the other jurisdiction. Hence, government tax revenue 
depends on the strategies chosen by the firms. For this reason, the firm profit 
functions depending on tax rates must be examined to consider the associated utility 
function, including lump-sum transfer. 
To show these welfare implications, optimal integration strategies with taxation are 
examined in the following sub-section. 
 
3.2.4.2 Strategic alignment 
According to alternative parameter configurations, strategic alignments of firms and 
their impact on welfare with jγ >0 are examined in the following: 
(a)  For all integration strategies to coexist, these conditions must hold: 
- ex/dθ < i/exθ , which results in a relation between the fixed costs; transport costs t; 
and the tax rate jγ : 
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- Furthermore, for the MNE strategy to exist )1(j t)1( α−
α−
>γ−  must hold.170 The 
resulting utility function of the representative household with lump-sum transfer is 
given by: 
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(b) Alternative parameter configurations can result in a situation in which only 
domestic firms and MNEs enter production. For this constellation to exist, the 
following conditions must hold:  
- i/dθ < ex/dθ , which results in a relation between the fixed costs; transport costs t; 
and the tax rate jγ :171 
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j
tf
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≥γ−          
- Furthermore, to ensure that the MNE strategy exists, it follows from i/dθ  that  
jj s)1)(1( α−γ− 0≠ must hold. Therefore, governments must select jγ <1. 
The resulting utility function of the representative household with lump-sum 
transfer is given by: 
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(c) Alternative parameter configurations may result in a situation in which no MNEs 
enter production. Then, following conditions hold:  
- The MNE strategy only exists if )1(j t)1( α−
α−
>γ−  holds. Otherwise, only domestic 
and exporting strategies are chosen.  
- Additionally, to guarantee that the export strategy exists, ex/dθ < maxθ  must hold. 
This can also be written as: 
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The resulting utility function of the representative household is given by: 
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Without firms selecting MNE activities, a tax base does not exist. For this reason, 
a lump-sum transfer to the representative household cannot be provided 
independent of the size of jγ . 
(d) Alternative parameter configurations may result in a situation in which only 
domestic firms enter production. For this constellation to exist, the following 
conditions have to hold: ex/dθ > maxθ  and i/dθ > maxθ . 
The resulting utility function of the representative household is given by: 
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Without firms selecting MNE activities, a tax base does not exist. For this reason, 
a lump-sum transfer to the representative household cannot be provided 
independent of the size of jγ . 
 
3.2.4.3 The decisions of the governments 
The decisions of the governments depend on the exogenous variables, such as 
transport costs, country size, variable costs, fixed costs, and the firm productivities, 
resulting in a set of optimal integration strategies. 
First, prices of a single firm do not change because of the taxes levied. These are 
only influenced by transport costs.172 
Transport costs are passed on to the households, whereas taxes are paid by the 
firms; and prices in A and B for goods from the same firm only differ if transport costs 
exist.  
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If a strategy of production in A and B is reasonable, not all profits of a firm are taxed. 
Instead, only profits generated by MNEs in the foreign market are subject to taxation 
of the foreign government. Hence, the government in B taxes the profits gained in B 
of MNEs that have their origin in A and vice versa. 
Governments considered the following aspects when setting their optimal tax rate 
0< jγ <1: 
1. Firm profits, including taxation, only change if levied taxes influence a firm to 
choose a strategy other than MNE activities as optimal. If this is true, government 
tax revenues also change because the mass of firms choosing MNE activities is 
influenced by the size of jγ .  
2. Prices in the differentiated sector depend on the chosen strategies of firms, and 
the mass of firms selecting the MNE strategy depends on jγ . If i/exex/d θ<θ , this 
impact on the utility of households in j arises if firms select the export strategy 
instead of MNE activity as optimal because of taxation in j.  
3. The degree of taxation influences the mass of firms entering the market in j 
because of profit taxation in j. The utility of households in j is affected by this 
variety effect.    
4. In general a, lump-sum transfer is additional income for households in that 
country and is spent on x0. 
5. If firms in the differentiated sector select strategies other than at jγ =0, the working 
income of households is not lowered because they can work in the homogeneous 
sector. 
6. When selecting jγ >0, the tax rate selected by one government depends on the 
tax rate of the other. 
7. The market size X results endogenously and depends on the selected jγ . 
 
Only if the positive impacts of taxation outweigh the negative ones are governments 
acting as benevolent planners interested in selecting 0< jγ <1. 
For this reason, each government solves 
j
U
γ∂
∂
, as in (3.26) and (3.27). In these 
expressions, the market size has different outcomes depending on the integration 
strategies heterogeneous firms choose. This endogeneity of the market size X results 
BEST-RESPONSE TAX RATES ON PROFITS OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS       163 
in a situation in which every parameter configuration results in a corresponding level 
of X. This implies that the mass of firms in equilibrium varies endogenously. 
Due to market entry conditions, expected profits according to (3.26), (3.27), (3.29) 
and (3.30) are competed to zero. As an example, consider the situation in (3.26). 
Expected profits for all firms headquartered in A are defined by: 
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Vice versa, this also accounts for all firms headquartered in B. 
Furthermore, market size X and the mass of firms in equilibrium are interdependent. 
The market size X and the mass of firms induce further interdependences to other 
equilibrium determining expressions (i.e., the cut-off levels and the demand of the 
households).  
 
Even without the complexity induced by the linkages of the different variables, the 
maximization of welfare,
j
U
γ∂
∂
, results in a problem with a dimensionality higher than 
fourth degree.173 These aspects preclude an analytical solution of 
j
U
γ∂
∂
 and suggest 
using numerical analysis to determine the welfare maximizing tax rates jγ  and their 
interactions with other variables. 
 
3.2.5 Set-up of the numerical framework 
To derive a solution to this problem and to find a welfare maximizing expression for 
the tax rate γ j we use Mathematica 7.0. This program is utilized to set up the 
numerical framework that represents the theory of the model as derived in previous 
sections.174  
 
 
                                            
173
 A derivation of a unique solution with dimensionality higher than fourth degree cannot be provided. 
This is proved by the theory of Galois. For a survey see Taton (1983). 
174
 See derivation VIII in Appendix 3.4 for the full input sheet with given values for specific variables.  
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3.2.5.1 Definitions  
The coding of the numerical framework starts with defining variables and making 
assumptions. Analogously to the assumptions of the model, the fixed costs, maxθ , α , 
and µ  are set to constant numerical values, considering fd<fex<fi and 0<µ < α <1. 
 
After paying the market-entry costs of fd, a firm draws its individual productivity level 
θ . We apply a uniform distribution of the firms over θ , specified as F[θ_]. The 
distribution function is defined piecewise to ensure that F[θ_]takes the value 0 if the 
distribution is not reached and takes the value 1 in the boundaries of minθ and maxθ . 
To guarantee continuous results, firms are ranked according to individual 
productivity, starting with low productive firms, reflected by the expression 
θ[i_,n_]. The productivity of the single firm θ[i_,n_] depends on the rank i 
of the i-th firm, given a mass of firms in the economy n.  
For further analysis, a function to provide the rank of the indifferent firm that is 
between two strategies is computed using the expression inr[θ_,n_], which 
reports the rank of the firm given the productivity θ and the mass of firms n 
founded in the country.  
The demand of the representative household as in (3.2), results in optimal output for 
the firms as derived previously. Therefore, the computation of the profit-maximizing 
output is represented by x[θ_,X_,t_, γ_]. The optimal output of a firm i 
depends on its productivity θ, the market size X, the transport costs t, and the 
withholding tax rate γ j . As the tax rate of country j, γ j, is only relevant for the MNE 
strategy, we must consider jγ =0 for both the domestic and the exporting strategies. 
The choice of the integration strategy of firms is driven by cut-off productivity 
thresholds. They are coded as follows: The first threshold separates domestic 
producers from exporters from j and is computed as θde[X_,s_,t_],  considering  
X and s in the country in which the differentiated goods are sold. The associated 
firm number is reported by ide[n_,X_,s_,t_]. With this expression, the rank of 
the indifferent firm is calculated in terms of productivity, depending on the 
endogenous mass of firms n in j, the endogenous market size in the other country, its 
country size, and the transport costs t. Because the domestic and exporting strategy 
both are independent of the tax rate, ide[n_,X_,s_,t_] does not depend on it. 
For example, by entering ide[25000,5000,1,1.05], the system calculates the 
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rank of the indifferent firm ide with cut-off productivity ex/dθ  to be the 19912nd 
firm, given a mass of 25000 firms in this country, a market size of 5000, a country 
size of 1, and transport costs of 1.05. Hence, the 19913rd firm out of 25000 exports 
for sure.  
 
Analogously we compute the threshold productivity i/exθ  as  θei[X_,s_,t_, γ_] 
with the associated rank iei[n_,X_,s_,t_, γ_], considering  X , s, and γ in 
the country in which the economic activity takes place. The same notion is used to 
code the cut-off level i/dθ  as θdi[X_,s_,t_, γ_], linked to the rank 
idi[n_,X_,s_,t_, γ_], considering  X , s, and γ in the country in which the 
economic activity takes place. 
 
3.2.5.2 Consistency of market size X 
The inclusion of the endogenously defined market size X from a demand perspective 
as in section 3.2.2, into the numerical model does not result in the consistency 
needed to derive results. The proof of inconsistency starts with computing market 
size of country j from a supply perspective for firms active in the different strategies in 
j, j { }B,A∈  (i.e., Yd [supply of domestic firms from A vice versa from B], Yex [supply 
of exporting firms from B and vice versa from A], Yin [supply of MNEs with origin 
in B and vice versa with origin in A]). The market size for domestic producers in A, 
referring to the representative household, yields Yd[nA_,X_,t_]. Yd depends on 
the mass of firms in the domestic market nA, the market size X in A itself and 
transport costs t. It is characterized by the integral over the output of all domestic 
firms i.  
 
Analogously, we compute the market size of firms that export from Country B to 
Country A. From the perspective of firms producing in B and exporting to A, the 
export market size, referring to the representative household in A, is given by 
Yex[nB_,X_,s_,t_,γ_]. The size of the export market of firms from B in A 
depends on the mass of firms located in B(nB), on the market size X in A, the country 
size s in A, transport costs t, and the tax rate γ in A. The definition of Yex in the 
numerical analysis also considers the scenario that possibly no exporters exist. 
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The market size for multinational firms in terms of the representative household is 
defined by Yin[nB_,X_,s_,t_,γ_].The market for MNEs in A depends on the 
mass of firms located in B (nB), the market size X in A, the country size s in A, 
transport costs t, and the tax rate γ in A. This coding also includes conditions to 
guarantee that the system integrates correctly regarding prevailing integration 
strategies.  
The entire market size from a supply perspective, referring to the representative 
household in A, is determined as the sum of all three market segments and is 
represented by: 
Y[nA_,nB_,X_,s_,t_,γ_]:=Yd[nA,X,t]+Yex[nB,X,s,t,γ]+Yin[nB,X,s,
t,γ] 
 
Inconsistency in the market size will result in differing outcomes regarding the market 
size from supply (Y) and demand (X) perspectives. If the configuration is consistent 
we should expect a result of Y=5000, for example, if X is 5000. However, using the 
code defined previously, inserting X=5000, Y=5000 does not necessarily occur. For 
example, Y[20000,20000,5000,1,1.05,0.08] results in a market size of Y= 4192.26. 
The inconsistency of the market size can be clarified with graphic 3.3:175  
 
Graphic 3.3: 
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 The plot can be implemented using the code:  
Plot[{Y[20000,20000,X,1,1.05,0.08],X},{X,0,7000},AxesLabel→{X(Y),Y(X)}].
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The inconsistency of the market size in graphic 3.3 is obvious. The curve of the 
market size X itself has a different progression than the curve Y. The intersection of 
both curves gives the true market size for the given values, i.e. Xm=4691.47. 
To achieve the essential consistency of market size, the computation uses a Quasi-
Newton method, computed as Xm[nA_,nB_,s_,t_,γ_].176 The method is so 
named, because we use an approximation for the slope, using the gradient of the 
secant of the function Xm, for which we search. Graphic 3.4 shows the visualization of 
the method:177 
 
Graphic 3.4: 
 
The program is coded to find the null, starting to calculate the secant at a value of 
1000 (in graphic 3.4 this corresponds to x0), assuming a width of 20 (in graphic 3.4 
this corresponds to the second value x1). The slope of the secant results in a null, 
which is the next starting value (in graphic 3.4 this corresponds to x2). The slope of 
the secant associated with this new starting value results in a new null (in graphic 3.4 
this corresponds to x3).  
This iteration is repeated until the exact null is found. Meanwhile, the width in which 
the boundaries of the slope of the secants are calculated is reduced stepwise.  
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 As in Spelucci (1993) and Knorrenschild (2008). 
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 As in Knorrenschild (2008). 
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3.2.5.3 The mass of firms in equilibrium 
Firm decisions to enter the market are based on the expectation of future profits. 
Heterogeneous firms enter production as long as their future earnings expectations 
are positive. Hence, the mass of firms in the market is determined by expected profits 
being equal to zero. After computing the profit function of the single firm i with its 
particular strategy, expected profits are determined by the profits of all firms in the 
specific market. The profit functions of the single firms in the different strategies are 
computed.  
For a firm selecting the domestic strategy in Country A we apply 
Gd[i_,nA_,nB_,s_,t_,γ_]. We must consider that the tax rate γ has to be set 
to 0 and transport costs to 1 because they both are not relevant for domestic 
producers. Furthermore, the rank of the i-th firm, the mass of firms in A and B and the 
country size of A must be considered to compute Gd of the i-th firm. Although this 
firm selects the domestic strategy in Country A, the mass of firms in B must be 
considered because of competitive conditions.  
The profit of a firm in the export strategy is computed as 
Gex[i_,nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]. Profits of an exporting firm, i, from A to B 
depend on the mass of firms in A and B (nA and nB), the size of B(sB), transport 
costs t that apply for the export strategy, and the tax rate being applied in B, i.e. γB 
for MNEs.  
The profit function of MNEs originally located in A with subsidiaries in B is coded as 
Gin[i_,nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]. Profits of an MNE, i, from A, being an MNE in 
B, also depend on the mass of firms in A and B (nA and nB), the size of B (sB), 
transport costs t that would apply for the export strategy, and the tax rate on profits of 
MNEs earned in B being applied in B (γB). 
 
Expected profits (EG) in an economy result from the integration of profits over all 
firms in the different strategies. 
For A they are given by:  
EG[nA_,nB_,sA_,sB_,t_,γA_,γB_]:=EGd[nA,nB,sA,t, γA]+EGex[nA,nB,
sB,t, γB]+EGin[nA,nB,sB,t, γB].  
The computation of expected profits includes conditions to ensure that profits are 
only integrated if the associated strategy exists. 
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Finally, coding the mass of firms in equilibrium results from expected profits being 
competed to zero by firms entering the market.  
For firms in A, this is given by:  
Firms[nB_,sA_,sB_,t_,γA_,γB_].The process to find the null is coded by the 
instruction to test several values in defined steps. After determining the first negative 
value of expected profits, the program jumps back to exactly approach the null while 
the width of the steps is permanently reduced. 
For example, the instruction to calculate the mass of firms in equilibrium in A given 
nB=18000, sA=1, sB=1, t=1.05, γ A=0.08, γ B=0.08 is depicted by 
Firms[18000,1,1,1.05,0.08,0.08]. 
The example results in 12852.1 firms in A given 18000 firms in Country B, with 
associated expected profits of -0.00004, thus supporting the previously described 
method. 
 
3.2.5.4 Equilibria 
Considering the utility function in (3.1), households in the two countries benefit from 
consumption of homogeneous good x0 and differentiated goods.  
To implement the utility maximization process, we must first consider the stand-alone 
contribution of x0. Without the existence of a differentiated sector, the representative 
household only generates utility by consuming x0.  
 
Hence, the benefit of one unit of differentiated goods is constituted by its net 
contribution (i.e. additional utility versus additional costs). The computation of the 
equilibrium utilizes this notion to implement the utility maximizing process. In this 
computation, the equilibrium of the model is labeled 
Equilibrium[sA_,sB_,t_,γA_,γB_] and depends on the given values of 
country sizes, transport costs, and tax rates in A and B. It is computed so that the 
system delivers data describing the equilibrium. 
 
Given the exogenous variables, the system endogenously determines the equilibrium 
mass of firms in A and B. The tax rates being unequal, BA γ≠γ ,  results in the mass 
of firms differing in both countries, nA≠nB. The programming of the mass of firms in 
equilibrium is visualized in graphic 3.5. 
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Graphic 3.5: 
 
 
In computing to find the correct value for the mass of firms, nB=1 is the starting point. 
The program searches for the corresponding mass of firms in A conditioned on nB=1 
[i.e., nA(nB)]. In the figure, this is denoted as a. Given nA(1) firms in A, the iteration 
proceeds by calculating the associated mass of firms in B, denoted as a*. 
Analogously, we assume nA=1 and search for the associated value for the mass of 
firms in B, denoted as b [i.e., nB(nA)]. Given nB(1) firms in B, the system calculates 
the corresponding mass of firms in A, denoted as b*. In the intersection of the two 
resulting graphs, the new starting value is given, C. This loop is repeated until the 
difference between the new starting value minus the old starting value is ≤ 20 (i.e., 
nB3-nB0≤20) in the program or C in the figure.178     
The computation proceeds using calculations of expected profits for A and B. The 
system calculates expected profits and all other key figures for the different possible 
integration strategies and sums them up afterwards. Hence, EGewA denotes 
expected profits in A; EGewB denotes expected profits in B. 
The next relevant variable is the consistent market size for A, which is calculated 
using Xm[nA_,nB_,sA_,t_,γA], as defined in section 3.2.5.2, and analogously 
for B.  
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 Compare with the computation in the input sheet as in derivation VIII in Appendix 3.4 for nB3-
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Afterwards, the contributions of the different strategies to total market size are 
shown, separately for A and B. For example, the share of output of all domestic firms 
in its market in A is computed as YDA=Yd[NA,XMA,t]; the capital letters denote 
equilibrium values. The expression depends on the mass of firms in A (NA), the 
overall market size in A (XMA), and transport costs t.179 
The sum of expenses of the representative household for differentiated goods in A is 
represented by MA=MYDA+MYEXA+MYINA. 
MYDA=MYd[NA,XMA,sA,t] denotes expenses of the representative household in A 
for goods from domestic producers,  
MYEXA=MYex[NB,XMA,sA,t,γA]are expenses for imports from B to A and  
MYINA=MYin[NB,XMA,sA,t,γA] is the calculation of expenses of the 
representative household in A for goods from MNEs from B. The analogous notion 
(MB) is used to compute expenses for the representative household in B.  
Equilibria and, therefore, welfare are constituted by the utility of consumption of 
differentiated goods. Again, to determine utility, we distinguish between A and B and 
between the different strategies. Therefore, for A we compute the utility of 
consumption of differentiated goods from domestic firms, from imports from B and 
from MNEs in A originally located in B. Then, the overall utility of the representative 
household from differentiated good consumption in A is given, depending on the sum 
of the three sub functions, and shows UA=1/µ(YDA+YINA+YEXA)^µ , referring to 
(3.1). Analogously, the overall utility of the representative household from 
differentiated good consumption in B is given by UB=1/µ(YDB+YINB+YEXB)^µ.  
In addition, the representative household benefits from a lump-sum transfer financed 
by profit taxation of foreign MNE production in subsidiaries. A single MNE with origin 
in A pays taxes according to its profits: 
TinB[i_,nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]:=(Gin[i,nA,nB,sB,t,γB]+fin)*γB/(1-
γB)
 
Because this is tax revenue paid on profits of a single MNE with origin in A gained by 
its subsidiary in B and is subject to taxation in B, total tax revenue in the jurisdiction 
of B is defined by: 
                                            
179
 Analogously, we compute YEXA for the share of output of all exporting firms located in B supplying 
A’s market. The same notion is used to compute YINA, which denotes the share of output of all MNEs 
headquartered in B supplying the market in A by a subsidiary in A. The analogue computation for 
Country B is given as YDB, YEXB and YINB. 
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ETinB[nA_,nB_,sB_,τB_,t_,γB_]:=NIntegrate[TinB[i,nA,nB,sB,τB,t
,γB],{i,Min[nA,Max[iei[nA,Xm[nB,nA,sB,τB,t,γB],sB,τB,t,γB],idi
[nA,Xm[nB,nA,sB,τB,t,γB],sB,τB,t,γB]]],nA}] 
and analogously for A. 
That is, ETinB is given by the integral over all firms selecting the MNE strategy and 
paying profit taxes in B and vice versa in A.  
A household in B obviously receives a lump-sum transfer TB=1/sB*ETinB and a 
household in A receives TA=1/sA*ETinA from its government.   
Finally, welfare is given as WB=UB-MB+TB for B and WA=UA-MA+TA for A. 
 
3.2.5.5 Results of numerical analysis 
Using the knowledge of the behavior of firms concerning their integration strategies, 
governments maximize welfare (measured per-capita) in their jurisdictions by 
optimally choosing withholding tax rate γ j.  
Therefore, we examine equilibria of the model resulting from a variation of the tax 
rates γ j (c.p., this results in equilibria for each of the two countries, A and B).  
To analyze the numerical output, we focus on the mass of firms in equilibrium, 
labeled NA and NB, for the mass of firms in each country, A or B, thereby indicating 
the mass of differentiated goods in each country. Furthermore, we focus on the 
consistent market size in each country, XmA and XmB, and their contributions based 
on the output of firms selecting different integration strategies.  
 
3.2.5.5.1 Results with identical country sizes 
In a scenario in which the two countries, A and B, behave cooperatively, referring to 
a social planner’s perspective, the resulting numerical analysis indicates that welfare 
is maximized for both jurisdictions with the choice of γ A= γ B=0.180 In this case, the 
welfare of the representative household in each country results in 
WA=WB=139.023.181 In this scenario, an equilibrium mass of firms of NA=NB=15239 
and an equilibrium market size of XmA=XmB=4313.14 come to the fore. NA=NB is 
constituted by ≈11139 domestic firms, no exporters from B, and ≈44100 MNEs. 
Furthermore, the market size in equilibrium is constituted by a domestic market share 
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 See derivation VIII in Appendix 3.4 for the full input sheet with given values for specific variables. 
181
 See derivation IX in Appendix 3.4 for a table summarizing welfare implications resulting from any 
combination of γ A and γ B.  
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of YDA=YDB=2515.59 (≈58.32%) and a market share of MNEs of 
YINA=YINB=1797.54 (≈41.68%). On the one hand, these market shares consider the 
mass of firms; on the other hand, they also consider the output of the firms selecting 
each strategy. Separating these two impacts, we find 73.1% of the firms select the 
domestic strategy and 26.9% select the MNE strategy. Because the governments do 
not levy taxes on profits of MNEs, the export strategy does not exist in this 
equilibrium because costs associated with an MNE activity are lower than costs of 
exporting due to transport costs. Obviously, a lump-sum transfer to the households 
cannot be provided in this equilibrium because γ A= γ B=0.  
 
Because policy makers in A attempt to maximize the welfare of households in their 
country, they do not consider the welfare in B and vice versa. Hence, they behave 
uncooperatively. Given any certain tax rate γ B, there is incentive to determine the 
welfare maximizing best-response tax rate γ A and vice versa.  
We implement this approach in the numerical model, finding equilibrium because the 
mass of firms in A (NA), settles to a level that guarantees expected profits in both 
countries are competed to zero. The same iteration is repeated for the second 
country, B.  
Using the knowledge of the existing masses of firms in both countries given the tax 
rates γ A and γ B we determine equilibrium describing variables and study welfare. 
Given this condition of consistency, regarding NA and NB, with the outcome of 
numerical analysis in terms of welfare in A and B, we can derive Nash equilibria 
concerning tax rates γ A and γ B.182 This can be done for any combination of full-
percentage tax rates. 
 
Given a scenario in which both countries, A and B, have γ j=0, the best response tax 
rate of one country, given zero taxation in the other country, is γ j=8%.183 For this 
country, this results in welfare in equilibrium of Wj=142.555. This obvious increase of 
welfare from Wj=139.023 to Wj=142.555 is achieved at the expense of the other 
country because its welfare declines to Wj=135.183, without the application of 
                                            
182
 Compare with Nash (1951). Furthermore, tests of stability of this model confirm this notion of 
equilibrium. A convergence of equilibria still appears if firms in A and B alternately enter and exit the 
market.  
183
 See derivation X in Appendix 3.4 for a table summarizing all responses to Bγ =0%. 
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taxation in this jurisdiction. Instead, a social planner would deviate from this solution 
because total welfare declines in this scenario compared to the zero taxation setting 
described previously. 
 
Assuming that A is the deviator, choosing γ A=8%, this scenario is characterized by 
NA=25974 varieties available in A versus NB=4316 varieties of differentiated goods 
in B. NA is constituted by ≈19543 domestic firms, ≈5287 exporters from B and ≈1144 
MNEs. NB is constituted by ≈3077 domestic firms, no exporters from A, and ≈1239 
MNEs. 
This tax rate constellation shows the following implications: 
The market in A is given by XmA=4494 associated with an increased market share of 
90.8% domestic producers. The market share of MNEs in A declines to 2.5%; and, in 
this constellation, differentiated goods also are imported to A. The market share of 
these exporting firms from B in A is 6.7%. In contrast with zero taxation, this strategy 
is not existent. Again, on the one hand, these market shares consider the mass of 
firms; on the other hand, they also consider the output of the firms selecting each 
strategy. Separating these two impacts of output and masses of firms selecting single 
strategies, we find 75.24% of firms selecting the domestic strategy, 20.36% the from 
B exporting, and 4.4% selecting the MNE strategy. In comparison to a zero taxation 
scenario, the mass of MNEs declines and the mass of exporters from B and domestic 
firms increases.    
Households in A benefit from more firms entering the market. This increase is 
associated with a larger market size and is due to the love for variety preferences. 
Furthermore, a positive per-capita lump-sum transfer to households in A is achieved. 
Also, a negative impact of γ A=8% is generated because fewer cheap differentiated 
goods from MNEs are available. Imports are more expensive than goods supplied by 
MNEs.  
In total, the positive impact outweighs the negative for households in A. For this 
reason, welfare in A increases because of γ A=8% and γ B=0%, compared to a 
scenario without taxation. 
In contrast, the market in Country B is given by XmB=4116, associated with a market 
share of 18.3% of domestic producers. The market share of MNEs in A increases to 
81.7% and still no goods are imported to B.  
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Households in B suffer from a decreased mass of firms entering the market there 
because the mass of domestic firms in B declines dramatically. On the one hand, 
more cheap goods from MNEs are available for households in B; but, on the other 
hand, fewer national firms enter the market in B. Hence, households suffer from 
fewer available varieties of goods due to market entry conditions (i.e., expected 
profits are competed to zero). In addition to fewer domestically produced varieties 
being available, the increased market share of MNEs reflects not only more varieties 
from MNEs but also single MNEs output, which does not increase utility of 
households due to love for variety preferences. Because the increased market share 
of MNEs does not increase welfare to the same extent, the negative impact of market 
shares cannot be compensated by an increased market share of MNEs in B due to 
love for variety preferences. Because γ B=0% is selected, a per-capita lump-sum 
transfer in B does not arise.  
In sum, welfare in B declines compared to the situation without profit taxation in both 
countries. 
Given the described situation for B, we find the best-response tax rate to γ A=8% to 
be γ B=7%.184 Hence, the constellation of γ A=8% and γ B=0% is not stable. 
Country B, therefore, does not select γ B=0%; instead γ B=7% is the best-response 
given γ A=8%. The welfare of the representative household increases to WB=138.082 
compared to WB=135.183 in the γ A=8% and γ B=0% scenario.   
The welfare of the neighbor country, A, then decreases to WA=138.319 instead of 
WA=142.555 in the γ A=8% and γ B=0% scenario. The equilibrium is characterized by 
a market size in A of XmA=4260 in contrast to XmB=4238 associated with a mass of 
firms NA=16156 compared to NB=14233. NA is constituted by ≈11814 domestic 
firms, ≈248 exporters from B, and ≈4094 MNEs; and NB is constituted by ≈10379 
domestic firms, ≈180 exporters from A, and ≈3674 MNEs. 
Compared to the γ A=8% and γ B=0% scenario, this indicates an increased market 
size XmB as well as a considerable increase in the mass of firms NB. Increased 
welfare in B, therefore, is due to more available varieties of differentiated goods for 
consumers in B. Fewer products from MNEs are available for them because of 
taxation, but more goods from domestics and exporters are supplied.   
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 See derivation XI in Appendix 3.4 for a table summarizing all responses to Aγ =8%. 
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In this scenario, taxation induces positive welfare implications due to love for variety 
preferences and positive tax revenue for households in B compared to the previous 
scenario. 
The constellation of γ A=8% and γ B=7% is a stable equilibrium with a non-
cooperative tax setting. This can be seen, because, the best response for A given 
γ B=7% again is γ A=8%. Hence, this combination of tax rates is a best-response for 
one another.185 Because the countries are identical, obviously γ A=7% with γ B=8% is 
also a stable equilibrium. Even though both countries generate lower welfare than 
without taxation these are stable equilibria in contrast to a zero taxation scenario, 
because every country has incentive to deviate.  
Graphic 3.6 summarizes the results of best-response taxes and shows the two stable 
equilibria: 
 
Graphic 3.6: 
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From both individual and world welfare perspectives, a non-cooperative tax setting 
results in inefficiently high tax rates.  
Governments are completely informed when setting tax rates. For this reason, they 
both know that the other has incentive to deviate from zero taxation. Considering this, 
welfare in its own jurisdiction is maximized considering the tax rate the other country 
is to select. Hence, zero taxation is not a stable choice for either country, even 
though it will deliver the highest welfare for each of them. 
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 See derivation XII in Appendix 3.4 for a table summarizing all responses to Bγ =7%. 
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Therefore, the zero taxation scenario should only be obtained under reliable 
cooperation (i.e., with a social planner) because each single government has 
incentive to deviate.  
 
3.2.5.5.2 Results with different country sizes 
In a scenario assuming A marginally larger than B and in which the two countries 
behave cooperatively, the results of numerical analysis indicate that welfare is 
maximized in both jurisdictions with the choice of γ A= γ B=0. In this case, the welfare 
of the representative household in each country results in WA=139.829 and 
WB=139.201.186 Compared to the scenario with identical country sizes, this result 
shows that already the marginally larger country size of A delivers a positive welfare 
implication that also occurs for the smaller country, B. In this scenario, an equilibrium 
mass of firms of NA=16235 and NB=14671 and an equilibrium market size of 
XmA=4355 and XmB=4322 come to the fore. NA is constituted by ≈11889 domestic 
firms, no exporters from B, and ≈4346 MNEs; NB is constituted by ≈10735 domestic 
firms, no exporters from A, and ≈3936 MNEs.  
The market size in equilibrium is constituted by a domestic market share of 
YDA=2649 (≈60.08%) and YDB=2416 (≈55.9%) and a market share of MNEs of 
YINA=1706 (≈39.2%) and YINB=1907 (≈44.1%). These market shares include the 
mass of firms selecting a strategy as well as the output of these single firms. 
Because the governments do not levy taxes on profits of MNEs, the export strategy 
does not exist in this equilibrium because the costs associated with MNE activity are 
lower than the costs of exporting due to transport costs and fixed costs relations. 
Obviously, a lump-sum transfer to the households cannot be provided in this 
equilibrium because γ A= γ B=0.  
In comparison to the analysis with identical country sizes, the mass of firms increases 
in A and decreases in B. The market sizes of both countries increase, but the impact 
of country size results in a stronger magnitude for the market size in A than in B. 
Furthermore, the constitution of market shares changes. The domestic market share 
increases in A and declines in B in contrast to the market shares of MNEs that 
decline in A and increase in B in comparison to the analysis with equally sized 
countries.  
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 See derivation XIII in Appendix 3.4 for a table summarizing welfare implications resulting from any 
combination of γ A and γ B.  
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The impact of country size results in the following implications for country A: 
Because country size is larger, the demand is also larger, resulting in more firms 
entering the market in A. Hence, NA and XMA are greater than in the previous 
analysis with identical country sizes; and more domestic firms are founded. 
Households in A benefit because more varieties are available. Furthermore, the 
foundation of domestic firms is stimulated because competition given by MNEs from 
B is not as intense. This is because fewer firms decide to enter the market in B 
because this is the smaller country. For these reasons, welfare in A is not higher 
because of the availability of cheaper differentiated goods from MNEs but because of 
a higher satisfaction of love for variety preferences.  
The impact of country size results in the following implications for country B: 
The assumption of the larger country size of A results in more firms being stimulated 
to enter the market in A. This is because firms in A face greater national demand. For 
this reason, more firms supplying demand in B with MNE activities also enter the 
market in A. This intensifies competition in B. For this reason, fewer domestic firms 
enter the market in B. Hence, NB is smaller than with identical country sizes. 
Although fewer varieties of differentiated goods are available in B, XMB is greater 
than before; and the impact on welfare is positive compared to the previous analysis. 
Hence, if country size in A exogenously is given marginally as being bigger than in B, 
welfare in B is higher, even though it is the smaller country in this analysis.  
Because policy makers of countries attempt to maximize the welfare of their 
households, they do not consider welfare in the other jurisdictions. Given any certain 
tax rate γ B, there is incentive to determine the welfare maximizing best-response tax 
rate γ A and vice versa.  
With the outcome of numerical analysis in terms of welfare in A and B, we can derive 
Nash equilibria concerning the tax rates γ A and γ B.187 This can be done for any 
combination of full-percentage tax rates.  
Given this scenario in which both countries have γ j=0, the best response tax rate of 
one country, given zero taxation in the other country, is γ j=8%.188 The deviator 
achieves a welfare increase at the expense of the other country (i.e., WA= 143.078 
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 Furthermore, tests of stability of this model confirm this notion of equilibrium. A convergence of 
equilibria still appears if firms in A and B alternately enter and exit the market. Because this model 
consists of one period only, entry and exit happens immediately off the reel.  
188
 See derivations XIV and XV in Appendix 3.4 for tables summarizing all responses to Bγ =0% or 
Aγ =0%.  
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with WB=135.185 if A deviates and WB=142.566 with WA=135.687 if B deviates). 
Instead, a social planner will deviate from this solution because total welfare declines 
in this scenario compared to the zero taxation setting described previously. 
  
Selecting γ j=8%, the deviator achieves a welfare increase in its jurisdiction because 
households in this country benefit from a bigger mass of firms entering the market. 
This is associated with a larger market size and is due to love for variety preferences. 
Furthermore, a positive per-capita lump-sum transfer to households in this country is 
achieved. 
Also a negative impact of γ j=8% is generated in this jurisdiction because fewer 
cheap differentiated goods from MNEs are available. Although imports also occur, 
these are more expensive than goods supplied by MNEs.  
In total, the positive impact outweighs the negative. For this reason, welfare in j 
increases because of γ j=8% if profits in the other country are not taxed.  
In this scenario, households in the other country suffer from fewer firms entering the 
market there because the mass of their domestic firms declines dramatically. On the 
one hand, more cheap goods from MNEs are available for households in this 
country. On the other hand, as expected profits are competed to zero, fewer national 
firms enter this market; and households suffer from fewer available varieties. In 
addition to fewer domestically produced varieties being available, the increased 
market share of the MNEs reflects not only more varieties from MNEs but also single 
MNEs output, which does not increase utility of household due to love for variety 
preferences. Because the increased market share of MNEs does not increase 
welfare to the same extent, the negative impact of market shares cannot be 
compensated by an increased market share of MNEs in B due to love for variety 
preferences. Because taxation in this country is not applied, a per-capita lump-sum 
transfer does not arise here. In sum, welfare in this country declines compared to the 
situation without profit taxation in both countries. 
Given the described situation for the heretofore non-deviating country, we find the 
best-response tax rate to γ j=8% at 7% instead of zero taxation.189 Hence, the 
constellation of γ j=8% as response to zero taxation is not stable. 
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 See derivations XVI and XVII in Appendix 3.4 for tables summarizing all responses to Bγ =8% 
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The country responding on γ j=8% achieves a welfare increase at the expense of the 
other country (i.e., WA= 138.555 with WB=138.326 if A responds with γ j=7%, and 
WB=138.129 with WA=138.847 if B responds with γ j=7%). 
Increased welfare in the country selecting a tax rate of 7% instead of zero taxation, 
therefore, is due to more available varieties of differentiated goods for consumers 
there. Because of taxation, fewer products from MNEs are available for them, but 
more goods from domestic and exporting firms are supplied.   
In this scenario, taxation induces positive welfare implications due to love for variety 
preferences and positive tax revenue compared to the previous scenario without 
taxation in this jurisdiction. 
The 8%-7% tax rate constellation is a stable equilibrium. This can be seen, because 
the best response for A given γ B=7% again is γ A=8% and the best response for B 
given γ A=7% again is γ B=8%. Hence, this combination of tax rates is the best-
response for one another.190 Although both countries generate lower welfare than 
without taxation these are stable equilibria in contrast to a zero taxation scenario, 
because every country has incentive to deviate.  
Graphic 3.7 is a summary of the results of best-response taxes and shows the two 
stable equilibria. 
 
Graphic 3.7: 
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 See derivations XVIII and XIX in Appendix 3.4 for tables summarizing all responses to Bγ =7% 
and Aγ =7%. 
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These stable equilibrium tax rates are identical with those for symmetric countries; 
but the conditions of consistency, foremost the implications on welfare, differ in 
magnitude to the previous analysis. Obviously, the exact values of optimal tax rates, 
as well as the results of these values in both settings with symmetric and asymmetric 
countries, only occur due to the selected parameter configurations. 
From both individual and world welfare perspectives, a non-cooperative tax setting 
results in inefficiently high tax rates.  
Governments are completely informed when setting tax rates. For this reason, they 
both know that the other has an incentive to deviate from zero taxation. Considering 
this, welfare in its own jurisdiction is maximized considering the tax rate the other 
country selects. Hence, zero taxation is not a stable choice for either country, even 
though it will deliver the highest welfare for each of them. 
Therefore, the zero taxation scenario can only be obtained under reliable cooperation 
(i.e., with a social planner) because each single government has incentive to deviate.  
 
3.2.6 Outline  
Support for the here derived result of inefficient tax rates selected by governments in 
a non-cooperative tax setting is found in other trade literature and empirical 
studies.191 
In this analysis, we utilize an alternative approach depending on exogenously given 
parameters such as transport costs, fixed costs, the resulting endogeneity of 
integration strategies, endogenous market entry, and heterogeneity of firms. 
 
3.2.6.1 The role of the constellation of exogenously given parameters  
In our model, cut-off levels are derived between domestic, exporting producers, and 
MNE producers. These depend on exogenously given parameters. 
At the first cut-off, firm productivity is such that additional profits of exporting exactly 
results in zero profits: 
( ) αα−
α
µ−
α
α−
α−α
=θ )1(
j
)1()1(
ex
ex/d
)1(s
tXf
                       (3.20)                               
       
                                            
191
 For a survey see Davies and Eckel (2007), Zodrow (2003), Wilson (1999), Sinn (1990) and Razin 
and Sadka (1991). 
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The critical productivity level in (3.20) increases with increasing t, fex, and market size 
X. Hence, the indifferent firm must be more productive to break even. 
Additionally, the cut-off productivity depends on the country size sj. The larger the 
foreign country sj, the smaller productivity of a firm must be for the export strategy to 
become reasonable.  
The next threshold is the productivity level at which profits of an exporting firm equal 
the profits of an MNE: 
( ) α
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                 (3.21) 
 
The critical productivity level in (3.21) increases with increasing overhead costs (fi – 
fex), an increasing market size X, decreasing transport costs t, increasing jγ , and a 
decreasing sj. An increasing i/exθ  is associated with a smaller mass of firms selecting 
MNE strategies.  
Furthermore, only if )1(j t)1( α−
α−
>γ−  does a real and unique solution exist. If the 
parameter configuration of the transport costs t, the tax rate jγ , and α  does not 
satisfy this condition, MNE activities do not exist. 
 
Alternatively, certain configurations of parameters may result in a situation in which 
domestic firms integrate directly as MNEs instead of choosing the export strategy. 
The following cut-off level is the relevant productivity threshold if i/dθ < ex/dθ :   
( ) αα−
α
µ−
α
α−
α−γ−α
=θ )1(
jj
)1()1(
i
i/d
)1)(1(s
Xf
                  (3.22) 
 
The critical productivity level in (3.22) increases with increasing fi and an increasing 
market size X. Additionally, the cut-off productivity depends on the country size sj and  
jγ . The smaller the foreign country sj and the higher the tax rate jγ , the higher the 
productivity of a firm must be for the MNE strategy to become reasonable.  
 
For i/dθ < ex/dθ  so that this cut-off level exists, the following condition must hold: 
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As can be seen from the cut-off levels the mass of firms selecting an integration 
strategy, as well as which strategies are optimal to select at all, depends on 
exogenously given parameters. These dependencies in a setting with heterogeneous 
firms distinguish this model from the latest literature.192 
 
3.2.6.2 The role of endogenous market entry and market size 
In this model, the mass of firms in equilibrium results endogenously because 
expected profits are competed to zero until the last firm entering the market 
generates zero profits. With the inclusion of this endogeneity, we can analyze the 
implications of national and international policy decisions on integration modi of 
heterogeneous firms. Taxation influences not only entry of MNEs and exporting firms 
into the market but also the mass of domestic firms.  
Given a specific tax rate, the exact composition of prevailing integration strategies in 
this country is due to the constitution of competition. For example, if a tax rate 
increases, fewer MNEs enter the market; and, depending on the size of transport 
costs, they also may refrain from becoming exporters. Then, fewer firms will supply 
demand in this country and expected profits will increase. Therefore, the output of 
each single firm is influenced; and more domestic firms can enter the market, 
competing expected profits to zero. Hence, equilibria with different tax rates are 
determined by other compositions of integration strategies and other masses of firms 
producing individual optimal outputs. This endogenous market size and especially 
further entry of domestic firms in a setting with heterogeneous firms distinguishes this 
model from the latest literature.193  
 
3.2.6.3 The role of heterogeneity 
In our model, stable equilibria are obtained with a 8%-7% tax setting scenario. This is 
driven by the incentive of each government to deviate unilaterally from zero taxation 
to induce positive impacts on welfare in its jurisdiction. This influence on welfare is 
characterized by following implications: 
                                            
192
 As in Davies and Eckel (2007). 
193
 As in Davies, Egger, and Egger (2009). 
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The mass of firms in its country increases. Increased welfare, therefore, results in 
more available varieties of differentiated goods for consumers there. Although more 
goods from domestic and exporting firms are supplied, fewer products from MNEs 
are available for them, induced by taxation. For the unilaterally deviating country, the 
overall impact in this scenario is that taxation induces positive welfare implications 
due to love for variety preferences and positive tax revenue, even though fewer 
cheap goods supplied by MNEs are available. 
The extent of more domestic firms entering the market in this analysis also depends 
on the distribution of firms over productivity levels. In this analysis, a uniform 
distribution F(θ) is assumed. The specification of an alternative distribution function, 
therefore, may induce different results. The assumption of a distribution G(θ)  in 
which the mass of firms increases with productivity so that many MNEs and few 
domestic firms exist, will slow the stimulating effect on domestic firms to enter the 
market if positive tax rates are selected. 
Hence, an increase in the profit tax rate of a single government has the following 
implications: 
Because an increase in the profit tax rate induces some MNEs not to enter the 
market and expected profits are competed to zero, alternatively integrated firms can 
enter the market and the outputs of single firms are adjusted. Depending on the 
distribution function, the composition of the mass of firms selecting different 
integration strategies then differs. For this reason, if G(θ) instead of F(θ) is applied, 
fewer domestic firms can enter the market and single optimal output adjusts 
according to endogenous market entry conditions. Obviously, the extent of the 
resulting implications depends on the exact parameter configuration. However, the 
impact of F(θ) with more firms with lower single output is always positive for 
consumers due to love for variety preferences. If, instead of F(θ), now G(θ) is 
applied, this impact on welfare concerning more available varieties is dampened. 
Instead, the outputs of the single firms will be increasingly influenced.   
Another positive impact on utility of the representative household is achieved by 
providing a lump-sum transfer. An additional lump-sum transfer only is used to 
finance the consumption of 0x  and the homogeneous good is appreciated less than 
differentiated goods. According to (3.1), the impact of transfer on welfare is not 
extensive.  
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The third impact of taxation on welfare concerns some MNEs providing cheaper 
goods not entering the market. This has negative implications for the representative 
household, because these relatively cheap varieties are not supplied.   
 
In an analysis with the here described distribution function G(θ), love for variety 
preferences will be satisfied less than in the analysis with F(θ). Previously, in the 
analysis with F(θ), the positive impact on welfare by unilaterally deviating from the 
cooperative zero tax setting scenario is mainly driven by higher satisfaction of these 
preferences. With this alternative distribution of firms G(θ), fewer domestic firms will 
enter the market and far fewer cheap varieties supplied by MNEs will be available for 
consumers in this jurisdiction.  
Hence, in contrast to F(θ), this distribution function G(θ) will more likely result in a 
negative impact of taxation (i.e., the negative impact of fewer cheaper varieties 
provided by MNEs can be more influential than the positive implication given by tax 
revenue and stimulated market entry satisfying love for variety preferences). 
Obviously, the results depend on the exact parameter configurations; but for 
configurations that ensure this described impact of G(θ) zero taxation will result in a 
stable equilibrium. In the previous analysis, zero taxation is optimal from a world 
welfare perspective but, unfortunately, is unstable in a non-cooperative tax setting. 
Hence, the results in this analysis are mainly constituted by the exact specification of 
the distribution of firms over productivity and, therefore, due to heterogeneity.  
 
3.3 Conclusion  
 
We develop a model with heterogeneous firms to derive welfare maximizing profit tax 
rates set by benevolent planners. Heretofore, governments levy withholding tax rates 
on profits earned by subsidiaries of MNEs located in their countries. When selecting 
these optimal tax rates governments take their impact on the optimal integration 
strategies of firms, as well as on market entry and market sizes, into account.  
The integration strategies chosen depend on the individual productivity level of a firm. 
Given their productivity levels, firms maximize profits, considering relative sizes of 
fixed costs, transport costs, country and market sizes, per-unit variable costs, and the  
degree of profit taxation of governments. 
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Therefore, each firm individually either selects domestic production, an exporting 
strategy, or MNE activities as optimal; the composition of the prevailing strategies is 
determined endogenously, depending on the withholding profit tax rates chosen by 
the governments. These described behavioral modifications of integration strategies 
of heterogeneous firms responding to economic policy interventions are included in 
the considerations of the government. Due to the incorporation of several 
endogenous variables, especially market entry and market size, this utilitarian 
maximization of welfare is solved numerically in this analysis, considering identical 
and differing country sizes. 
Numerical analysis with identical country sizes results in a zero taxation scenario that 
can only be obtained under cooperation of governments (i.e., from a social planner’s 
perspective). An incentive for a government to deviate unilaterally from a zero 
taxation scenario is given in a non-cooperative setting. Because this can be 
anticipated by the other government, both governments deviate from the zero 
taxation scenario, resulting in inefficiently high tax rates, which are stable Nash 
equilibria. The constellation of these profit tax rates is characterized by lower welfare 
for both jurisdictions than without taxation. Because of the unilateral incentive to 
deviate from a scenario without taxation, the zero taxation scenario is not stable in a 
non-cooperative setting, although it generates the highest welfare from a world 
welfare perspective.    
 
Numerical analysis, assuming one country to be marginally larger than the other, 
results in the same optimal tax rates in equilibrium (i.e., a social planner selects a 
zero taxation scenario to be optimal considering welfare in both countries; and in a 
non-cooperative tax setting, stable Nash equilibria with inefficiently high tax rates are 
obtained). In comparison to the analysis with identical country sizes, we emphasize 
the implication of these differing country sizes on welfare of the representative 
household in both countries. Our main finding in this context is that not only the 
welfare of the assumed marginally larger country is given to be higher but also the 
welfare in the exogenously given smaller country is higher because of a larger world 
demand than in the numerical analysis with identical country sizes. 
 
In conclusion, using our model, we derive inefficiently high tax rates in a non-
cooperative setting and zero taxation from a social planner’s perspective when 
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governments act as benevolent planners and set withholding tax rates on profits 
earned by subsidiaries of MNEs in their countries. Based on our results and the 
existence of only a little research regarding withholding tax rates with MNE activity, 
we are motivated to do further research. 
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3.4 Appendix  
 
Derivation I: 
We use the utility function in (3.1), 
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This paper applies X=


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j di)i(x1  which denotes the sub-utility, respectively the market size as 
specifiable as Xd,ex,i in (3.4), Xd,i in (3.5) and Xd,ex in (3.6). 
 
 
Derivation II: 
The derivation of the profit maximizing output is shown in the following: 
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The derivation of the optimal price is shown in the following: 
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The domestic firm i applies the price pj(i) in country j.  
The maximum attainable profits for a domestic firm i from country j therefore are given by: 
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Derivation III: 
The derivation of the optimal output of exports of a firm i from country A is derived as following: 
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The derivation of the optimal price for exports to B of a firm i from A: 
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Maximum attainable profits of an exporting firm i from country A therefore are given by: 
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Derivation IV: 
In contrast to a domestic firm, multinational profits of an MNE bear higher fixed costs fi>fd and an MNE 
pays taxes jγ  on the difference between sales and variable costs.   
The derivation of the optimal output of an MNE from A supplying the market in B by a subsidiary in B 
is given by: 
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The derivation of the optimal price supplying the market in B therefore is shown by: 
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Maximum attainable profits of an MNE i from country A therefore are given by: 
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Derivation V: 
Derivation of cut-off level ex/dθ  
We derive the productivity level that at least additionally guarantees zero profit from exporting. In this 
situation the exporting firm generates zero profit from D and, hence, is indifferent whether to engage in 
export activities or not. Firms with productivity levels just above this threshold benefit from exporting: 
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Firms that are at least as productive as i/dex/d θ<θ engage in the exporting strategy. 
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Derivation VI: 
Derivation of cut-off level i/exθ  
The next threshold is characterized by a productivity level at which exporting and multinational firms 
have the same profit. Firms with productivity levels above this level engage in a multinational activity. 
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Firms producing with productivity i/exθ  are indifferent whether to choose the multinational or exporting 
strategy or not. A firm with productivity )i(θ  just above i/exθ  engages in a multinational strategy and 
generates positive profits from this activity. 
 
Derivation VII: 
Derivation and analysis of cut-off level i/dθ  
The next cut-off level characterizes a situation where the export strategy does not exist. Firms in this 
scenario directly integrate their firm following an MNE activity. The following condition has to be 
satisfied: 
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Firms that satisfy the following condition integrate their firm as an MNE, the export strategy does not 
exist: 
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Derivation VIII: Mathematica- Input 
fd:=0.0014 
fex:=.0015 
fin:=.0017 
α :=0.75 
µ :=0.6 
θmin:=0 
θmax:=30 
F[θ_]:=(θ-θmin)/(θmax-θmin) 
inr[θ_,n_]:=n F[θ] 
θ[i_,n_]:=Piecewise[{{-1,i<0||i>n},{i (θmax-θmin)/n +θmin,i≥0 &&in}}] 
x[θ_, X_,t_]:= (α θ)^(1/(1-α))/((t)^(1/(1-α)) X^((1-µ)/(1-α))) 
θde[ X_,s_,t_] :=t fex^((1-α) / α) X^((1-µ) / α) /(α (s (1-α))^((1-α)/α)) 
ide[n_,X_,s_,t_]:=inr[θde[X,s,t],n] 
θei [ X_,s_,t_,γ_]:=If[γ≥1-t^(-α/(1-α)),∞, (fin-fex)^((1-α)/α) X^((1-µ)/α)/(α (s (1-α))^((1-
α) /α) (1-γ-t^(-α/(1-α)))^((1-α)/α))] 
iei[n_,X_,s_,t_,γ_]:=inr[θei[X,s,t,γ],n] 
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θdi[X_,s_,t_,γ_] :=fin^((1-α)/α) X^((1-µ)/α)/(α (s (1-γ) (1-α))^((1-α)/α)) 
idi[n_,X_,s_,t_,γ_]:=inr[θdi[X,s,t,γ],n] 
Yd[nA_,X_,t_]:=NIntegrate[(1/α) (x[ θ[i,nA],X,0,1])^α,{i,0,nA}] 
Yex[nB_,X_,s_,t_,γ_]:=If[ide[nB,X,s,t]<Min[iei[nB,X,s,t,γ],nB],NIntegrate[(1/α) (x[ 
θ[i,nB],X,t])^α,{i,ide[nB,X,s,t],Min[iei[nB,X,s,t,γ],nB]}],0] 
Yin[nB_,X_,s_,t_,γ_]:= NIntegrate[(1/α) (x[ 
θ[i,nB],X,0,1])^α,{i,Min[nB,Max[iei[nB,X,s,t,γ],idi[nB,X,s,t,γ]]],nB}] 
Y[nA_,nB_,X_,s_,t_,γ_]:=Yd[nA,X,t]+Yex[nB,X,s,t,γ]+Yin[nB,X,s,t,γ] 
Xm[nA_,nB_,s_,t_,γ_]:=(k=0;X0=1000;Z0=Y[nA,nB,X0,s,t,γ]-X0;d=20*2^(-
k);X1=X0+d;Z1=Y[nA,nB,X1,s,t,γ]-X1;X2=N[(d Z0+X0 Z0-X0 Z1)/(Z0-
Z1)];While[Abs[X2-X0]>.00001&&k<15,X0=X2;k++;Z0=Y[nA,nB,X0,s,t,γ]-
X0;d=20*2^(-k);X1=X0+d;Z1=Y[nA,nB,X1,s, t, γ]-X1;X2=N[(d Z0+X0 Z0-X0 Z1)/(Z0-
Z1)]];X2) 
Gd[i_,nA_,nB_,s_,t_,γ_]:=s x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nA,nB,s,t,γ],0,1] (1/(α θ[i,nA]))-s 
x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nA,nB,s,t,γ],0,1]/θ[i,nA]-fd 
Gin[i_,nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]:=(1-γB) (sB x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],0,1] (1/(α 
θ[i,nA]))-sB x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],0,1]/θ[i,nA])-fin 
Gex[i_,nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]:= sB x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],τB,t] (t/(α θ[i,nA]))-  sB 
x[θ[i,nA],Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],t] t/θ[i,nA]-fex 
EGd[nA_,nB_,sA_,t_,γA_]:=NIntegrate[Gd[i,nA,nB,sA,t,γA],{i,0,nA}] 
EGex[nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]:=If[ide[nA,Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],sB,t]<Min[iei[nA,Xm[nB,nA,
sB,t,γB],sB,t,γB],nA],NIntegrate[Gex[i,nA,nB,sB,t,γB],{i,ide[nA,Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],sB
t],Min[iei[nA,Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],sB,t,γB],nA]}],0] 
EGin[nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]:=NIntegrate[Gin[i,nA,nB,sB,t,γB],{i,Min[nA,Max[iei[nA,Xm[
nB,nA,sB,t,γB],sB,t,γB],idi[nA,Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],sB,t,γB]]],nA}] 
EG[nA_,nB_,sA_,sB_,t_,γA_,γB_]:=EGd[nA,nB,sA,t,γA]+EGex[nA,nB,sB,t,γB]+EGin
[nA,nB,sB,t,γB] 
Firms[nB_,sA_,sB_,t_,γA_,γB_]:=(N1=2^10;K=10;While[EG[N1,nB,sA,sB,t,γA,γB]>0,
N1=2 N1;K=K+1];K=K-2;N1=N1-2^K;While[K>-4,K=K-1; 
If[EG[N1,nB,sA,sB,t,γA,γB]>0,N1=N1+2^K,N1=N1-2^K]];Return[N1]) 
MYd[nA_,X_,s_,t_]:= NIntegrate[1/(α  θ[i,nA]) x[ θ[i,nA],X,0,1],{i,0,nA}] 
MYex[nB_,X_,s_,t_,γA_]:=If[ide[nB,X,s,t]<Min[iei[nB,X,s,t,γA],nB],NIntegrate[ t/(α  
θ[i,nB]) (x[ θ[i,nB],X,t]),{i,ide[nB,X,s,t],Min[iei[nB,X,s,t,γA],nB]}],0] 
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MYin[nB_,X_,s_,t_,γA_]:= NIntegrate[1/(α  θ[i,nB]) (x[ 
θ[i,nB],X,0,1]),{i,Min[nB,Max[iei[nB,X,s,t,γA],idi[nB,X,s,t,γA]]],nB}] 
TinB[i_,nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]:=(Gin[i,nA,nB,sB,t,γB]+fin)*γB/(1-γB) 
ETinB[nA_,nB_,sB_,t_,γB_]:=NIntegrate[TinB[i,nA,nB,sB,t,γB],{i,Min[nA,Max[iei[nA,X
m[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],sB,t,γB],idi[nA,Xm[nB,nA,sB,t,γB],sB,t,γB]]],nA}] 
 
Targetfile="DatenPIII.dat" 
Equilibrium[sA_,sB_,t_,γA_,γB_]:=(nA0=2000;nB0=2000;J=0;nA1=N[Firms[nB0,sA,s
B,t,γA_,γB_]];nB1=N[Firmsl[nA0,sB,sA,t,γB,γA]];nA2=N[Firms[nB1,sA,sB,t,γA,γB]];n
B2=N[Firms[nA1,sB,sA,t,γB,γA]];nA3=N[nA2-nA1 nA2-nA1 nB1+nA1 nA2 nB1+nA1 
nB2-nA2 nB2/(1-nA1-nB1+nA2 nB1+nA1 nB2-nA2 nB2)];nB3=N[(nB1-1)/(nA2-nA1) 
(nA3-nA1)+1];Print[{J,N[nA3],N[nB3]}];While[(Abs[nA3-nA0] >20|| Abs [nB3-
nB0]>20)&&J<50, nA0=nA3; nB0=nB3; nA1=Firms[nB0,sA,sB,t,γA,γB] ; 
nB1=Firms[nA0,sB,sA,t,γB,γA];nA2=Firms[nB1,sA,sB,t,γA_,γB_];nB2=Firms[nA1,s
B,sA,,t,γB,γA];nA3=N[nA2-nA1 nA2-nA1 nB1+nA1 nA2 nB1+nA1 nB2-nA2 nB2/(1-
nA1-nB1+nA2 nB1+nA1 nB2-nA2 nB2)];nB3=N[(nB1-1)/(nA2-nA1) (nA3-nA1)+1]; 
J++;Print[{J,nA3,nB3}]];Print[{"Equilibrium",J,nA3,nB3}];NA=nA3;NB=nB3;EGewA=E
G[NA,NB,sA,sB,t,γA,γB];EGewB=EG[NB,NA,sB,sA,t,γB,γA];XMA=Xm[NA,NB,sA,t,γ
A];XMB=Xm[NB,NA,sB,t,γB];YINA=Yin[NB,XMA,sA,t,γA];YINB=Yin[NA,XMB,sB,t,γB]
;YEXA=Yex[NB,XMA,sA,t,γA];YEXB=Yex[NA,XMB,sB,t,γB];YDA=Yd[NA,XMA,t];YD
B=Yd[NB,XMB,t];MYDA=MYd[NA,XMA,sA,t];MYDB=MYd[NB,XMB,sB,t];MYEXA=MY
ex[NB,XMA,sA,t,γA];MYEXB=MYex[NA,XMB,sB,t,γB];MYINA=MYin[NB,XMA,sA,t,γ
A];MYINB=MYin[NA,XMB,sB,t,γB];UA=1/µ (YDA+YINA+YEXA)^µ;UB=1/µ 
(YDB+YINB+YEXB)^µ;MA=MYDA+MYEXA+MYINA;MB=MYDB+MYEXB+MYINB;W
A=UA-MA+(1/sA) ETinB[NB,NA,sA,t,γA];WB=UB-MB+(1/sB) 
ETinB[NA,NB,sB,t,γB];Ergebnis={DateString[],sA,sB,t,γA,γB,NA,NB,EGewA,EGewB,
XMA,XMB,YDA,YDB,YEXA,YEXB,YINA,YINB,MYDA,MYDB,MYEXA,MYEXB,MYINA
,MYINB,(1/sA) ETinB[NB,NA,sA,t,γA],(1/sB) ETinB[NA,NB,sB,t,γB], 
UA,UB,MA,MB,WA,WB};Print[Result];PutAppend[Result,Targetfile]) 
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Derivation IX: 
Welfare implications with identical country sizes 
γA/γB 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
0% 139.023; 139.023 138.508; 139.793  137.843; 140.411 137.204; 140.970 136.631; 141.449 136.128; 141.862
1% 139.793; 138.508  138.934; 138.934 138.442; 139.654 137.825; 140.219 137.256; 140.701 136.752; 141.118
2% 140.411; 137.843 139.654; 138.442 138.842; 138.842 138.388; 139.508 137.836; 139.994 137.337; 140.404
3% 140.970; 137.204 140.219; 137.825 139.508; 138.388 138.742; 138.742 138.337; 139.326 137.854; 139.740
4% 141.449; 136.631 140.701; 137.256 139.994; 137.836 139.326; 138.337 138.633; 138.633 138.281; 139.132
5% 141.862; 136.128 141.118; 136.752 140.404; 137.337 139.740; 137.854 139.132; 138.281 138.519; 138.519
6% 142.194; 135.707 141.443; 136.329 140.729; 136.912 140.057; 137.432 139.463; 137.875 138.916; 138.223
7% 142.432; 135.386 141.678; 135.999 140.955; 136.580 140.281; 137.097 139.675; 137.541 139.130; 137.903
8% 142.555; 135.183 141.788; 135.791 141.049; 136.365 140.369; 136.876 139.747; 137.318 139.155; 137.607
9% 142.545; 135.134 141.744; 135.737 140.986; 136.302 140.274; 136.808 139.616; 137.247 139.046; 137.607
10% 142.544; 135.135 141.754; 135.734 140.987; 136.303 140.275; 136.810 139.617; 137.254 139.041; 137.611
 
 
 
γA/γB 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
0% 135.707; 142.194 135.386; 142.432 135.183; 142.555 135.134; 142.545 135.135; 142.544
1% 136.329; 141.443 135.999; 141.678 135.791; 141.788 135.737; 141.744 135.734; 141.754
2% 136.912, 140.729 136.580; 140.955 136.365; 141.049 136.302; 140.986 136.303; 140.987
3% 137.432; 140.057 137.097; 140.281 136.876; 140.369 136.808; 140.274 136.810; 140.275
4% 137.875; 139.463 137.541; 139.675 137.318; 139.747 137.247; 139.616 137.254; 139.617
5% 138.223; 138.916 137.903; 139.130 137.681; 139.197 137.607; 139.046 137.611; 139.041
6% 138.356; 138.356 138.162; 138.662 137.953; 138.727 137.875; 138.553 137.881; 138.533
7% 138.662; 138.162 138.204; 138.204 138.082; 138.319 138.023; 138.153 138.033; 138.118
8% 138.727; 137.953 138.319; 138.083 138.002; 138.002 137.996; 137.853 138.010; 137.804
9% 138.553; 137.875 138.153; 138.023 137.853; 137.996 137.689; 137.689 137.712; 137.634
10% 138.533; 137.881 138.118; 138.033 137.804; 138.010 137.634; 137.712 137.635; 137.635
 
 
Derivation X: 
Best-response tax rates given %0B =γ  
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 15239 15239 4313 4313 2516 2516 0 0 1798 1798 0 0 139.023 139.023
1% 17038 13538 4348 4287 2786 2251 0 0 1562 2035 0.102 0 139.793 138.508
2% 18784 11742 4376 4252 3047 1972 0 0 1329 2281 0.174 0 140.411 137.843
3% 20454 10014 4403 4219 3293 1697 49 0 1061 2522 0.208 0 140.971 137.204
4% 21954 8455 4428 4190 3511 1445 99 0 818 2745 0.213 0 141.449 136.631
5% 23292 7065 4451 4164 3703 1216 144 0 604 2948 0.197 0 141.862 136.128
6% 24427 5887 4470 4143 3863 1020 188 0 419 3123 0.163 0 142.194 135.707
7% 25328 4960 4485 4127 3990 863 236 0 259 3263 0.118 0 142.432 135.386
8% 25974 4316 4494 4116 4081 753 301 0 112 3363 0.057 0 142.555 135.183
9% 26251 4070 4497 4114 4122 711 375 0 0 3403 0 0 142.545 135.134
10% 26250 4071 4497 4114 4122 711 375 0 0 3403 0 0 142.544 135.135
 
 
Derivation XI: 
Best-response tax rates given %8A =γ  
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 25974 4316 4494 4116 4081 753 301 0 112 3363 0.058 0 142.555 135.183
1% 24374 4316 4452 4137 3873 1026 409 0 170 3111 0.088 0.208 141.787 135.789
2% 24374 4316 4412 4157 3662 1290 513 0 237 2867 0.124 0.384 141.049 136.365
3% 21277 8991 4374 4176 3453 1542 612 99 308 2534 0.161 0.507 140.369 136.876
4% 19832 10445 4340 4195 3249 1782 706 220 385 2193 0.202 0.585 139.747 137.317
5% 18501 11740 4307 4209 3059 1996 788 358 460 1855 0.243 0.617 139.155 137.607
6% 17267 13073 4283 4227 2874 2211 873 522 536 1494 0.283 0.596 138.727 137.953
7% 16156 14233 4260 4238 2707 2400 946 728 608 1110 0.322 0.516 138.319 138.082
8% 15225 15225 4242 4242 2564 2564 1008 1008 671 671 0.356 0.356 138.002 138.002
9% 16236 14538 4250 4241 2728 2449 1431 1074 91 717 0.054 0.381 137.852 137.995
10% 16356 14469 4250 4241 2748 2437 1502 1082 0 722 0 0.383 137.804 138.012
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Derivation XII: 
Best-response tax rates given %7B =γ  
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 4960 25328 4127 4485 863 3990 0 236 3263 259 0 0.118 135.386 142.432
1% 6624 23641 4148 4443 1146 3766 0 312 3002 364 0.201 0.166 135.999 141.678
2% 8254 21984 4169 4402 1419 3541 0 385 2749 476 0.367 0.218 136.581 140.955
3% 9838 20380 4189 4364 1682 3317 95 456 2412 592 0.482 0.271 137.097 140.281
4% 11332 18877 4208 4330 1927 3102 210 521 2072 707 0.551 0.325 137.541 139.674
5% 12732 17474 4226 4299 2154 2896 339 582 1733 822 0.576 0.379 137.903 139.129
6% 14005 16212 4240 4272 2360 2707 492 636 1389 929 0.553 0.431 138.161 138.661
7% 15084 15084 4246 4246 2537 2537 681 681 1028 1028 0.477 0.477 138.204 138.204
8% 16156 14233 4260 4238 2707 2400 946 728 608 1110 0.322 0.516 138.319 138.082
9% 17143 13490 4266 4233 2867 2277 1333 772 66 1184 0.039 0.550 138.153 138.023
10% 17235 13434 4266 4234 2882 2268 1384 776 0 1190 0 0.550 138.117 138.032
 
 
Derivation XIII:  
Welfare implications with asymmetric country sizes 
γA/γB 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
0% 139.829; 139.201 139.002; 139.787 138.353; 140.421 137.714; 140.981 137.141; 141.461 136.637; 141.876
1% 140.322; 138.524 139.521; 139.065 138.928; 139.653 138.327; 140.232 137.758; 140.725 137.255; 141.132
2% 140.938; 137.847 140.179; 138.464 139.425; 138.975 138.863; 139.495 138.332;  140.013 137.835; 140.421
3% 141.486; 137.206 140.742; 137.836 140.016; 138.414 139.298; 138.858 138.803; 139.313 138.344; 139.758
4% 141.965; 136.631 141.215; 137.265 140.503; 137.854 139.832; 138.367 139.188; 138.754 138.741; 139.118
5% 142.371; 136.131 141.623; 136.761 140.914; 137.352 140.246; 137.876 139.634; 138.316 139.071; 138.632
6% 142.706; 135.712 141.952; 136.338 141.233; 136.928 140.566; 137.452 139.967; 137.901 139.418; 138.261
7% 142.948; 135.388 142.194; 136.008 141.463; 136.595 140.794; 137.115 140.184; 137.565 139.636; 137.933
8% 143.078; 135.185 142.306; 135.798 141.573; 136.376 140.883; 136.895 140.348; 137.289 139.711; 137.707
9% 143.075; 135.136 142.282; 135.741 141.521; 136.312 140.796; 136.826 140.236; 137.215 139.561; 137.631
10% 143.075; 135.137 142.281; 135.742 141.521; 136.313 140.797; 136.828 140.240; 137.218 139.557; 137.635
 
 
 
γA/γB 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
0% 136.278; 142.132 135.893; 142.452 135.687; 142.565 135.642; 142.537 135.642; 142.537
1% 136.832; 141.456 136.503; 141.689 136.293; 141.791 136.236; 141.747 136.238; 141.747
2% 137.410; 140.744 137.078; 140.966 136.860; 141.062 136.798; 140.993 136.799; 140.990
3% 137.924; 140.083 137.591; 140.294 137.370; 140.373 137.304; 140.267 137.306; 140.269
4% 138.359; 139.468 138.031; 139.689 137.808; 139.757 137.738; 139.620 137.741; 139.622
5% 138.687; 138.918 138.387; 139.145 138.167; 139.204 138.097; 139.042 138.101; 139.034
6% 138.919; 138.481 138.623; 138.663 138.428; 138.721 138.362; 138.547 138.369; 138.526
7% 139.166; 138.199 138.766; 138.319 138.555; 138.326 138.508; 138.149 138.513; 138.095
8% 139.226; 137.978 138.847; 138.129 138.541; 138.083 138.452; 137.823 138.473; 137.773
9% 139.077; 137.901 138.675; 138.052 138.375; 138.029 138.243; 137.754 138.234; 137.673
10% 139.045; 137.907 138.628; 138.058 138.328; 138.042 138.185; 137.763 138.183; 137.695
 
 
Derivation XIV: 
Best-response tax rates given %0B =γ (sB=1, sA=1.01) 
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 16235 14671 4355 4322 2649 2416 0 0 1706 1907 0 0 139.829 139.201
1% 17781 13061 4375 4287 2885 2164 0 0 1490 2123 0.098 0 140.322 138.524
2% 19550 11191 4404 4252 3147 1879 0 0 1257 2373 0.164 0 140.938 137.847
3% 21212 9464 4431 4220 3390 1604 46 0 995 2616 0.195 0 141.486 137.206
4% 22717 7897 4456 4190 3606 1350 91 0 758 2841 0.197 0 141.965 136.631
5% 24039 6518 4478 4165 3793 1122 132 0 553 3042 0.179 0 142.371 136.131
6% 25170 5340 4496 4143 3951 925 169 0 377 3218 0.147 0 142.706 135.712
7% 26060 4419 4512 4127 4075 769 208 0 229 3358 0.104 0 142.948 135.388
8% 26688 3787 4522 4117 4162 661 263 0 97 3455 0.050 0 143.078 135.185
9% 26945 3555 4525 4114 4199 621 325 0 0 3493 0 0 143.075 135.136
10% 26944 3557 4525 4114 4199 622 325 0 0 3493 0 0 143.075 135.136
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Derivation XV: 
Best-response tax rates given %0A =γ (sB=1, sA=1.01) 
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 16235 14671 4355 4322 2649 2416 0 0 1706 1907 0 0 139.829 139.201
1% 14230 16540 4312 4347 2350 2705 0 0 1962 1642 0 0.108 139.002 139.787
2% 12435 18300 4278 4376 2073 2969 0 0 2206 1407 0 0.184 138.354 140.423
3% 10700 19980 4246 4403 1800 3217 0 52 2446 1134 0 0.222 137.714 140.981
4% 9129 21494 4216 4428 1548 3438 0 107 2668 883 0 0.233 137.141 141.461
5% 7723 22850 4190 4450 1320 3633 0 157 2871 660 0 0.215 136.637 141.876
6% 6529 24004 4168 4469 1122 3796 0 207 3046 464 0 0.181 136.216 142.207
7% 5567 24945 4152 4485 962 3929 0 265 3190 291 0 0.132 135.889 142.449
8% 4902 25619 4142 4494 850 4025 0 342 3292 127 0 0.066 135.687 142.566
9% 4655 25903 4140 4496 807 4068 0 429 3333 0 0 0 135.641 142.537
10% 4656 25901 4140 4496 807 4067 0 429 3332 0 0 0 135.642 142.537
 
 
Derivation XVI: 
Best-response tax rates given %8B =γ (sB=1, sA=1.01) 
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 4902 25619 4142 4494 850 4025 0 342 3292 127 0 0.066 135.687 142.566
1% 6520 23992 4162 4452 1123 3813 0 451 3039 188 0.203 0.098 136.293 141.791
2% 8078 22422 4183 4412 1383 3602 0 555 2799 256 0.374 0.134 136.864 141.062
3% 9613 20881 4203 4374 1637 3389 97 655 2469 330 0.493 0.173 137.374 140.374
4% 11068 19430 4221 4340 1875 3184 214 748 2133 408 0.567 0.215 137.808 139.753
5% 12430 18086 4238 4309 2095 2989 347 835 1796 486 0.596 0.256 138.168 139.209
6% 13693 16850 4253 4282 2299 2806 506 914 1448 562 0.576 0.297 138.428 138.721
7% 14821 15768 4263 4260 2481 2642 705 985 1077 633 0.499 0.336 138.555 138.326
8% 15825 14889 4271 4246 2643 2505 979 1048 649 696 0.343 0.368 138.544 138.083
9% 16820 14172 4277 4242 2805 2387 1385 1113 87 742 0.052 0.394 138.375 138.029
10% 16938 14102 4277 4242 2824 2375 1453 1121 0 746 0 0.396 138.328 138.043
 
 
Derivation XVII: 
Best-response tax rates given %8A =γ (sB=1, sA=1.01) 
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 26688 3787 4522 4117 4162 661 263 0 97 3455 0 0 143.078 135.185
1% 25075 5396 4480 4137 3955 936 371 0 154 3200 0.081 0.215 142.306 135.798
2% 23500 6962 4440 4157 3747 1201 474 0 219 2956 0.114 0.396 141.573 136.376
3% 21952 8508 4402 4179 3536 1460 575 102 290 2615 0.152 0.524 140.881 136.895
4% 20693 9787 4372 4193 3361 1671 658 230 354 2292 0.186 0.611 140.348 137.289
5% 19150 11348 4337 4213 3141 1927 757 351 440 1915 0.231 0.637 139.711 137.707
6% 17893 12646 4310 4227 2956 2138 838 541 514 1548 0.272 0.617 139.226 137.978
7% 16791 13825 4288 4239 2791 2330 912 757 585 1153 0.309 0.536 138.847 138.129
8% 15825 14889 4271 4246 2643 2505 979 1048 649 696 0.343 0.368 138.544 138.083
9% 15088 15866 4265 4248 2525 2667 1041 1485 698 96 0.371 0.057 138.452 137.823
10% 15022 15990 4266 4249 2513 2688 1050 1561 702 0 0.372 0 138.473 137.773
 
 
Derivation XVIII: 
Best-response tax rates given %7B =γ (sB=1, sA=1.01) 
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 5567 24945 4152 4485 962 3929 0 265 3190 291 0 0.132 135.889 142.445
1% 7255 23233 4174 4442 1246 3702 0 342 2928 399 0.196 0.182 136.503 141.689
2% 8891 21567 4195 4402 1518 3474 0 415 2677 512 0.357 0.235 137.078 140.966
3% 10478 19957 4215 4364 1778 3248 93 485 2345 630 0.468 0.290 137.591 140.294
4% 11972 18451 4235 4330 2020 3032 204 550 2010 748 0.534 0.344 138.031 139.689
5% 13366 17049 4251 4299 2244 2825 328 610 1678 862 0.557 0.399 138.387 139.145
6% 14620 15783 4265 4271 2446 2636 475 664 1344 971 0.534 0.453 138.623 138.66
7% 15720 14734 4276 4251 2622 2475 661 711 993 1066 0.463 0.495 138.766 138.316
8% 16791 13825 4288 4239 2791 2330 912 757 585 1153 0.309 0.536 138.847 138.129
9% 17750 13088 4293 4234 2946 2209 1284 799 63 1225 0.038 0.570 138.675 138.052
10% 17823 13042 4293 4234 2959 2201 1334 802 0 1230 0 0.572 138.628 138.058
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Derivation XIX: 
Best-response tax rates given %7A =γ (sB=1, sA=1.01) 
 
Tax rate NA NB XmA XmB YdA YdB YexA YexB YINA YINB TinA/sa TinB/sb WA WB
0% 26060 4419 4512 4127 4075 769 208 0 229 3358 0.104 0 142.948 135.388
1% 24360 6099 4470 4148 3852 1055 285 0 333 3093 0.151 0.207 142.193 136.008
2% 22688 7745 4429 4169 3627 1332 359 0 443 2837 0.202 0.379 141.463 136.595
3% 21086 9331 4392 4189 3406 1595 429 99 557 2496 0.255 0.499 140.794 137.115
4% 19565 10845 4357 4209 3190 1844 495 218 679 2147 0.309 0.572 140.184 137.565
5% 17049 13365 4298 4251 2825 2244 610 328 862 1678 0.398 0.557 139.145 138.387
6% 16857 13574 4299 4241 2793 2286 612 511 894 1443 0.413 0.575 139.166 138.199
7% 15720 14734 4276 4251 2622 2475 661 711 993 1066 0.463 0.495 138.766 138.316
8% 14821 15768 4263 4260 2481 2642 705 985 1077 633 0.499 0.336 138.555 138.326
9% 14074 16776 4259 4266 2359 2806 750 1390 1151 69 0.534 0.041 138.508 138.149
10% 14022 16855 4259 4265 2350 2820 753 1445 1156 0 0.536 0 138.513 138.095
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